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CONTENTS

The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding — *Albert O. Hirschman* — 329

Political Decay and the European Revolutions, 1789-1848 — *John R. Gillis* — 344

The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization — *Edward L. Morse* — 371

The Urban Poor: Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities? — *Joan Nelson* — 393

New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World — *Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier* — 415

REVIEW ARTICLES

Soviet Russia: Literature and Life — *Alexander Gerschenkron* — 433

Stability, Transformation, and Regime Interests — *J. David Greenstone* — 448

The Contributors — ii

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THE SEARCH FOR PARADIGMS AS A HINDRANCE TO UNDERSTANDING

By ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN*

IN a recent issue of this journal, Oran Young argued forcefully against the "collection of empirical materials as an end in itself and without sufficient theoretical analysis to determine appropriate criteria of selection."[1] The present paper issues a complementary critique of the opposite failing. Its target is the tendency toward *compulsive and mindless theorizing*—a disease at least as prevalent and debilitating, so it seems to me, as the one described by Oran Young.

While the spread of mindless number-work in the social sciences has been caused largely by the availability of the computer, several factors are responsible for the compulsion to theorize, which is often so strong as to induce mindlessness. In the academy, the prestige of the theorist is towering. Further, extravagant use of language intimates that theorizing can rival sensuous delights: what used to be called an interesting or valuable theoretical point is commonly referred to today as a "stimulating" or even "exciting" theoretical "insight." Moreover, in so far as the social sciences in the United States are concerned, an important role has no doubt been played by the desperate need, on the part of the hegemonic power, for shortcuts to the understanding of multifarious reality that must be coped with and controlled and therefore be understood *at once*. Interestingly enough, revolutionaries experience the same compulsion: while they are fond of quoting Marx to the approximate effect that interpreting the world is not nearly as important as changing it, they are well aware of the enormous strength that is imparted to revolutionary determination by the conviction that one has indeed fully understood social reality and its "laws of change." As a result of these various factors, the quick theoretical fix has taken its place in our culture alongside the quick technical fix.

In the following pages, I do not have a central epistemological theorem to offer that would permit us to differentiate between good and

* The substance of this paper was originally presented at a Conference on Social Science Research and Political Change in Latin America organized by the Centro de investigaciones sociopolíticas para América Latina (CISAL) at Pacific Grove, California, May 9-11, 1969. It was written while the author was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California. David Riesman contributed extensive comments.

[1] Oran R. Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969), 489-90.

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bad theorizing, or between fruitful and sterile paradigmatic thinking. My accent throughout is on the kind of *cognitive style* that hinders, or promotes, understanding. I introduce the topic by a critical look at two books that exemplify opposite styles. Subsequently, I make an attempt to delineate various areas in which an impatience for theoretical formulation leads to serious pitfalls. Theorizing about Latin American society and economy, on the part of both Latin Americans and outside observers, receives special attention because it has been particularly marked by the cognitive style I find unfortunate.

I

John Womack's *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*[2] and James L. Payne's *Patterns of Conflict in Colombia*[3] are the two books I shall use to open the argument. They have in common that they are both by young North American scholars; both, in fact, were originally written as doctoral dissertations; and they were both published early in 1969. But this is where any possible resemblance ends. At this point I should state that both books aroused in me unusually strong feelings: I found Womack's way of telling the Zapata story extraordinarily congenial, while I was strongly repelled by Payne's book in spite of its crispness, cleverness, and occasional flashes of wit. There are of course many striking contrasts between the two books that can account for these opposite reactions, not the least perhaps being that Womack obviously fell in love with revolutionary Mexico and the Zapatistas whereas Payne's treatment exudes dislike and contempt for Colombians in general, and for Colombian politicians in particular. But the more important, and not necessarily related, difference is in the cognitive styles of the two authors. Within the first few pages of his book Payne presents us triumphantly with the key to the full and complete understanding of the Colombian political system. The rest of the book is a demonstration that the key indeed unlocks all conceivable doors of Colombian political life, past, present, and future. Womack, on the other hand, abjures any pretense at full understanding right in the Preface, where he says that his book "is not an analysis but a story because the truth of the revolution in Morelos is in the feeling of it which I could not convey through defining its factors but only through telling of it." "The analysis that I could do," so he continues, "and that I thought pertinent I have tried to weave into the narrative, so that it would issue at the moment right for understanding it" (p. *x*).

[2] New York. [3] New Haven and London.

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And indeed what is remarkable about the book is the continuity of the narrative and the almost complete, one might say Flaubertian, absence from its pages of the author who could have explained, commented, moralized, or drawn conclusions. Yet whoever reads through the book will have gained immeasurably in his understanding not only of the Mexican Revolution, but of peasant revolutions everywhere, and Womack's very reticence and self-effacement stimulate the reader's curiosity and imagination. Payne's book, on the contrary, obviously explains far too much and thereby succeeds only in provoking the reader's resistance and incredulity; the only curiosity it provokes is about the kind of social science that made an obviously gifted young man go so wrong.

Here, then, is the experience behind the title of this paper: understanding as a result of one book without the shadow of a paradigm; and frustration as a result of another in which one paradigm is made to spawn 34 hypotheses (reproduced, for the convenience of the reader, in the book's appendix) covering all aspects of political behavior in Colombia and, incidentally, the United States as well.

Perhaps I should explain briefly what Mr. Payne's basic "insight" or paradigm consists in: politicians in Colombia, he has found out through questionnaires, interviews, and similar devices, are motivated primarily by status considerations rather than by genuine interest in programs and policies, as is predominantly and fortunately the case in the United States. He uses the neutral-sounding terms "status incentive" and "program incentive"; the former characteristically motivates Colombian political leaders whereas the latter animates their North American counterparts. In plain language, occasionally used by the author, Colombian politicians are selfish (p. 70), ambitious, unscrupulous, unprincipled, exceedingly demagogic—interested exclusively in increasing their own power, always ready to betray yesterday's friends and allies, and, to top it all, incapable of having friendly personal relations with anyone because they feel comfortable only with abject supplicants (p. 12). On the other hand, there is the politician with a program incentive whose preferred habitat is the United States of America. *He* enjoys working on concrete policies and achieving a stated goal; hence he is principled, willing to defend unpopular causes, always ready to come to constructive agreements, hard-working, and generally lovable.

For a North American to contrast Colombian and United States politicians in terms of such invidious stereotypes is, to say the least, a distasteful spectacle. We must of course allow for the possibility that truth, as unearthed by the scholar, turns out to be distasteful. But

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Payne does not betray any sense of realizing the unpleasantness of his discovery. On the contrary, he evidently draws much satisfaction from the edifice he has built and takes good care to make sure that there will be no escape from it. At various points he assures us that Colombians are like that; that, as he put it in a subtitle, they are not "on the brink of anything"; that it is futile to expect any change in the pattern of Colombian politics from such incidental happenings as industrialization or urbanization or agrarian reform: like the three characters in Sartre's *Huis Clos*, the 20 million Colombians will just have to go on living in their self-made hell while Mr. Payne, after his seven-month diagnostic visit (from February to September, 1965, as he informs us in the preface), has returned to his own, so much more fortunate section of the hemisphere.

It is easy to show that the Payne model is as wrong as it is outrageous. In the first place, it is unable to explain the very wide swings of Colombian politics; after all, during almost all of the first half of the twentieth century Colombia stood out as a "stable" democracy with peaceful transfers of power from one party to another; throughout the Great Depression of the thirties when almost all other Latin American countries experienced violent political convulsions, constitutional government continued in spite of much social unrest.

This experience is hard to explain by a theory that holds that vicious political in-fighting, untrammeled by any concern with programs or loyalty, holds continuous sway throughout the body politic. Moreover, such a theory ought to take a good look at—and give a special weight to—the body's head: if Payne had done that he might have noticed that his stereotype, the politician with a status incentive, simply does not apply to a number of the most outstanding leaders and recent presidents of Colombia—there is no need to mention names, but it is amusing to quote, in contrast, from a recent portrait of a contemporary President of the United States: "His preoccupation seems to have been success—in this case the achievement of power rather than its use for political purposes."[4]

Supposing even that the diagnosis is essentially correct and that politicians in Colombia are more interested in the quest for power *per se* than in the use of this power for the carrying out of specific programs—what does this "insight" explain? Suppose that we find, as Payne indeed does, that those self-seeking politicians frequently switched sides or vote for demagogic measures, does this finding teach us anything fundamental about the political system, its ability to ac-

[4] Nora Beloff and Michael Davie, "Getting to Know Mr. Nixon," *The Observer*, February 23, 1969.

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commodate change, to solve newly arising problems, to assure peace, justice, and development? It does nothing of the sort, but at best leaves us with the proposition, which incidentally is both platitudinous and wrong, that if the politicians are vicious, the ensuing politics are likely to be vicious too!

Let us pass now from the paradigms of James Payne to John Womack, who has rigorously excluded from his universe any semblance of a paradigm. It is of course impossible to do justice to his narrative. I shall refer here only to one particular turn of the events he describes in order to show how he invites speculation and thereby contributes to the possibility of understanding.

It has perhaps not been sufficiently remarked that the book has *two* protagonists: Zapata dominates the action during the first nine chapters, but in the important last two chapters (80 pages) the leading figure is Gildardo Magaña who became Zapata's ranking secretary after mid-1917 and, after a brief fight for the succession, the chief of the Zapatista movement following Zapata's death in April, 1919. Womack honors Magaña with one of his too-rare character portraits: "From these stresses [of his youth] Gildardo Magaña somehow emerged strong and whole. What he had learned was to mediate: not to compromise, to surrender principle and to trade concessions, but to detect reason in all claims in conflict, to recognize the particular legitimacy of each, to sense where the grounds of concord were, and to bring contestants into harmony there. Instinctively he thrived on arguments, which he entered not to win but to conciliate" (p. 290).

Womack then relates the exploits of Magaña as a resourceful negotiator of ever new alliances and contrasts him with the rigid and sectarian Palafox, Zapata's earlier principal secretary, who "seemed in retrospect the individual responsible for the Zapatistas' present plight—the man they could blame for their disastrous involvement with Villa in 1914, their alienation of worthy chiefs in the constitutionalist party, and their abiding reputation as the most intransigent group in the revolutionary movement" (p. 306).

After the murder of Zapata, Magaña maneuvered tactfully and successfully among the various chiefs. After six months, the succession crisis was over and Magaña was recognized as commander-in-chief, with the movement virtually intact. Womack then traces the complex events through which the Zapatistas, as he puts it in the title of his last chapter, "Inherit Morelos"—that is manage, by alternately fighting and negotiating and by backing Obregón at the right moment, to pass from outlaws into local administrators and members of a national coalition. "So ended the year 1920, in peace, with populist agrarian

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reform instituted as a national policy, and with the Zapatista movement established in Morelos politics. In the future through thick and thin these achievements would last. This was the claim Zapata, his chiefs, and their volunteers had forced, *and Magaña had won and secured*" (p. 369; italics added).

Twice Womack implies that this outcome was due not only to the presence of Magaña, but perhaps also to the absence of Zapata from the scene. There is first the "extraordinary maneuver" by which Magaña offered the Carranza government the Zapatistas' support when United States intervention threatened in the Jenkins case in 1919. Womack says here flatly, "Had Zapata lived, Zapatista strategy could not have been so flexible" (p. 348). Then again at the celebration of Obregón's victory, on June 2, 1920, "twenty thousand Agua Prieta partisans marched in review through the Zócalo, among them the forces from Morelos. And watching with the honored new leaders from a balcony of the Palacio National . . . stood the squat, swarthy de la O, frowning into the sun. From an angle he looked almost like Zapata, dead now for over a year. (If de la O had been killed and Zapata had lived, Zapata would probably have been there in his place, with the same uncomfortable frown, persuaded by Magaña to join the boom for Obregón but probably worrying, as Magaña was not, about when he might have to revolt again.)" (p. 365).

Out of these bits and pieces, there emerges a proposition or hypothesis that must have been on Womack's mind, but that he allows the reader to formulate: did the comparative success of the Morelos uprising within the Mexican Revolution rest on the *alternating* leadership, first of the charismatic, revolutionary Zapata and then of the skillful, though highly principled, negotiator Magaña? And what are the "lessons" of this story for other revolutions and, in particular, for revolutionary movements that are confined to a limited portion or sector of a nation-state?

The historian is probably ambivalent about such questions. He revels in the uniqueness of the historical event, yet he constantly intimates that history holds the most precious lessons. And I believe he is right on both counts! Perhaps the rest of this paper will show why this is not a self-contradictory position.

II

First let me return briefly to the comparison of Payne and Womack. What strikes the reader of the two books most is, as I said before, the difference in cognitive style: Payne, from the first page to the last,

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breathes brash confidence that he has achieved complete understanding of his subject, whereas Womack draws conclusions with the utmost diffidence and circumspection. His respect for the autonomy of the actors whose deeds he recounts is what gives his book its special appeal and probably contributed to the spectacular accolade he received from Carlos Fuentes in the *New York Review of Books*.[5] For it is today a most unusual restraint. I believe that the countries of the Third World have become fair game for the model-builders and paradigm-molders, to an intolerable degree. During the nineteenth century several "laws" were laid down for the leading industrial countries whose rapid development was disconcerting to numerous thinkers who were strongly affected by what Flaubert called "la rage de vouloir conclure."[6] Having been proven wrong by the unfolding events in almost every instance, the law-makers then migrated to warmer climes, that is, to the less developed countries. And here they really came into their own. For the less developed, dependent countries had long been objects of history—so that to treat them as objects of iron laws or rigid models from whose working there is no escape came naturally to scholars who turned their attention to them. Soon we were witnesses to a veritable deluge of paradigms and models, from the vicious circle of poverty, low-level equilibrium traps, and uniform stage sequences of the economist, to the traditional or non-achievement-oriented or status-hungry personality of the sociologist, psychologist, or political scientist. A psychologist may find it interesting some day to inquire whether these theories were inspired primarily by compassion or by contempt for the underdeveloped world. The result, in any case, is that the countries of Latin America, for example, appear to any contemporary, well-read observer far more constrained than, say, the United States or France or the USSR. Latin American societies seem somehow less complex and their "laws of movement" more intelligible, their medium-term future more predictable or at least formulable in terms of clearcut simple alternatives (such as "reform or revolution?"), and their average citizens more reducible to one or a very few stereotypes. Of course, all of this is so exclusively because our paradigmatic thinking makes it so. Mr. Payne is merely the latest in a long line of "law"-makers, model-builders, and paradigm-molders who have vied with one another in getting an iron grip on Latin American reality. And it must now be

[5] March 13, 1969.

[6] I have long looked for a good translation of this key concept into English. It now strikes me that an apt, if free, rendering of Flaubert's meaning would be "the compulsion to theorize"—which is the subject and might have been the title of the present paper.

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said that Latin American social scientists have themselves made an important contribution to this headlong rush toward the all-revealing paradigm.

Elsewhere I have described as "the age of self-incrimination" one phase of the efforts of Latin Americans at understanding their own reality and the lag of their countries behind Europe and the United States. Incidentally, traces of this phase can be found in a few contemporary Latin American intellectuals, and they, jointly with their bygone confrères, provide Payne with some telling quotations about the despicable character of Colombian politicians and politics. By and large, the phase has fortunately passed; it has, however, been replaced by a somewhat related phase that might be called the age of the *action-arousing gloomy vision*: on the basis of some model or paradigm, the economic and social reality of Latin America is explained and the laws of movement of economy and society are formulated in such a way that current trends (of terms of trade, or of income distribution, or of population growth) are shown to produce either stagnation or, more usually, deterioration and disaster. The art of statistical projection has made a potent contribution to this type of forecast, which is then supposed to galvanize men into action designed to avert the threatened disaster through some fairly fundamental "structural changes."

Now I believe that this strategy for socioeconomic change has sometimes been and can on occasion again be extremely useful in just this way. But for several reasons I would caution against the exclusive reliance on it that has recently characterized Latin American social and economic thought.

There is a world of difference, by the way, between this action-arousing gloomy vision and the Marxian perspective on capitalist evolution. In the Marxian perspective, events in the absence of revolution were not at all supposed to move steadily downhill. On the contrary, capitalist development, while punctuated by crises and accompanied by increasing misery of the proletariat, was nevertheless expected to be going forward apace. It was in fact the genius of Marxism—which explains a large part of its appeal—that it was able to view both the advances and the setbacks of economic development under the capitalist system as helping toward its eventual overthrow.

My first criticism of the vision ties in directly with my dislike of paradigms laying down excessive constraints on the conceivable moves of individuals and societies. Why should all of Latin America find itself constantly impaled on the horns of some fateful and unescapable dilemma? Even if one is prepared to accept Goldenweiser's "principle

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of limited possibilities" in a given environment, any theory or model or paradigm propounding that there are only two possibilities—disaster or one particular road to salvation—should be *prima facie* suspect. After all, there *is*, at least temporarily, such a place as purgatory!

The second reason for which I would advocate a de-emphasis of the action-arousing gloomy vision is that it creates more gloom than action. The spread of gloom is certain and pervasive, but the call to action may or may not be heard. And since the theory teaches that in the normal course of events things will be increasingly unsatisfactory, it is an invitation *not* to watch out for possible positive developments. On the contrary, those imbued with the gloomy vision will attempt to prove year by year that Latin America is going from bad to worse; a year like 1968—and this may hold for 1969 as well—when the economic performance of the three large and of several small countries was little short of brilliant, will come as a distinct embarrassment.

Frequently, of course, the theories I am criticizing are the result of wishful thinking: wouldn't it be reassuring if a society that has been unable to meet some standard of social justice or if an oppressive political regime were *ipso facto* condemned to economic stagnation and deterioration? For that very reason we should be rather on our guard against any theory purporting to *prove* what would be so reassuring.

But the propensity to see gloom and failure everywhere is not engendered only by the desire to reprove further an oppressive regime or an unjust society. It may also be rooted in the fact that one has come to expect his country to perform poorly because of its long history of backwardness and dependence; hence any evidence that the country may possibly be doing better or may be emerging from its backwardness is going to be dissonant with previous cognitions and is therefore likely to be suppressed; on the contrary, evidence that nothing at all has changed will be picked up, underlined, and even greeted, for it does not necessitate any change in the preexisting cognitions to which one has become comfortably adjusted. This is so because people who have a low self-concept and expect failure apparently feel some discomfort when they suddenly perform well, as psychologists have shown.[7] In this manner, social psychology provides a clue to a Latin American phenomenon that has long puzzled me, yet has struck me with such force that I have invented a name for it—the "failure complex" or "fracasomania."

Finally the paradigm-based gloomy vision can be positively harmful.

[7] Elliott Aronson, "Dissonance Theory: Progress and Problems," in R. P. Abelson and others, eds., *Theories of Cognitive Consistency: A Source Book* (Chicago 1968), 24.

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When it prevails, hopeful developments either will be not perceived at all or will be considered exceptional and purely temporary. In these circumstances, they will not be taken advantage of as elements on which to build. To give an example: the rise of the fishmeal industry in Peru and the similarly spectacular growth of banana planting in Ecuador from about 1950 to the mid-sixties contradicted the doctrine that the era of export-promoted growth had ended in Latin America. As a result, economists first ignored these booms, then from year to year predicted their imminent collapse. It is quite possible that particularly the latter attitude held down the portion of the bonanza that the two countries might otherwise have set aside for longer-term economic and social capital formation; for why bother to exert oneself and, in the process, antagonize powerful interests if the payoff is expected to be so limited and short-lived? More recently, another theory of gloom has been widely propagated: it seems that now the opportunities for import-substituting industrialization have also become "exhausted" even though it can be argued that, just as earlier in the case of *desarrollo hacia afuera*, there is still much life left in *desarrollo hacia adentro*.[8] Again, if the exhaustion thesis is wholly accepted it may weaken the search for and prevent the discovery of new industrial opportunities.

In all these matters I would suggest a little more "reverence for life," a little less straitjacketing of the future, a little more allowance for the unexpected—and a little less wishful thinking. This is simply a matter, once again, of cognitive *style*. With respect to actual socioeconomic analysis, I am of course not unaware that without models, paradigms, ideal types, and similar abstractions we cannot even start to think. But cognitive style, that is, the kind of paradigms we search out, the way we put them together, and the ambitions we nurture for their powers—all this can make a great deal of difference.

III

In trying to spell out these notions in greater detail I shall now make three principal points. In the first place, I shall explain why the gloomy vision is in a sense the first stage of any reflections about a backward reality and shall make a plea for not getting stuck in that stage. I shall then attempt to show that in evaluating the broader

[8] See my article, "The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXXII (February 1968), 1-32. The Spanish terms *desarrollo hacia afuera* and *desarrollo hacia adentro* are convenient shorthand expressions for growth through the expansion of exports and of the domestic market, respectively.

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social and political consequences of some ongoing event we must be suspicious of paradigms that pretend to give a clearcut answer about the desirable or undesirable nature of these consequences. And finally I shall suggest that large-scale social change typically occurs as a result of a unique constellation of highly disparate events and is therefore amenable to paradigmatic thinking only in a very special sense.

The initial effort to understand reality will almost inevitably make it appear more solidly entrenched than before. The immediate effect of social analysis is therefore to convert the real into the rational or the contingent into the necessary. Herein, rather than in any conservatism of "bourgeois" social scientists, probably lies the principal explanation of that much commented-upon phenomenon—the conservative bias of social science in general, and of functional analysis in particular. This very conservatism takes, however, a strange turn when the target of the social scientist is a society that is viewed *from the outset* as backward or unjust or oppressive. For analysis will then make it appear, at least to start with, that the backwardness, injustice, and oppression are in reality far more deep-rooted than had been suspected. This is the origin of all the vicious-circle and vicious-personality theories that seem to make any change impossible in the absence of either revolution, highly competent central planning with massive injection of foreign aid, or massive abduction of the young generation so that it may be steeped elsewhere in creativity and achievement motivation.[9] Interestingly enough, then, the same analytical turn of mind that leads to a conservative bias in the case of a society that we approach *without* a strong initial commitment to change, leads to a revolutionary or quasi-revolutionary stance in the case of societies that are viewed from the outset as unsatisfactory. In the case of the former, the analyst, like the ecologist, often becomes enamored of all the fine latent functions he uncovers, whereas in the latter case he despairs of the possibility of change (except for the most massive and revolutionary varieties) because of all the interlocking vicious circles he has come upon.

Fortunately these initial effects of social science analysis wear off after a while. In the case of the backward countries, the realization will dawn that certain so-called attributes of backwardness are not necessarily obstacles, but can be lived with and sometimes can be turned

[9] It is only fair to note that, in his more recent work on achievement motivation, David McClelland has changed his earlier views on these matters. Thus he writes (after having given cogent reasons for doing so): "To us it is no longer a self-evident truth that it is easier to produce long-range personality transformations in young children than it is in adults." David C. McClelland and David G. Winter, *Motivating Economic Achievement* (New York 1969), 356.

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into positive assets. I have elsewhere attempted to bring together the accumulating evidence for this sort of phenomenon.[10] This evidence, then, should make us a bit wary when *new* vicious circles or *new* development-obstructing personality types or *new* deadends are being discovered. Though such discoveries are bound to occur and can be real contributions to understanding, they carry an obligation to look for ways in which they may play not a reinforcing but a neutral or debilitating role in so far as system maintenance is concerned. Perhaps social scientists could pass a rule, such as has long existed in the British Parliament, by which an M.P. proposing a new item of public expenditure must also indicate the additional revenue through which he expects the nation to finance it. Similarly it might be legislated by an assembly of social scientists that anyone who believes he has discovered a new obstacle to development is under an obligation to look for ways in which this obstacle can be overcome or can possibly be lived with or can, in certain circumstances, be transformed into a blessing in disguise.

IV

A related element of the cognitive style I am advocating derives from the recognition of one aspect of the unfolding of social events that makes prediction exceedingly difficult and contributes to that peculiar *open-endedness* of history that is the despair of the paradigm-obsessed social scientist. Situations in which the expertise of the social scientist is solicited frequently have the following structure: some new event or bundle of events such as industrialization, urbanization, rapid population growth, etc., has happened or is happening before our eyes, and we would like to know what its consequences are for a number of social and political system characteristics, such as integration of marginal or oppressed groups, loss of authority on the part of traditional elites, political stability or crisis, likely level of violence or of cultural achievement, and so on. Faced with the seemingly reasonable demand for enlightenment on the part of the layman and the policy-maker, and propelled also by his own curiosity, the social scientist now opens his paradigm-box to see how best to handle the job at hand. To his dismay, he then finds, *provided he looks carefully*, that he is faced with an embarrassment of riches: various available paradigms will produce radically different answers. The situation can be compared, in a rough way, with the quandary the forecasting economist has long experienced:

[10] "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XIII (July 1965), 385-93.

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the magnitudes that are of most interest to the policy-makers, such as the prospective deficit or surplus in the balance of payments or the budget, or the inflationary or deflationary gap, or the rate of unemployment, are usually—and maddeningly—*differences* between gross magnitudes. Hence even if the gross magnitudes are estimated with an acceptable margin of error, the estimate of the difference may be off by a very large percentage and may easily be even of the wrong sign. The hazards in forecasting qualitative social events on the basis of perfectly respectable and reliable paradigms can be rather similar. Take the question: what is the effect of industrialization and economic development on a society's propensity for civil war, or for external adventure, or for genocide, or for democracy? As with the effect, say, of accelerated growth on the balance of payments, the answer must be: it depends on the *balance* of the contending forces that are set in motion. Industrialization creates new tensions, but may allay old ones; it may divert the minds of the elite from external adventure while creating new capabilities for such adventure, and so forth. Thus the outcome is here also a *difference* whose estimate is necessarily subject to a particularly high degree of error. This ambiguous situation, incidentally, characterizes also less crucial, more "middle-range" causal relationships. An example is the effect of bigness and diversity of an organization on innovation. As James Q. Wilson has argued, bigness and diversity increase the probability that members will conceive of and propose major innovations; but they also increase the probability that any one innovation that is proposed will be turned down. Again the net effect is in doubt.[11]

Wilson's dilemma is the sort of cognitive style in paradigmatic thinking that is not often met with; ordinarily social scientists are happy enough when they have gotten hold of *one* paradigm or line of causation. As a result, their guesses are often farther off the mark than those of the experienced politician whose intuition is more likely to take a variety of forces into account.

V

Finally, the ability of paradigmatic thinking to illuminate the paths of change is limited in yet another, perhaps more fundamental way. In the context of most Latin American societies, many of us are concerned with the bringing about of *large-scale* change to be carried

[11] James Q. Wilson, "Innovation in Organization: Notes Toward a Theory," in James D. Thompson, ed., *Approaches to Organizational Design* (Pittsburgh 1966), 193-218.

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through in a fairly brief period of time. But ordinarily the cards are stacked so much against the accomplishment of large-scale change that when it happens, be it a result of revolution or reform or some intermediate process, it is bound to be an unpredictable and nonrepeatable event, unpredictable because it took the very actors by surprise and nonrepeatable because once the event has happened everybody is put on notice and precautions will be taken by various parties so that it won't happen again. The uniqueness and scientific opaqueness of the large-scale changes that occur when history "suddenly accelerates" have often been remarked upon. Womack brings them out as well as anyone in his narrative of the Mexican Revolution. I shall invoke the authority of two recent commentators belonging to rather different camps. The first is the anthropologist Max Gluckman, who addresses himself to "radical change" after having defended anthropology against the charge that it is not interested in change. He writes, "The source of radical change escapes these analyses [of other kinds of change]. Perhaps this is inevitable because social anthropology aims to be scientific. Scientific method cannot deal with unique complexes of many events. The accounts of the actual course of events which produce change therefore necessarily remain historical narratives. . . ."[12]

Perhaps a more significant witness, because as a Marxist he should be an inveterate paradigm-lover, is Louis Althusser. In his remarkable essay, "Contradiction and Over-determination," Althusser makes much of some striking statements of Lenin's about the unique constellation of events that made possible the Russian Revolution of 1917. The key passage from Lenin is: "If the revolution has triumphed so rapidly it is exclusively because, as a result of a historical situation of extreme originality, a number of completely distinct currents, a number of totally heterogeneous class interests, and a number of completely opposite social and political tendencies have become fused with remarkable coherence."[13]

On the basis of Lenin's testimony Althusser then proceeds to explain that revolutions never arise purely out of the basic economic contradictions that Marx stressed, but only when these contradictions are "fused" in some unique manner with a number of other determinants. This fusion or embedding is the phenomenon he calls "overdetermination" of revolutions. Actually this is a poor term (as he himself recognizes) for it could imply that, had one of the many circumstantial factors not been present, the revolution would still have taken place.

[12] *Politics, Law and Ritual in Tribal Society* (Oxford 1965), 286.
[13] As quoted in Althusser, *Pour Marx* (Paris 1967), 98.

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But the whole context of the essay, and certainly the quotations from Lenin, exclude this interpretation. On the contrary, it is quite clear that even with all these converging elements the revolution won by an exceedingly narrow margin. *Thus, while a surprising number of heterogeneous elements almost miraculously conspired to bring the revolution about, every single one of them was still absolutely indispensable to its success.* Uniqueness seems a better term for this phenomenon than overdetermination.

Incidentally, this interpretation of revolutions undermines the revolutionary's usual critique of the advocacy of reform. This critique is generally based on the *high degree of improbability* that a ruling group will ever tolerate or even connive at the elimination or destruction of its own privileges; the only way to achieve this end is by smashing the "system" through revolutionary assault. But with the view of revolutions as overdetermined or unique events, it turns out to be a toss-up which form of large-scale change is more unlikely—so we may as well be on the lookout for whatever rare openings in either direction appear on the horizon.

In sum, he who looks for large-scale social change must be possessed, with Kierkegaard, by "the passion for what is possible" rather than rely on what has been certified as probable by factor analysis.

This view of large-scale social change as a unique, nonrepeatable, and *ex ante* highly improbable complex of events is obviously damaging to the aspirations of anyone who would explain and predict these events through "laws of change." Once again, there is no denying that such "laws" or paradigms can have considerable utility. They are useful for the apprehending of many elements of the complex and often are stimuli to action before the event and indispensable devices for achieving a beginning of understanding after the event has happened. That is much but that is all. The architect of social change can never have a reliable blueprint. Not only is each house he builds different from any other that was built before, but it also necessarily uses new construction materials and even experiments with untested principles of stress and structure. Therefore what can be most usefully conveyed by the builders of one house is an understanding of the experience that made it at all possible to build under these trying circumstances. It is, I believe, in this spirit that Womack makes that, at first sight rather shocking, statement, "the truth of the revolution in Morelos is in the feeling of it." Perhaps he means not only the truth, but also the principal lesson.

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POLITICAL DECAY AND THE EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS, 1789-1848

By JOHN R. GILLIS*

UNTIL very recently social interpretations of revolution have enjoyed a position of virtual orthodoxy among both historians and social scientists. Sociologists and political scientists concerned with the problem of revolution have been mainly of the structural-functional school. They describe a revolutionary situation as one of "multiple dysfunction" in the relations between the political system and the society it serves. Revolution thus interpreted is a violent redress of imbalance among functionally interrelated and historically synchronous social and political parts of one total system. It is commonly assumed that it is the social process, including economic change, that is the dynamic element in any revolutionary event, and that political institutions play a causative role only in so far as they fail to provide mechanisms for resolving the state of disequilibrium.[1] Historians of revolution, many of them strongly if not consciously influenced by Marxist traditions of interpretation, have taken much the same position. If they tend to think more in terms of trends than of equilibrium systems, nevertheless they agree with the social scientists that revolution is primarily the result of accumulating social and economic pressures, with politics playing only a secondary role in shaping the course of events.[2]

Only in the past few years has this type of interpretation been seriously challenged, although now there is a growing body of historians and social scientists who are prepared to argue that political change

* I wish to thank the members of the Thesis Writers' Seminar of the Princeton University History Department for their criticisms of an earlier draft of this article.

[1] Chalmers Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System* (Stanford 1964); and Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston 1966). A useful survey of recent work in the field is provided by Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," *World Politics* (January 1966), 159-76.

[2] A distinction must be made between those histories that treat the social aspects of the revolutionary period as such and those studies that attempt to impose social categories on political events (or *vice versa*). Norman Hampson's *Social History of the French Revolution* (London 1963) is an example of a work that maintains a proper distinction between the social and political spheres. Jeffry Kaplow's introduction to his *New Perspectives on the French Revolution* (New York 1965), which treats social history as if it were an explanation for political events, ignoring the possibility that social and political movements may be in opposition, or even irrelevant, to one another, is illustrative of structural-functionalism in history. Eric Hobsbawm's *Age of Revolution* (Cleveland 1962), which interprets the events of 1789-1848 almost exclusively in terms of social and economic change, is in a similar category.

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should be treated as an independent variable in the analysis of revolution. Borrowing heavily from the work of nineteenth-century students of revolutionary phenomena, most notably Alexis de Tocqueville, they contend that any explanation of the European events of 1789, 1830, or 1848 that omits consideration of the institutional development of the European state in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is necessarily incomplete. Sometimes consciously, but more often implicitly, they discard the notion that state and society are necessarily interdependent parts of a larger system. And without denying the importance of social and economic change, they stress the part political institutions and governing elites have played in the coming of revolution in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe.[3]

What might be called the political interpretation of European revolution has been given additional credibility by the results of recent work in the field of the comparative study of revolution, particularly those studies which contrast the European upheavals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries with the events in non-Western countries in recent decades. These comparisons make the importance of the political element particularly evident by emphasizing that the major differences between Western and non-Western revolutions are attributable in large measure to the fact that in developing countries organized movements of social and economic protest usually overthrow or take over strong political systems that are already fairly modern, while European revolutions began with the collapse of relatively traditional regimes and then proceeded through a period of power vacuum during which various groups, most of which are weakly organized, struggled to establish a new, more modern political order. In one of the most recent comparative studies, Samuel Huntington described this contrast in the following manner:

> The Western revolution is usually directed against a highly traditional regime headed by an absolute monarch or dominated by a land-owning aristocracy. The revolution typically occurs when this regime comes into severe financial straits, when it fails to assimilate the intelligentsia or other urban elite elements, and when the ruling class from which its leaders are drawn has lost its moral self-confidence and will to rule. . . . Eastern revolutions, in con-

[3] Among the historical works that attempt to revise the prevailing social interpretation are Robert R. Palmer, *The Age of Democratic Revolution* (Princeton 1959-64); and Alfred Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (Cambridge 1964). A cogent criticism of the structural-functional position is found in Randall Collins, "A Comparative Approach to Political Sociology," Reinhard Bendix, ed., *State and Society* (Boston 1969), 42-67.

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> trast, are directed against at least partially modernized regimes. These may be indigenous governments that have absorbed some modern and vigorous middle class elements . . . or they may be colonial regimes in which power and wealth of a metropolitan country gives the local government a seemingly overwhelming superiority in all the conventional manifestations of political authority and military force. . . . Western revolutions are thus precipitated by weak traditional regimes; Eastern revolutions by narrow modernizing ones.[4]

Those familiar with European history will find Huntington's contrasts somewhat overdrawn. The old regimes were by no means highly traditional in the sense in which he uses that term. They had already lost many of the attributes of feudalism and had incorporated elements that in retrospect appear quite modern. Nevertheless, most of Huntington's description is quite acceptable, and indeed very much in agreement with many of the generalizations about European revolution formulated by Crane Brinton in his *The Anatomy of Revolution*, a pioneer comparative study by a historian, published thirty years ago. Brinton's book also stressed the importance of the collapse of the old regimes, particularly the faltering confidence of the governing elites and the accompanying defections of intellectuals previously loyal to the state.[5] Brinton was aware of the importance of the political element, but this part of his thesis was largely ignored during the intervening decades when structural-functional interpretations were at the peak of their popularity. The decay of political loyalties was simply attributed to social and economic change, without reference to the internal dynamics of the political institutions themselves. When historians and social scientists bothered to treat the phenomenon of the governing elites' failure of nerve, they concerned themselves primarily with the defections of free intellectuals, ignoring almost entirely the behavior of those most closely associated with the machinery of the state, namely the civil and military services.[6] The result was a regrettable lack of studies of political personnel in periods of revolution, an omission that can be understood only in the light of the past tendency to view the

[4] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New York 1968), 273.
[5] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, rev. ed. (New York 1959), 38-43, 54ff.
[6] Most studies of intellectuals in European revolutions concentrate on the independent professions, neglecting almost entirely the civil and military personnel. See Lenore O'Boyle, "The Democratic Left in Germany, 1848," *Journal of Modern History*, XXXIII (December 1961), 374-83; and Lewis Namier, *1848: Revolution of the Intellectuals* (London 1944).

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state as a dependent variable in a larger system in which social and economic factors are determinant.

Recent work on the field of comparative revolutions provides ample reason for paying greater attention to the neglected aspects of political development. One historian, Peter Amann, has suggested that European revolution should be looked upon as a "breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompanied by a lessening of the habit of obedience."[7] A number of political scientists have worked out an interpretation of revolution as a form of internal civil war, thus also modifying, if not rejecting, the notion of purely social and economic origins of revolution in favor of a theory that takes into account some of the political dimensions of upheaval.[8]

However, most of these studies have been more suggestive than conclusive. Amann talks about the loss of the habit of obedience among the general population but does not account for defections among the political elites themselves. The explanation of revolution as one form of internal war fails to make clear distinctions between this and other forms of domestic violence, thus raising the question of its applicability to specific historical situations. Huntington's attempt to fit revolution into a general theory of political modernization is more useful, but his description of the pre-revolutionary European states as highly traditional so distorts historical reality that it obscures many of the most important causes of the collapse of the old regimes. Indeed, designations of modernity and traditionalism prove less useful than do the distinctions between political development and political decay, concepts favored by many political scientists (including Huntington himself) because of their universal applicability. Modernity and traditionalism are appropriate to contemporary history but are not easily applied to the period in which the European revolutions fall. The political events that preceded them are much better understood in terms of political development and political decay, changes that may involve aspects of modernization but are not necessarily identical with either modernity or traditionalism.

Traditionalism does not explain the collapse of the old regimes, for as I have already pointed out they were by no means traditional in the sense in which political scientists and sociologists now use that term. In almost every case, they had entered a transitional period between

[7] Peter Amann, "Revolution: A Redefinition," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXVII (March 1962), 38.

[8] Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of Internal War," *History and Theory*, IV, No. 2 (1965), 133-63.

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tradition and modernity, between the decentralized political structure of feudalism and the forms of nation-state as we know them today. But in terms of political development, defined by Huntington and others as the "institutionalization of political organizations and procedures," the old regimes were in a state of breakdown or decay.[9] This was not simply a function of traditionalism, for in the European revolutions breakdown came after the first steps toward political modernization had already been made. In every instance, however, political decay represented a sharp break in a continuity of political development stretching over several decades, thus amounting to a reversal of many previous trends toward higher levels of institutionalization. If decay is defined as the process by which a set of political organizations and behavior patterns that have come to have legitimacy and stability lose these qualities, then the periods just prior to the European revolutions can be viewed as times of fairly rapid political breakdown. Measured either by the indicators that have been developed by social scientists—loss of adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of organization and procedure—or in terms more familiar to historians —intransigence, corruptibility, demoralization, and inefficiency—the breakdown of previously attained levels of political development is indeed striking.

When this is taken into account, the collapse of the old regimes—the events that invariably marked the beginning of Western revolutions—no longer appears simply as an accident or as the function of social and economic crisis. When interpreted in light of contemporary theories of political development and political decay, breakdown becomes explicable in its own terms, not simply a random event but a pattern often repeated in the course of political history. The work Huntington and S. N. Eisenstadt have done on various aspects of political decay is particularly relevant here, for they have pointed out that sustained, regular political development, with its accompanying stability, is a quite rare phenomenon and that most political systems are susceptible to periodic stalemates and even outright reversals of the direction of change. Eisenstadt defines breakdowns as situations in which the capacity of key institutions to deal with the day-to-day problems of government declines for an extended period. Not only do elite groups begin to function at a lower level of efficiency, but they also develop characteristics of "delinquent communities," losing their orientation toward their original political functions. When regressions of this sort

[9] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 393-405.

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affect the state, they need not involve all the personnel of government in order for a serious breakdown to occur; but when those who occupy strategic positions in the hierarchy of authority are affected, they can stalemate the entire structure. Huntington's analysis of political decay also pays close attention to the loss of autonomy and coherence of key institutions. When the political personnel lose their dedication to the tasks of government and begin to devote their attention to interests peripheral to those of the state, then breakdown is likely to occur. Corruption can take many forms but the result is always the same: lower capacity to deal with problems facing the state and society.[10]

Eisenstadt takes care to distinguish between breakdowns and the kind of failures of leadership or judgment that are a common feature of any political system, even a highly developed one. Concentrating primarily on contemporary history, and thus on modernizing polities, he attempts to show that sustained periods of declining efficiency and effectiveness have been a rather frequent feature of both Western and non-Western societies. Using examples from a number of developing countries, including Indonesia and Argentina, he argues that breakdowns often take place in nations where political development in the form of political modernization has already made considerable advances. For further evidence that breakdown can happen even in those countries that have reached quite a high level of political modernization, he draws on the experiences of Italy and Germany in the twentieth century.[11]

Huntington draws on examples of ancient as well as contemporary states, and his concept of political development and decay as a process applicable to pre-modern as well as modern regimes makes his analysis relevant to the European regimes of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. He too demonstrates the fallacy of assuming that once progress in political development has begun it is irreversible. Political development involves its own contradictions that can lead to lower levels of efficiency; states often become less flexible and adaptable, and even lose legitimacy in the eyes of those who are supposed to be the governing elite. Progress in economic or social development does not guarantee high levels of political institutionalization, for social, economic, and political change need not be synchronous or even interdependent. Contrary to the structural-functional concept of the relationship between state and society, the social and political spheres often

[10] Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XII (July 1964), 345-67; and Eisenstadt, *Modernization: Protest and Change* (Englewood Cliffs 1966), 129ff.

[11] Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," 355ff.

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develop autonomously and at different rates, sometimes interacting in such a way as to stalemate one another. Huntington points out that political decay is often aggravated in non-Western countries by too rapid social and economic development, which overloads weak, fragile political institutions, thus inducing their corruption and eventual breakdown. Yet it is not the dysfunctional relation between the needs of society and the capacity of the state alone that produces this situation, but rather contradictions within the political institutions themselves that are the root cause of the drop in effectiveness and efficiency.[12]

The utility of theories of political breakdown for the study of European history should be obvious. Indeed, European social and cultural historians have long been aware of regressive tendencies of groups and institutions in the periods preceding revolutions. Some have even used the notion of social regression or economic breakdown to explain these upheavals. The French economic historian Labrousse attempted to show how revolutions in his country have been preceded by economic recessions, while his great compatriot, Georges Lefebvre, argued that the so-called "aristocratic revolution" prior to 1789, with all its regressive tendencies, was a major precipitant of the events that followed.[13] Thus far no social scientist or historian has suggested explicitly that similar long-term phenomena in the political sphere might also have contributed to the upheaval of 1789 and the revolutions of the nineteenth century. No one has attempted to explain in a thorough manner the failure of nerve of the supporters of the old regime in terms of a regression in the process of political development. Furthermore, there has been no consistent effort to understand the course of European revolution in terms of successive attempts to restart the engine of political growth, or to interpret the termination of the period of chaos and disorder as a sign of success in accomplishing that task. The idea that economic or social trends can be reversed is acceptable to historians, but the application of a similar notion to political institutions is excluded by their conventions, which assume that change in that area, if slow, is nevertheless steady and irreversible. As Huntington points out, "an underlying commitment to the theory of progress is so overwhelming as to exclude political decay as a possible concept."[14]

It would be well therefore to investigate the part that political decay played in Western Europe's age of revolution so as to add a neglected

[12] Huntington, "Political Development," 405-30.

[13] Ernst Labrousse, "1848-1830-1789, Comment naisent les révolutions," *Actes du Congrès de le Centenaire de Révolution de 1848* (Paris 1948), 1-31; Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution*, trans. by R. R. Palmer (Princeton 1947), Part I.

[14] Huntington, "Political Development," 392-393.

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dimension to the understanding of the events of that period. In order to place the European upheavals in their proper perspective, it is useful to discard both the myth of the irreversibility of political development and the notion of the functional interdependence of state and society. Comparative studies of revolution suggest that the uniqueness of European revolution lies in part in the initial collapse of the old regimes, a circumstance that had a determining effect on what followed. Using as examples the French Revolution of 1789 and the Prussian Revolution of 1848, it is possible to show how the proper understanding of this uniqueness and emphasis on its importance can illuminate the causes, course, and outcome of the revolutionary events, thus clarifying aspects distorted or ignored by conventional social interpretations.

I

In the cases of both France and Prussia the political system on the eve of the revolution is best described by the term transitional. With respect to progress toward modernity—the rationalization of authority, separation of private and public functions, and the political mobilization of the population—change was already substantial, although it is important to note that the feudal origins of the absolute state and the essentially religious character of traditional authority were still very much in evidence. Much of the state's strength and legitimacy were still based on an alliance of crown and altar, and it was still dependent to a large degree on a close social alliance with the traditional elites, including the landed aristocracy. Bureaucratization and professionalization of the civil and military services were only in the initial stages, though it is important to keep in mind that while both states were still in a transitional stage between tradition and modernity they had developed a fairly high level of institutionalization since the seventeenth century. In both France and Prussia highly developed forms of bureaucratic absolutism served as the bridge between the traditional decentralized feudal polity and the modern nation-state.

In contrast to the political systems of today's developing countries, whose modern features are generally imposed by colonial powers or imported by indigenous progressive elites, the state in Europe had evolved from traditional structures of a feudal past. The first steps toward political modernization in both France and Prussia had been taken within the institutional and ideological structures of that system. In their attempt to implement the concept of sovereignty, French monarchs of the seventeenth century had begun to use every device short

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of major reorganization of society to extend their control both horizontally over the provinces and vertically into the various strata of the traditional corporative society. Medieval theories of divine-right monarchy had served their purposes well, so well in fact that the first steps toward the establishment of the modern nation-state required no obvious break with the past or sudden shift of ideology.[15] The sovereign's major instrument for change was a reformed civil service, freed from its previously close association with nobility of birth by the device of opening all offices to purchase. By the end of the reign of Louis XIV, France possessed a fair degree of institutional differentiation, having a civil service oriented toward specific political goals, staffed by a mixture of nobles and bourgeoisie.[16]

The thrust of Prussia's political development can also be traced to the seventeenth century, when its kings began the establishment of civil and military services emancipated from the control of traditional social groups. In contrast to the French method of breaking the landed aristocracy's monopoly on civil office by instituting a system of purchase, the Prussian monarchy experimented with various forms of the merit system, gradually perfecting these forms to the point that by the end of the eighteenth century a system of academic examinations had been established. The *Allgemeine Landrecht* of 1794 codified this development and by the early nineteenth century Prussia had a civil service that, in contrast to its predecessors, was not only more effective and efficient but also almost autonomous of other groups in Prussian society. Yet, as in the French case, all this had been achieved within the ideological and social limits of what was still a transitional polity and society. Elements of tradition mixed with elements of modernity in a political system that, although highly developed by its own standards, had by no means crossed the threshold of the nation-state.[17]

It was at this point of transition that the breakdown of political development occurred in both France and Prussia, not because of a lack of previous progress but because the progress that had been made involved contradictions that could not be resolved without a more radical departure from the past. Not only had the previous political

[15] On the continuities of French modernization see Bernard E. Brown, "The French Experience of Modernization," *World Politics*, XXI (April 1969), 380-83.

[16] Martin Göhring, *Die Ämterkäuflichkeit im Ancien Régime* (Berlin 1938), 158ff.

[17] Hans Rosenberg, *Aristocracy, Bureaucracy and Autocracy: The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958), 75-87; Reinhart Koselleck, *Preussen zwischen Reform und Revolution: Allgemeines Landrecht, Verwaltung und soziale Bewegung von 1791 bis 1848* (Stuttgart 1967), 143-49.

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development created certain problems within the institutions of the state itself, leading to lower levels of flexibility and adaptability, but in both France and Prussia on the eve of revolution the rate of political change was out of phase with changes in the social and economic sectors. In the case of France, political development had been outrun by social and economic growth for which the state itself had been originally responsible. Prussia before 1848 was affected by some of the same problems, but it was more seriously threatened by a lack of adequate social and economic development than by the abundance of it.

In both bureaucratic monarchies it was the civil services that were the most seriously affected by political decay. In the decades prior to the revolutions, previous trends toward higher levels of institutionalization had been slowed and even reversed by factors both internal and external to the bureaucracies themselves. In France's case, one of the monarchy's major instruments of political development in earlier periods, venality, became an agent of regression. Historians have shown how during the second half of the eighteenth century the high judiciary, the *noblesse de robe*, turned away from its previously professional orientation toward effective service to the state and began to act in the interest of regressive social forces. Despite attempts by reformers to bring greater coherence to the administrative structure, there is evidence that French administration was becoming less rather than more efficient as the eighteenth century progressed.[18] Caught in the squeeze of recurring budgetary deficits, which were partly the result of the failure to find more flexible and adaptable administrative institutions, the French monarchy was forced to choose between investment in further social and economic modernization and expenditure on radical changes in the overall governmental structure. Heavily dependent for income on the existing system of venality, the French state was reluctant in this period of growing indebtedness to undertake those reforms that, though they might increase efficiency by separating public office from private property, would most certainly deprive it of a most important source of revenue. And even the most progressive members of government favored policies that encouraged economic growth at the expense

[18] Franklin L. Ford, *Robe and Sword: The Regrouping of the French Aristocracy after Louis XIV* (New York 1965), 105-23; Palmer, *Age of Democratic Revolution*, I, 55-82; Lefebvre, 15-34. Historians are gradually abandoning the idea that this decay was the product of an aristocratic resurgence within the civil and military services, but even if the ratio of nobles to bourgeoisie remained fairly constant throughout the eighteenth century, the decline in the level of capacity among the officials of most agencies seems undeniable. Vivian Gruder, *The Royal Provincial Intendants* (Ithaca 1968), 214-16.

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of institutional development, hoping that the increased tax base would eventually make basic reforms financially feasible. Thus, for most of the eighteenth century the French government remained obsessed with fiscal matters, ignoring or postponing desperately needed political development, while at the same time fostering changes that were bringing additional pressure to bear on the already overloaded political institutions.[19]

Attempts to reform the tax system in order to produce needed revenues were opposed not only by vested interests outside government but also by elements within the state itself. The *noblesse de robe* and segments of the administration and military, the very groups on which France's political development depended, were among the most outspoken opponents of administrative reorganization and particularly the provision for access on the basis of merit to civil and military office. By the end of the eighteenth century the only major impetus toward institutional reform was coming from a few reformers at the ministerial level and from certain isolated elements in the higher administration, notably the royal intendants. But even reformers like Turgot and Necker were devoting most of their attention to social and economic modernization, and the intendants, enlightened as they were, were not aware that the economic growth and social change they were accelerating was contributing to the increasing rigidity of the whole bureaucratic structure.[20]

Reformers were forced to seek support for their political development plans at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchies and among the enlightened public, a group that before the revolution was still largely politically passive. Even the bourgeoisie, the group that might be expected to be the strongest supporters of political development, was basically content with the existing system. Ironically, the very considerable social and economic modernization that was being promoted by the state proved to be one of the greatest deterrents to reform, because instead of objecting to the system of venal offices the French bourgeoisie invested in it. Recent studies demonstrate that a large share of the capital accumulated in the course of the eighteenth century went

[19] C.B.A. Behrens, *The Ancien Régime* (London 1967), 163-84.

[20] A detailed study of reform efforts within the administration is provided by J. F. Bosher's work on the struggle to achieve a reorganization of the French customs system, *The Single Duty Project* (London 1964). A useful survey of pre-revolutionary government is provided by Alfred Cobban, "The Decline of Divine Right Monarchy in France," *New Cambridge Modern History*, VII (Cambridge 1957), 214-40; J. F. Bosher, "French Administration and Public Finance in their European Setting," *New Cambridge Modern History*, VIII (Cambridge 1965), 565-91.

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into the purchase of state offices, thus strengthening what was by then an institution that was a major cause of political decay.[21]

With social and economic modernization working against institutional reform, the changes that were brought about were effectively stalemated. Even the strategy of bypassing regressive bureaucratic mechanisms by working through more efficient semi-autonomous bodies such as the General Farm, an independent tax-collecting agency, was ultimately a failure. By the end of the 1760's the General Farm had become a vested interest, opposed to further institutional reform.[22] The little pressure for change that did exist came not from the general public or from bodies outside the state, but from those trying to enter or rise in the civil or military services, from the unemployed or underemployed intellectuals who were frustrated by the lack of opportunities available to men of talent. Population growth, coupled with economic progress, contributed to the pressure on public office; and particularly among the middle and lower ranks of the legal profession there was considerable sentiment in favor of the abolition of purchase and substantial rationalization of the bureaucratic system.[23] When these men, many of whom had only a precarious foothold in administration or justice, later came to speak out against "aristocracy," they meant not the social group as such but rather those institutions that, having once been open to purchase or talent, were now increasingly the possession of some closed social elite. Democracy meant for them the separation of social privilege and political power, for, as R. R. Palmer has described it, the democratic movement in eighteenth-century France was directed primarily "against the possession of government, or any public power, by any established, privileged, closed, or self-recruiting groups of men."[24]

In this and other respects the political situation in pre-revolutionary France was less a struggle between castes or classes than a contest for power between the "ins" and the "outs." The lines between the "democrats" and the "aristocrats" cut directly across the state itself, since some of the sharpest divisions were among various levels and bodies within the administrative, military, and judicial hierarchies. Not all nobles sided with the defenders of the status quo; not all the bourgeoisie were in the movement for reform. The distinctions between the

[21] George V. Taylor, "Noncapitalist Wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution" *American Historical Review*, LXXII (January 1967), 469-96.

[22] Bosher, "French Administration," 577-78.

[23] On the divisions among the legal profession, especially between lawyers and judges, see Philip Dawson's suggestive article, "The *Bourgeoisie de Robe* in 1789," *French Historical Studies*, IV (Spring 1965), 1-21.

[24] Palmer, I, 4-5.

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privileged and underprivileged did not conform to lines of birth (though within certain institutions of the state they did), but instead coincided with the divisions between those who benefited from the increasingly corrupt venal system and those who demanded that office be opened to talent.[25]

II

The situation in Prussia on the eve of 1848 was remarkably similar. There too internal conflict between reformers and conservatives within the bureaucracies had come to an impasse. The rise of a new generation of Prussian officials, educated to modern ideas and firmly attached to the concept of promotion on the basis of merit, threatened an older, entrenched elite who owed their offices more to certain ascriptive characteristics than to individual academic or professional achievements. The distinctions between the "democratic" and "aristocratic" positions were not so clearcut in Prussia's case, because their office had never been purchasable and the monopoly of the old nobility over both civil and military rank had been formally abolished at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, there had emerged in the late eighteenth century a new kind of aristocracy, a service nobility, which by the 1840's had accumulated considerable privilege and power. This group, which included both nobles and commoners, dominated the upper ranks of the Prussian administration and judiciary in such a way that a rising generation of bureaucratic talent, younger men who were both socially and intellectually differentiated from the older service nobility, found themselves blocked and frustrated in the decades just prior to 1848. As the internal dissension along lines of rank and age intensified, the older generation of officials reacted with a combination of fear and hostility. The very considerable progress toward institutional flexibility, autonomy, and coherence that had been made since the late eighteenth century was slowed and even reversed as the elite itself became divided and unsure of its own authority. As a result, the progressive image of the Prussian state, an inheritance from the earlier Reform Era (1806-1819), faded and on the eve of 1848 government policy was being attacked from both inside and out.[26]

As in France, the significant political dissensions were not so much those between social groups as those between political factions with

[25] Cobban, 25-35, 54-67; D. Dakin, "The Breakdown of the Old Regime in France," *New Cambridge Modern History*, VIII (Cambridge 1967), 604-05.

[26] John R. Gillis, "Aristocracy and Bureaucracy in Nineteenth-Century Prussia," *Past and Present*, XLI (December 1968), 105-15; Koselleck, 380-97.

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differing views of the necessity of institutional development. There were popular discontents resulting from the substantial economic and demographic changes that had taken place between 1815 and 1848, but it was still the question of political development that was at the center of the debate between conservatives and progressives. Unlike those of pre-revolutionary France, Prussia's problems stemmed more from a lack of economic development than from a surplus. Until much later in the nineteenth century business and industry remained low-prestige occupations, lacking the social attractions of the civil and military services. Thus although the bureaucracy was plagued by recurrent overcrowding and conditions of underemployment, the other sectors suffered for a lack of talent. This imbalance was partly responsible for the fact that in the first half of the century the most articulate leaders of movements of political reform were often recruited from the ranks of state employees. In 1848 it was not the businessmen or the laboring poor but the young professional men, most of whom were in the service of the state, who demanded the most radical political changes. If many of the most active participants in the Prussian Revolution of 1848 tended to be concerned with issues of civil equality and constitutional reform rather than economic development or social legislation, it was because their own personal and professional interests were so inextricably bound up with the larger questions of political development.[27]

The internal crises in both France and Prussia were complicated because there existed no alternative instruments by which intra-governmental stalemates could be resolved. French absolutism had effectively destroyed the public spirit of the country's ancient representative bodies; and in Prussia, where eighteenth-century monarchy had also abolished almost all the agencies of self-government, even the provincial estates that had been created in the 1820's tended to serve regressive rather than progressive purposes as far as political development was concerned.[28] The tasks of government that might have been distributed between executive and legislative agencies were piling up on the unreformed civil service, thus increasing the frustrations of its reform-minded members while at the same time reinforcing the regressive tendencies of others. In both the French and Prussian cases there is evidence that those at the top of the hierarchy became less flexible,

[27] Koselleck, 398-447; John R. Gillis, "The Prussian Bureaucracy, 1840-1860: A Study of Social and Political Transformation," (unpub. diss., Stanford 1965), 102-66.

[28] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (Garden City 1955), 32-119; Heinrich Heffter, *Die deutsche Selbstverwaltung im 19. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart 1950), 109-36, 207-30.

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and even actually corrupt, as the extra-organization pressures mounted. They were either unable or unwilling to give up their powers to a more highly adaptable system of government.[29]

This is not to say that the whole crisis within the state just prior to the revolutions was simply a constitutional one. Even had there existed viable representative bodies or responsible agencies of local self-government there is no assurance that the stalemates would have been broken. Poor harvests and generally depressed economic conditions just prior to 1789 and 1848 did mobilize the protests of the general population and exacerbated problems of poor relief, placing demands on governmental capacity that the institutions could not sustain. But it should be remembered that such problems had arisen before and that the primitive forms of social and economic protests that followed from them were not new. Although it is true that in France in 1789 and Prussia in 1848 the social and economic problems facing the state were changing in character, thus requiring superior innovative capacity on the part of the governing elites, it was precisely this failure to respond that is the feature that distinguishes these from the previous periods of emergency. The failure was due not only to the scope and character of the pressures but to the actual decline in the flexibility, autonomy, and morale of the political elites themselves.

III

The causes of political decay in France and Prussia prior to their revolutions are not easily detected because so little research has been devoted to the elites and institutions in question. My own work on the Prussian bureaucracy before, during, and after the Revolution of 1848 has led me to believe that contradictory economic, intellectual, and social changes were largely responsible for the decay. Increasing criticism of the state from both within and without seems to have caused the more traditionally trained and oriented members of the civil service to lose whatever psychological and social flexibility they had previously possessed. Innovation requires a certain confidence, the kind of flexibility that allows the innovator to accept a possible change in his own role as a result of other changes. But instead of becoming more adaptable as problems began to pile up, the older generation of Prussian bureaucrats seems to have clung ever more closely to the traditional symbols of status. In the 1840's these men enforced the seniority cus-

[29] Ford, 115ff; Göhring, 305-33; Koselleck, 398-447; Dietrich Eichholtz, *Junker und Bourgeoisie vor 1848 in der preussischen Eisenbahngeschichte* (Berlin 1962), 83-135, 159-82.

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toms of their profession with unyielding stubbornness, refusing to make way for younger men who might be able to handle problems more effectively. In the earlier period there had been a good deal more give and take within the collegiately organized Prussian system, but in the decade prior to 1848 questions or initiatives from the younger men tended to be met with resentment rather than reason. Simple matters of a technical sort became questions of authority; generational differences were accentuated; and the solidarity of the Prussian civil service dissolved into competing factions.[30]

The older generation of Prussian officials, a group that had originally viewed itself as a highly effective service nobility, had been spoiled by its earlier success. Forced to defend its own accomplishments against the criticism of the rising generation, it became conservative, stressing the social aspects of its heritage to the detriment of its political duties. Originally detached from and even scornful of the old aristocracy of birth, it began to adopt some of the ideas and habits associated with that group. The maintenance of the right style of life and the cultivation of the proper social contacts became increasingly important. Concern over status often took precedence over functional goals in the decade before the revolution; and though it would be a mistake to use the term "corrupt" to refer to the practices of the higher echelons, there were those who cared more for their own social and economic interests than for the tasks of government.[31]

Conditions such as these caused many younger men to go over to open opposition. They had not been trained in the traditions of the service nobility, and being of more heterogeneous backgrounds than the senior men they felt less attached to the older symbols of status. As I mentioned earlier, the junior ranks were overcrowded, a fact that contributed to the feeling of deprivation prevalent among the younger professionals. Thus, when the revolution came the state was a house divided. A significant minority of the bureaucracy, mainly younger, lower-ranking members, defected temporarily or permanently to the liberal and radical opposition movements, leaving those loyal to the old bureaucratic absolutism in a state of confusion and despair. It was not until some weeks after the beginning of the revolution that the older generation of officials began to regain their nerve, and then only after they had dropped their previously defensive stance and joined in the power struggle over the future of the Prussian political system.[32]

[30] Gillis "The Prussian Bureaucracy, 1840-1860," 75-126; Koselleck, 379-97.
[31] Gillis, "Aristocracy and Bureaucracy in Nineteenth-Century Prussia," 115-26.
[32] For the recollection of one prominent conservative, see Otto von Bismarck, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen*, 1 (Stuttgart 1898), 20-52. Bismarck's lingering distrust of the

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The situation in France before 1789 bears a number of resemblances to the Prussian conditions, though it should be noted that so little work has been done on many aspects of the pre-revolutionary political elites and institutions that my conclusions are only tentative. Within both the judiciary and the administration there is evidence that men had been turning their offices more to private gain than public good.[33] In part this was the outcome of the purchase system, though it has been noted that the price of many offices was falling in the eighteenth century, so that they were less economically attractive than they had been earlier. Nevertheless, the social value of public office did not depreciate during the same period; indeed, there is every indication that the social status of the civil servant was rising during the decades prior to the revolution.[34] One reason for this was the still intimate association of the old nobility with state office, but, whatever the cause, the emphasis on the social value of office among the wealthiest elements of the population contributed to regression in the level of institutionalization by perverting the purpose of office-holding and corrupting the organizations themselves. France in 1789 had not developed politically much beyond the point she had reached at the end of the reign of Louis XIV, and the progress made in certain areas was insufficient to meet the intensity and scope of the social and economic problems facing the country. In objective terms the level of institutionalization was lower than in 1715, for many of the major organs of the state were now less independent, less flexible, and less internally coherent in their operations than earlier. Like Prussia in the 1840's, France in the 1780's had reached a point of regression if not of actual breakdown in the course of political development.

IV

Collapse is perhaps too strong a word to describe the condition of the French and Prussian states on the eve of revolution, but if the level of cohesion and confidence of their respective bureaucratic elites is any

bureaucracy was partly attributable to the radicalism of some of its members during the revolution. Otto Hintze, "Bismarcks Stellung zur Monarchie und zum Beamtentum," *Geist und Epochen der preussischen Geschichte*, ed. Fritz Hartung (Leipzig 1943), 653-61.

[33] Ford, 188-201; Palmer, 67-84, 439-65.

[34] Taylor, 477-80. The fall in prices, particularly on the lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, may have been one reason why venality was so swiftly abolished on the night of August 4, 1789. By that time the social value of state office outweighed its financial returns. For another analysis of the change from the purchase to the merit system see Bert F. Hoselitz, "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," in Joseph LaPalombara, ed., *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton 1963), 168-98.

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measure of breakdown, a very serious situation prevailed. In France the changes necessary to restore the independence and morale of the civil elites were blocked by the tradition of selling offices for fiscal purposes, a practice no French state in financial straits could easily abolish. In Prussia the improvement of professional standards faced no similar financial barrier because offices had long since been detached from purchase, but there too the necessary reforms were blocked. The Prussian state had survived one near-fatal collapse in 1806, primarily because its bureaucracy and army had been flexible enough to innovate in time of crisis, but by 1848 the senior civil servants, who had performed so well forty years before, were too attached to past glories to be able to respond a second time.

In both countries the rate of political development was out of phase with social and economic change. Nowhere was this more evident than in the breakdown of those mechanisms that act to regulate both the quality and quantity of skilled personnel available to government institutions. With the exception of a few unique agencies, such as the intendants, most French departments had no way of determining the quality of those who purchased its offices. In many cases offices became hereditary, the instruments of powerful families who used them to satisfy the status-expectations of incompetent sons and needy nephews.[35] Prussia's problem was somewhat different because there already existed a system of examinations for entry into its civil service. But these qualifying exams had not been adjusted to the practices of the reformed and expanded German universities, with the result that there was little or no regulation of the numbers entering the apprentice ranks of the bureaucracy in the early nineteenth century. Eventually this surplus became a burden, and in the manner that has so often been repeated in today's developing countries the frustrated young candidates turned against the very institutions they had once hoped to enter.[36]

The lack of proper regulatory institutions in pre-revolutionary France and Prussia helps to account for what historians like to call the alienation of the intellectuals. Not only members of the free professions, but also those closest to the state itself—civil servants, teachers, lawyers, and sometimes the clergy—turned toward the opposition. In eighteenth-century France they found expression for their discontents in the Enlightenment, with its stress on the universality of norms and the value

[35] Gruder, 24-33; Ford, 105-19.

[36] Johannes Conrad, *The German Universities for the Last Fifty Years* (Glasgow 1885), 19-25. For the role of intellectuals in developing countries, consult Edward Shils, "Intellectuals in the Political Development of New States," *World Politics*, XII (April 1960), 329-68.

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of talent over birth.[37] Their support for democracy was rooted in their experience in and out of government; their dislike for aristocracy was more often a matter of professional judgment than of social prejudice. It is not surprising to find that many of the programs of the revolution were not the declarations of wild-eyed ideologues but the work of patient bureaucrats, plans retrieved from the desk drawers of the old regime, where they had lain useless in the previous decades. J. F. Bosher has shown that the demand for customs reform, a measure that triumphed in 1790, originated not by way of the abstract *laissez-faire* theories of the physiocrats but came from the practical experience of officials concerned with economic and political development.[38] Once the revolution had begun, officials did take part in ideological politics, but it is wrong to assume that their later commitments were the product of pure reflection. In most cases the concerns they expressed through political slogans and parties involved matters about which there had been considerable prior discussion within the various agencies of the old regime. It is not surprising that they focused so much attention on problems of political development, the most neglected area in the previous decades. Living in a country still divided into many separate weak states, Prussia's reform-minded officials tended to see political development as inseparably linked with the national unification. No wonder then that German liberalism, a movement led by professors and bureaucrats, placed such great emphasis on a strong unified state as the first step toward the solution of other problems.[39]

The most notable thing about the pre-revolutionary political movements in both countries is that they were largely the creation of members of the bureaucratic elites themselves. This may help explain why in both France and Prussia the initial programs of the revolutionaries were so little concerned with problems of the businessman and the laboring poor. Marxist historians have trouble explaining the politics of what are supposed to be bourgeois revolutions of 1789 and 1848 because the course and outcome of those events do not reflect the immediate interests of a capitalist class. They find it equally difficult to apply a class interpretation to the programs of the later, more radical phases of these revolutions, whose politics do not necessarily represent the interests of the working poor. The fact is that the main thrust of change in every phase of the European revolutions of the late eighteenth

[37] Tocqueville, 138-47; Dawson, "The *Bourgeoisie de Robe* in 1789"; Robert Darnton, "Grub Street Style of Revolution: J. P. Brissot, Police Spy," *Journal of Modern History*, XL (September 1968), 301-27; Cobban, 54-67.

[38] Bosher, *The Single Duty Project*, 170-71.

[39] Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom* (Boston 1957), 329-40.

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and early nineteenth centuries seems to have been aimed largely at political rather than social or economic development; and even when certain measures seem to be motivated by class interests, they often turn out to be little more than extensions of previously frustrated political reform programs inherited from the enlightened bureaucrats of the old regimes. George V. Taylor's description of the French Revolution as "essentially a political revolution with social consequences and not a social revolution with political consequences" applies equally well to the Prussian case.[40]

The programs of both moderates and radicals were not devoid of social and economic content, but it was not the interests of the businessmen and laboring poor that were foremost in the minds of those who had led these factions. The various parties that emerged before or during the revolutions were divided more along lines of official rank than by class or caste. In France the revolutionary assemblies were dominated not by businessmen but by lawyers, though in Prussia it was the bureaucrats and others closely connected with the state who directed the parliamentary proceedings.[41] There were bitter debates over the direction political development should take, but in every case the programs were essentially forward-looking, aimed at further institutional differentiation, rationalization, elimination of corruption, and, of course, greater opportunity for the man of talent. In France in 1789 and Prussia in 1848 the major enduring conflicts were not between the landed aristocracy and the capitalist bourgeoisie but among men experienced in the functions of government who differed over what form a more efficient and effective political system should take. Even among conservatives there developed a gradual recognition of the fact that the old regime had shown itself to be incapable of dealing with the problems of the day; and in the political vacuum left by those events surrounding the breakdown of the old political system, they too joined the struggle to shape a workable political system.

V

The European revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can no longer be interpreted in terms of capitalism versus feudalism. In contrast to revolutions in today's developing areas, where struggle is more likely to conform to social or economic divisions, the conflicts

[40] Taylor, 491; Cobban, 162-73; Behrens, 176-77.

[41] James Sheehan, "Political Leadership in the German Reichstag, 1871-1918," *American Historical Review*, LXXIV (December 1968), 511-13; Karl Demeter, "Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Parlaments seit 1848," *Vierteljahrsschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, XXXIX (1952), 1-28.

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in France and Prussia more often focused on issues that were essentially constitutional and administrative. The circumstances of the origins of these revolutions had much to do with this, for the fact that they began with the breakdown of the existing forms of government had a determining effect on their courses and their conclusions. In each case the initial collapse of the regime left a power vacuum that was immediately filled with loosely organized factions, each fighting for its version of a new political community. Failure had discredited the old structures, not only in the eyes of the moderate liberals and radicals but also among the conservative factions. Even the nobility and the clergy, once faced with the fact of the breakdown of the old institutions, were willing to abandon the old system. In France there was surprisingly little opposition to the abolition of venality, and in Prussia conservatives were generally willing to discard their romantic notions of feudal restoration once they were faced by the realities of political collapse.[42]

In the initial stages of both revolutions political parties were weak and the level of political mobilization of the general population remained low. In a period when there were as yet no professional politicians in the modern sense of that term, it was natural that leadership should be exercised by men who were in some sense amateurs but at the same time had had considerable experience with public matters from the administrative or judicial point of view: lawyers, civil servants, teachers, and other professional men. Only later, when political parties and public opinion were more fully developed in the modern sense, did class or interest groups begin to play an important part; and only then did parliamentary politics cease to function as a forum for factions within the bureaucratic elites and become an instrument for particular social and economic bodies previously excluded from the politics of the old regime. This happened only gradually and it was not until after the revolutions were over that these newer groups began to exert a direct influence as great as that of the elites traditionally associated with the institutions of the state. In contrast to that of developing countries, where political participation often reaches a fairly high level before the revolution, mobilization was relatively weak at the time of the European revolutions.

Other groups, including elements of the lower classes, intervened

[42] Sigmund Neumann, *Die Stufen des preussischen Konservatismus* (Berlin 1930), 68ff. Demands for institutional reform, including the abolition of venality, are recorded in the *cahiers* of all three of the French estates in 1789. Beatrice Hyslop, *French Nationalism in 1789 according to the General Cahiers* (New York 1934), 72-73, 86-87, 100-49.

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only sporadically in the political process of both the French and Prussian revolutions; and while their actions had some effect on the decision-making elites, those in positions of leadership could not be deflected from their basic preoccupation with political development.[43] This is not to say that the peasant revolts and urban rebellions that occurred at various times during the course of the revolutions had no effect on the course and outcome of political events. The timing of tax strikes and protest marches was often important in tipping the balance of power in favor of one faction or another, and parliamentary parties and individual politicians did draw strength from the support of the crowd at crucial points in the political struggle. But such popular actions were more often accidental than purposive, and it is perhaps better to view the outcome in both France and Prussia as the result of the fortuitous interaction of several different types of upheaval rather than as the effect of one organically interrelated set of events. Only in the parliaments and revolutionary bureaus was there much continuity of thought and action. Though the urban and rural crowd has its place in the history of the revolutionary period, rebellious peasants and artisans were isolated from the elites who dominated the center of the political stage and were incapable of directly affecting those decisions that were to have the greatest impact in the long run.

Those who dominated the assemblies and ran the bureaus were, as I have already noted, primarily men with long-standing interests in such matters as government efficiency and long-range economic development. When concrete, immediate social and economic interests entered into their debates they did so primarily as they related to the legitimacy and strength of political institutions. It does little good to describe the various constitutions of the French Revolution or the laws passed in 1848 as bourgeois or proletarian in origin; and it is just as fruitless to call these "revolutions of intellectuals," since those terms explain as little about the revolutionaries' motives as does the language of class analysis. The notion that the French revolutionaries were fanatical dreamers who were without political skill or realism, a view first popularized by Burke, is easily dispensed with. The work of the French assemblies and revolutionary governments, particularly that

[43] On the character of the politics of the laboring poor see Albert Soboul, *The Parisian Sans-Culottes and the French Revolution, 1793-1794* (Oxford 1964); and Paul Noyes, *Revolution and Organization: Working Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848/49* (Princeton 1966). Though still loyal to the Marxist traditions of historiography, Soboul states that the laboring poor of the Paris sections acted more like a political faction than a conscious working class. Noyes presents the German artisans as politically liberal but socially conservative, without modern class consciousness.

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relating to the restructuring of the legal order and the reorganization of the bureaucracy, was sufficiently effective to remain a permanent part of the French state even after the revolution. The work of the parliament in Prussia, also initially attacked as unrealistic, was later embraced by the very men who were its original critics. Ironically, it was Bismarck, a man who had helped establish the pejorative meaning of the term "revolution of intellectuals," who made the constitutional drafts of 1848 the basis for the laws of his Second Empire.[44]

European revolutions tended to pass through a number of distinct phases, each of which provided a slightly different design for political stability. Yet once we get beyond the welter of constitutions we see certain common themes that characterize the entire sequence from start to finish. Even the apparently anti-authoritarian tendencies of the earlier phases contributed to the growth of stronger, more flexible and complex political institutions. It is interesting to note that the early stages of the French Revolution accelerated the growth and development of the bureaucracy almost as much as did the later Napoleonic era, the period that is most often associated with the establishment of strong central government.[45] Although each faction that came to power was committed to a different degree of political freedom and equality, all were in basic agreement on such issues as the desirability of secular symbols of national loyalty, the need for a civil service freed from patronage and venality, and the mobilization of the male population for the service of the state. The same was true of the Prussian revolution, in which even the most anti-authoritarian groups pressed for the modernization of the civil service. Prussian conservatives, who before 1848 had been demanding decentralization of certain aspects of government, now reversed themselves, gradually becoming the staunchest defenders of a centralized system of authority.[46] Thus there was a great deal more consensus than is generally recognized by those historians who concentrate their attention on specific social and economic issues raised in the course of the revolutions. Though it is true that these often aroused some of the most bitter debate, legislation such as the

[44] The continuity of constitutional and administrative development is treated in Ernst Rudolf Huber's *Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789*, III (Stuttgart 1963), 809ff. For France, see Jacques Godechot, *Les institutions de la France sous la Révolution et l'Empire* (Paris 1951).

[45] On the growth and rationalization of the bureaucracy during the French Revolution consult Clive Church, "The Social Basis of the French Central Bureaucracy under the Directory, 1795-1799," *Past and Present*, XXXVI (April 1967), 59-72; and the conference report on social mobility in *Past and Present*, XXXII (December 1965), 7-11.

[46] The expansion and development of bureaucratic institutions is described in Gillis, "The Prussian Bureaucracy, 1840-1860," chaps. 4-6.

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abolition of internal tariffs in 1790 or the Le Chapelier laws of 1791 often turn out to be instruments of political development rather than the products of class interest they are conventionally assumed to represent. In many cases the continuity of reform antedates the outbreak of the revolution itself, thus lending further weight to a political interpretation of the later events.[47]

The revolutions tended to run their course until such time as the newly created institutions of the state began to function effectively. When the reformed civil and military services had had time to institutionalize their operations, when the new secular symbols of authority had been widely accepted, the dynamics of the revolutionary process slowed and eventually stopped. As the agencies of tax collection began to deliver revenue and the new civil and military services began to operate with reasonable efficiency, the power of government to repress or control opposition was enormously increased. Yet the habit of obedience was rarely restored by coercion alone, and as Reinhard Bendix has argued, the successful integration of disparate groups within the new communities of citizenship had a definite conservative effect.[48] Bendix supports the contention that a substantial part of the popular discontent before and during the European revolutions was political rather than social and economic in character. Although there were severe repercussions from overpopulation and poor harvests, the overriding concern of those in control at the time was the attainment of civil and political equality rather than social or economic reform. Once the goal of political integration had been achieved, even the most self-consciously radical groups were willing to work within the political community for the achievement of their more specific social and economic goals. The social and economic consequences of the establishment of civil and political equality were of course enormous, leading to less spectacular but extremely important post-revolutionary changes that would eventually alter the character of the French and German societies. But it would be a mistake to identify these long-run effects with the purposes of the original reformers, whose concerns were primarily political.

The achievement of a high level of political development with respect to both the internal administration of the state and its representative institutions also moderated the open opposition within the political elites themselves. As the French historian Marcel Reinhard has pointed

[47] Cobban, 63; Bosher, 170-71.

[48] Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship* (London 1964), 55-104; and T. H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," *Class, Citizenship, and Social Development* (Garden City 1965), 71-134.

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out, the most obvious winners in the French upheaval were the civil and military services.[49] For whatever party ultimately triumphed, these elites were assured institutions better suited to their personal needs and professional goals. In 1815, when the Bourbon monarchy was restored in France, there was no attempt to displace the basic political institutions acquired in the course of the revolution. There were some changes of personnel at the highest levels, but for the most part the Napoleonic bureaucracy and military services remained intact. In Prussia it was the conservatives who completed the modernization of the legal and administrative system begun by the radicals in 1848; and in both countries new symbols of legitimacy, as well as the concept of civil equality, were honored by the restoration regimes. Indeed, it was the French ultraconservatives after 1815 and the Bismarckian conservatives after 1848 who wished to extend the process of political mobilization to its logical conclusion of universal male suffrage. They found universal suffrage and universal military conscription useful means for stabilizing their regimes.[50]

VI

The age of revolution in Western Europe was a fairly brief one, lasting only from the late eighteenth to the mid-nineteenth century. Upheavals after that period were usually externally caused, resulting from defeat in war, as was the case in the Paris Commune of 1871 and the so-called German Revolution of 1918.[51] In the post-revolutionary decades, movements of social protest, such as the working-class movement, would grow stronger, but the state managed to contain them with its strengthened institutions. In retrospect, it seems that European states were most prone to revolution during the period when the pace of social, economic, and political modernization was beginning to accelerate but before it had reached a high level in any of these areas. In the case of both France and Prussia the transition from tradition to modernity appears to have upset the rather high level of political institutionalization that had been achieved a century or more before their respective revolutions. The collapse that preceded each revolution was the product not only of the internal decay of the old institutions but

[49] Marcel Reinhard, "Elite et noblesse dans la seconde moitié du XVIIIe Siècle," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, III (1956), 36-37.

[50] René Rémond, *The Right Wing in France from 1815 to de Gaulle*, trans. by J. M. Laux (Philadelphia 1966), 32-78; Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany* (Princeton 1963), 311-36.

[51] For a view critical of the conventional interpretations of the French Revolution of 1830 see David Pinkney, "The Crowd in the French Revolution of 1830," *American Historical Review*, LXX (October 1964), 1-17.

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also of the pressures for reform that were part of the process of political modernization. At a certain point the balance of tradition and modernity that characterized the transition period began to shift in favor of the latter, and at this juncture the state was particularly vulnerable to collapse. In both France and Prussia revolution was an instrument of political modernization. Once a fairly high level of modern political development had been reached and the transition stage had been passed, the age of revolution was over, for by that time the essential character of development had been altered in the direction of sustained and seemingly irreversible political as well as social and economic modernization.

The European experience would seem to substantiate Samuel Huntington's generalization that revolution "is most likely to occur in societies which have experienced some social and economic development and where their processes of political modernization and political development have lagged behind the processes of social and economic change."[52] Yet Europe's age of revolution also had unique aspects that deviate from the patterns of developing countries, from whose history such conclusions are so often drawn. It was not simply an imbalance between the rates of change in the various sectors that produced the revolutionary situation, but also the apparently autonomous decay in the political area that precipitated the periods of violent domestic change. Models of revolution such as those developed by Chalmers Johnson, which depend on a structural-functional concept of disequilibrium between the state on the one hand and society on the other, do not provide an adequate explanation of the European upheavals. Nor do those explanations of revolution that simply assert the intransigence of the governing elites as a cause of disruption go far enough in their explanations. Intransigence or even outright incompetence are common enough in political history, but they are very different from the kind sustained by political regression that preceded the Prussian and French revolutions. In order to understand European revolutions, we must take into account the history of political decay; and to do this historians and social scientists must be willing to treat the institutions and personnel of the state as independent variables, with their own patterns and rates of change.

Without denying the importance of studying changes in the social, economic, and cultural spheres, it is nevertheless possible to demand that greater attention be paid to the political elites and the institutional context in which they operated. The nineteenth-century European tradition of distinguishing sharply between state and society no longer

[52] Huntington, *Political Order and Changing Society*, 265.

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seems so outdated when it is understood that political development does not always follow the pace set by social and economic change.[53] This does not mean that the study of the social and economic aspects of European revolutions must be abandoned, but only that political history be restored to the importance and autonomy it deserves. Only when this is accomplished will the historical relation between state and society be more accurately established and a clearer understanding of the role of political development in the events of European revolution fully achieved.

[53] A brief survey of that tradition is provided by Werner Conze, "Social History," *Journal of Social History*, 1 (Fall 1967), 7-16.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICIES

Modernization, Interdependence, and Externalization

By EDWARD L. MORSE*

FOREIGN policy has been radically transformed by the revolutionary processes of modernization not only in the societies composing the Atlantic region, but wherever high levels of modernization exist. There is a quality about modernization that dissolves the effects of what have generally been considered the major determinants of foreign policy, whether these determinants are based on ideology and type of political system (democratic versus totalitarian foreign policies, for example), or power and capability (great-power versus small-power policies). Wherever modernized societies exist, their foreign policies are more similar to each other than they are to the foreign policies of nonmodernized societies, regardless of the scale of the society or its type of government.

Both the international and the domestic settings in which foreign policies are formulated and conducted are subjected to continual and revolutionary transformation once high levels of modernization exist. Internationally, modernization is accompanied by increased levels and types of interdependencies among national societies. Domestically, it is associated with increased centralization of governmental institutions and governmental decision-making as well as with increased priorities for domestic rather than for external needs.

As a result of these transformations, three general sets of conditions have developed. First, the ideal and classical distinctions between foreign and domestic affairs have broken down, even though the myths associated with sovereignty and the state have not. Second, the distinction between "high policies" (those associated with security and the continued existence of the state) and "low policies" (those pertaining to the wealth and welfare of the citizens) has become less important as low policies have assumed an increasingly large role in any society. Third, although there have been significant developments in the in-

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strumentalities of political control, the actual ability to control events either internal or external to modernized societies—even those that are Great Powers—has decreased with the growth of interdependence, and is likely to decrease further.

Modernization and Foreign Policy

The notion that modernization has a revolutionary effect on foreign policy is not a new one. Comte and Spencer, for example, among other optimistic observers of industrialization in the nineteenth century, tried to demonstrate the irrationality of war as an instrument of policy in the relations among highly developed countries. On the other hand, Hobson, Lenin, and others who surveyed industrialization and linked it to the "new imperialism" of the late nineteenth century found that what they understood as modernization would lead to conflict among the same societies.

The view of modernization that underlies the concept of foreign policy in this essay owes little to such theories of economic determinism and little to the normative biases held by those writers. Moreover, it is not concerned with what happens in a society, and, consequently, to the foreign policy of its government, during the various phases of modernization. Rather, it acknowledges that the development of levels associated with "high modernization" carries with it implications for foreign policy. Once high mass-consumption levels are reached in a society and once high levels of interdependence among modernized societies exist, several common features of foreign policy appear that can be discussed in general terms and that pertain to democratic and nondemocratic political systems alike.

The implications of modernization for foreign policy can be derived from many of the definitions of modernization that have been formulated. I have chosen to follow Levy's definition because of its power in isolating those societies in which I am interested. It is based on two variables: "the uses of inanimate sources of power and the use of tools to multiply the effect of effort."[1] Each of these variables is conceived as a continuum, so that "a society will be considered more or less modernized to the extent that its members use inanimate sources of power and/or tools to multiply the effects of their efforts."[2] Accordingly, "Among the members of relatively modernized societies, uses of inanimate sources of power not only predominate, but they predominate in

[1] Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies* (Princeton 1966), II.

[2] *Ibid.*

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such a way that it is almost impossible to envisage any considerable departure in the direction of the uses of animate sources of power without the most far-reaching changes of the entire system. The multiplication of effort by application of tools is high and the rate is probably increasing exponentially."[3]

Only a few such societies have existed in history, and they all reached high levels of modernization during the nineteenth or twentieth centuries. Those for which the generalizations in this essay are germane include the fourteen societies identified by Russett and others as "high mass-consumption" societies.[4] They are all modern democracies. There is no logical reason to assume, however, that the foreign policies of nondemocratic modernized societies would not also be subsumed by these generalizations.

The general characteristics of modernized societies include the growth of knowledge about and control over the physical environment; increased political centralization, accompanied by the growth of specialized bureaucratic organizations and by the politicization of the masses; the production of economic surpluses and wealth generalized over an entire population; urbanization; and the psychological adjustment to change and the fleeting, rather than acceptance of the static and permanent.[5]

The achievement of high levels of modernization has also been associated with the growth of nationalism and the idealization of the nation-state as the basic political unit. The consolidation of the nation-state, however, is the central political enigma of contemporary international affairs, for modernization has also been accompanied by transnational structures that cannot be subjected to the control of isolated national political bodies. These structures exist in the military field, where security in the nuclear age has everywhere become increasingly a function of activities pursued outside the state's borders. They also exist in the economic field, where the welfare not only of the members of various societies, but of the societies themselves, increasingly relies upon the maintenance of stable commercial and monetary arrangements that are independent of any single national government.

The confrontation of the political structures that have developed

[3] *Ibid.*, 85.

[4] See Bruce M. Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven 1964), 298. These fourteen societies are the Netherlands, West Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, the United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Canada, and the United States.

[5] These five characteristics are adopted from Cyril E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History* (New York 1967), 9-34.

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along the lines of the nation-state with these transnational activities is one of the most significant features of contemporary international politics. Modernization has resulted in the integration of individual national societies, which face problems that can be solved in isolation with decreasing reliability. In other words, modernization has transformed not only the domestic setting in which foreign policy is formulated; by creating higher levels of interdependence among the diverse national societies, it has also transformed the general structures of international society.

FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

The fundamental distinction that breaks down under modernization is between foreign and domestic policies, at least in ideal terms. This distinction is much more characteristic of the foreign policies of nonmodernized societies in both ideal and actual terms than it is of modernized states. In modernized societies, it is difficult to maintain because both predominantly political and predominantly nonpolitical interactions take place across societies at high levels, and because transnational phenomena are so significant that either territorial and political or the jurisdictional boundaries are extremely difficult to define. The whole constellation of activities associated with modernization blurs the distinction so that an observer must analyze carefully any interaction in order to ascertain in what ways it pertains to foreign and domestic affairs.

Foreign policies can be analytically distinguished from domestic policies. Foreign policies are, at a minimum, manifestly oriented to some actual or potential sphere external to a political system, i.e., to some sphere outside the jurisdiction or control of the polity. Domestic policies, on the contrary, are oriented to some sphere within the jurisdiction and control of the polity. Foreign policies may be addressed principally to some domestic interest group, but as long as they carry some minimum intention and recognition of an external orientation they are considered foreign policies.

Classical distinctions between foreign and domestic policies are more normatively based and break down once societies become fairly modernized. Two sorts of classical distinctions exist. One, which underlies the Rankean tradition of the primacy of foreign policy, stresses the special significance foreign policies carry that other policies do not. This significance is the concern of foreign policy with the existence and security of a society: "The position of a state in the world depends on the degree of independence it has attained. It is obliged, therefore,

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to organize all its internal resources for the purpose of self-preservation. This is the supreme law of the state."[6]

The other tradition is the democratic one, which also is normative and which stresses the primacy of domestic over foreign affairs. Unlike the Rankean tradition, associated originally with monarchic foreign policies and later with totalitarian ones, this tradition stresses the pacific nature of policy, its formulation by representative legislative groups, and the control of external events by open rather than closed-door diplomacy. In this sense, democracies were thought to suffer severe disabilities in the conduct of foreign affairs.

In either case, there is an assumption that there exists an ontological divorce between foreign and domestic affairs that carries with it in political analysis normative tendencies to stress one of the two while ignoring the other. Foreign policy has been thought to differ from domestic policy in its ends (the national interest as opposed to particular interests), its means (any means that can be invoked to achieve the ends, as opposed to domestically "legitimate" means), and its target of operation (a decentralized, anarchic milieu over which the state in question maintains little control, as opposed to a centralized domestic order in which the state has a monopoly of the instruments of social order). Whether the substance of the distinction stresses domestic or foreign affairs, the separation of the two has a strong empirical foundation. Levels of interdependence among all nonmodernized societies were generally so low that governments could take independent actions either domestically or abroad with fairly little likelihood that much spillover between them would take place. The instruments used to implement either domestic or foreign policies had effects on either that were in normal times negligible. The "externalities" generated by either domestic or foreign policies did not significantly alter policies in the other field.

This is not to say that domestic factors did not affect foreign policy at all, nor that the general international setting did not affect the substance of policies. What it does suggest is that the normative distinction between foreign and domestic activities was quite well matched by actual conditions. The degrees to which they did not coincide led to debates about ways to improve the efficacy of foreign or domestic policies, or about their goals. But the degree of divergence was not so great as to call the distinction into question.

Regardless of how the distinction is made, it breaks down once

[6] Leopold von Ranke, "A Dialogue on Politics," reprinted in Theodore H. Von Laue, *Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years* (Princeton 1950), 168.

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societies become fairly modernized. This does not mean, as Friedrich has argued, that "foreign and domestic policy in developed Western systems constitutes today a seamless web."[7] Distinctions along the analytic lines I have suggested above still obtain, and governments still formulate policies with a predominant external or internal orientation. But foreign and other policies formulated under modern conditions affect each other in ways that are not salient in nonmodernized or premodernized societies and that derive from both the domestic and international interdependencies associated with modernization. They also derive from the increased scope of governmental activities under modern conditions. Before the Western societies became highly modernized, for example, the major part of government expenditures was devoted to foreign affairs, which was the central concern of government. As the role of the government in the economy and in domestic social life increases, concern for foreign affairs must decrease relative to concern for domestic affairs.[8] In addition, as a result of growing international interdependencies, the external and internal consequences of domestic and foreign policies become more significant, and consequences that are not intended and that may or may not be recognized tend also to increase. Therefore, undesirable policy-consequences also increase. This is true, for example, in terms of allocations of resources, regardless of the multiplier effect.

One example of the growing interdependence of foreign and domestic affairs in all modernized societies is related to the emphasis on a favorable balance of payments position. A requisite of favorable trade and services balance may be the restraint of domestic economic growth and the maintenance of economic stability at home in order to prevent domestic prices (and wages) from rising. At the same time, domestic growth is required to meet demands for raised living standards. But, in order to foster growth and meet demands for increased wages, a favorable balance of trade may have to be sacrificed.

The linkages between domestic and foreign policies constitute the basic characteristic of the breakdown in the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs in the modernized, interdependent international system. This statement does not imply that foreign and domestic policies are indistinguishable; for with regard to articulated goals and problems of implementation, they remain separate. Rather, it is suggestive of the ways in which foreign policies are transformed by the

[7] Carl J. Friedrich, "Intranational Politics and Foreign Policy in Developed (Western) Societies," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston 1966), 97.

[8] See Russett and others, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*, 308-309.

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processes of modernization and the development of high levels of interdependence. These processes have put an end to the normative distinctions asserting the primacy of the one or the other. They also overshadow the empirical distinction according to which foreign policies vary in type with the political institutions in which they are formulated.

THE DYNAMICS OF FOREIGN POLICIES IN MODERNIZED SOCIETIES

Foreign policies, like other sorts of policies, can be analyzed in terms of their substance, or *content*, the *processes* by which they are formulated, and their *outcomes*. Each of these three dimensions is transformed under the impact of modernization.

First, in terms of content, the ideal pattern of foreign policies, with its emphasis on the "high policy" functions of security and defense, or, alternatively, on expansion of some attribute of the state, has been widened into if not replaced by a new pattern. Either there is a broadening of the spectrum of policy goals to include goals of wealth and welfare in addition to those of power and position associated with high policies, or these older ideal patterns are completely overshadowed by the advent of "low policies."[9] What is distinctive and new about these policies is that they are primarily non-conflictual. Like the relations of which they are a part, some are merely fleeting and casual. Others are explicitly cooperative and pertain to the production of international collective goods,[10] which require compatible efforts on the part of official and nonofficial groups in diverse societies. In the case of highly modernized societies, their chief trait is that they *are seen as* economic goods. They arise from growth in international trade and the concomitant necessity to regulate trade imbalances, to produce additional liquidity, to finance trade, and to create all the other regulative devices

[9] Stanley Hoffmann offers another argument on "low policies" and "high policies" in his essay "Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," *Daedalus*, XCV (Summer 1966), 862-915. Hoffmann feels that nuclear stalemate has served to reinforce the attributes of the nation-state by stabilizing the structure of postwar international society, and that low policies do not generate the spillover expected of them by prophets of international integration. Although Hoffmann is quite right in saying that the integrationists overestimated the potential of economic exigencies for creating international integration, his denial of any effect of low policies is overstated.

[10] In definitions of public goods, the emphasis is usually placed on one society rather than on a group of societies. The focus is then on nonexclusivity or the incapacity of a single organization or government to prevent any individual members from receiving its benefits. See Mancur Olson, Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965). It is also true, however, that incentives exist for cooperation within a group, based on the lure of greater benefits.

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that go along with trade practices. They also pertain to the transformation of alliance structures in a nuclear world.

Although many of these goods are measurable in economic terms, they are not to be considered in the domain of international economics. On the contrary, one of the central features of politics among modernized societies is that the politics of wealth and welfare have overshadowed the politics of power and position, which in the relations among modernized societies are played out in economic terms. Trade rounds in GATT and reform measures in the IMF are the essence of international politics today. The purely political and purely economic cannot be seen as empirically separable.

Moreover, since the salient feature of this relation is an economic one, it has the additional characteristic that it is eminently commensurable, thus fostering theorizing about international political relations. One of the traditional difficulties associated with theorizing about international politics was that traditional national foreign objectives tended to be incommensurable. These goals were, in general, transcendental, by which I mean that they were never completely identified with empirical states of affairs. Such goals as "security," "grandeur," or "power" are characteristic transcendental national goals.[11] In the case of highly modernized societies, there arises an additional spectrum of goals that are empirical or at least almost completely transferable to empirical ones. These goals generally refer to qualities associated with wealth and welfare.

Second, with respect to the processes by which foreign policies are formulated, it is modernization rather than democratization that has transformed foreign policy decision-making from cabinet-style, closed decision-making, to open politics, both domestically and in international negotiations. The locus of foreign policy decision-making, with rare exception, has remained fundamentally administrative, with the legislature in a democracy becoming a place where foreign policy debates, as opposed to decisions, occur.

Third, and last, the problem of implementing and controlling foreign policies is also transformed under modernization. In one sense, as indicated by the definition I have proposed concerning foreign policies, the problem of controlling events external to a state is the pre-eminent problem for foreign policy wherever there exist political units without any overarching political authority structures. There was

[11] For a discussion of the transfer of action referents from transcendental to empirical ones, see Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Rapid Social Change and Some Implications for Modernization," *International Conference on the Problems of Modernization in Asia*, June 28-July 7, 1965 (Seoul 1965), 657-58.

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a time when great powers were separated from other powers b degree to which their governments could control events extern them as well as by the domestic effects of their external activities. To that distinction is made either on the basis of destructive power alor or with regard to nonmilitary areas. Because of the added complexit of the problems of control under modernized conditions, or at least in contemporary international society, no state can now be said to be a great power in the old sense of the term.

In addition, however, what is special about foreign policies as they are conducted in modern states today is the scale of the problem of control. The loss of control both domestically and in terms of foreign affairs, at a time when interdependencies among modernized societies are rising, will prove to be the central problem of international politics in the coming years. This central problem has several implications, not the least important of which is the future of the nation-state and the kinds of functional equivalents that can be devised to substitute for the state in those areas where the state can no longer be effective.

A. *The Transformation of Policy Objectives.* Preoccupation with high policies and traditional foreign policy objectives and instrumentalities has drawn the attention of scholars away from the changes in policy goals that have accompanied modernization, and specifically from the increased salience of low policies and the merging of goals of power and goals of plenty.

Most general discussions of foreign policy objectives focus on the oals of high policies, which in the past were generally conceived as timate ends and were transcendental. The classical goals of statecraft at Wolfers has defined as goals of "self-extension" or goals of "self-pres- ation" were such transcendental goals,[12] as were the goals known as perialism," "security," "prestige," and the ideal or postulated ition" or "role" of a state in the international system. For example, · transcendental goal of security may be identified with stature in ıternational system, or with a certain set of role-premises such as ator" or "balancer."

ggested with regard to transcendental goals that the classical f power and security have been expanded to, or superseded by, wealth and welfare. This change has been accompanied by a n the empirical referents used to identify transcendental goals. dental goals always have some empirical referent, but they are

Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Balti- 91-102. Wolfers adds a third category "self-abnegation," which fits a logical mpirical gap.

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only partly and never wholly identified with them. For example, power, or prestige, has been associated, in part, with increased population and with accretions of territory. What is interesting about the empirical referents of transcendental goals is that "they change; new ones are created; old ones pass out of existence; and their relations . . . are shuffled."[13]

Here, the old identification of power and security with territory and population has been changed to an identification of welfare with economic growth. "Territorial conquest," as Klaus Knorr has written, "by force of arms has lost the perennial attraction it possessed throughout mankind's violent history."[14]

Two general transformations associated with high levels of modernization are responsible for this change. One pertains to the classical instruments of policy, armaments and weapons, and the changes brough about in external goals by the development of nuclear weapons an their delivery systems. The other is related to more general tran formations of domestic society.

The effects of nuclear weapons on national external goals have ceived far greater attention than have the effects of the transformat of domestic society. This one-sided attention is a result of the occupation with high policies and serves to obscure more ra changes in policy objectives. It is also related to the assumption even with the development of nuclear weapons systems *plus ça cl plus c'est la même chose*, or that neither military nor economic dependence has grown in recent years, but that they may eve diminished considerably.[15] The development of nuclear weap had a crosscutting effect. On the one hand, it makes the territor incapable of providing defense and security, by creating the f global international system unified by the possibility of gener acceptable levels of human destruction. On the other hanc weapons are also said to reaffirm the viability of the nation political unit, by providing its absolute defense by deterrenc

In any case, the key to the obsolescence of territorial go companied the development of nuclear weapons is the in of territorial accretion. No modernized state can afford i fore no accident that major territorial disputes have disa relations among the highly modernized states and nc

[13] Levy, "Rapid Social Change," 657.

[14] Klaus Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age* 21.

[15] This is the argument in Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tu *and Justice* (Baltimore 1967), 325.

[16] A balanced analysis of both schools of thought can be foun "The Nation-State in the Nuclear Age," *Survey*, LXVII (April 19

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where there is no danger that nuclear weapons will be used and, therefore, accompany nation-building efforts only in the nonmodernized societies. Modernized societies are involved in major territorial disputes only when these disputes also involve a nonmodernized society as well, as in the case of the Sino-Soviet border. Territoriality decreases in importance even further as alliances become less useful. Requisites for American security, once consisting of territorial bases encircling the Soviet bloc, have changed tremendously with the hardening of missiles and the development of Polaris and Poseidon submarines.

Though the transformation of policy goals accompanying modernization is striking with reference to the ideal identification of power with territory and population, it is less apparent when power is identified with wealth, as it was by the mercantilist doctrine, which underlies classical notions of power politics.[17] The pursuit of both was thought to involve zero-sum conditions. Power, like wealth, was thought to be a universal constant. One state's gain was another's loss. Actual transformations associated with modernization and involving both domestic economic growth and international interdependence have changed these notions as well. The conditions giving verisimilitude to the zero-sum conception of power and wealth changed with rapid domestic economic growth and with the development of economic and other international interdependencies, as well as with the politicization of large groups in modernized societies that make increased demands upon government.

Rapid domestic economic growth, one of the prime indices of modernization, has a profound effect on both the relative priority of domestic and foreign goals and on the substance of each. Once economic growth sets in as a continuous, dynamic process, the value of accretion of territory and population dwindles and the "domestic savings and investment and advancement of education, science, and technology are [seen as] the most profitable means and the most secure avenues to the attainment of wealth and welfare."[18] The logic of economic growth, in other words, turns men's minds away from the external goals associated with the ruling groups of early modern Europe and toward the further development of domestic wealth by domestic means and under conditions of peace.[19]

[17] See Jacob Viner, "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries," *World Politics*, 1 (October 1948), 1-29.

[18] Knorr, *On the Uses of Military Power*, 22.

[19] Recent economic thought on the relation between war and economic growth falls into a great tradition of non-Marxist economic-political theory. For a history of these writings, see Edmund Silberner, *La guerre et la paix dans l'histoire des doctrines économiques* (Paris 1957).

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Domestic economic growth, like the creation of nuclear weapons, offers only a partial explanation of the transformation of foreign policy goals. In addition, the salience of low policies and the expansion of conflictual, zero-sum relations to cooperative strategies result also from transnational structures associated with modernization and the interdependencies that have developed among the modernized states. Low policies, in this sense, derive from the interactions of citizens in various states and from the actions of governments in the interests of their citizens or their responses to private group behavior in order to assure general stability and the achievement of other goals. These goals are themselves undermined by the scope of nongovernmental transnational and international interchanges and may also be predominantly domestic and pertain to welfare and social services.

Another aspect of the increased salience of low policies pertains to the interests of governments in building new transnational structures in order to achieve both international and domestic goals. For example, one of the motivations for creating a common market in Europe has been the increased wealth it would bring to the citizens of each member-state as a result of increased levels of trade. It is for this reason that one principal characteristic of foreign policies under modernized conditions is that they approach the pole of cooperation rather than the pole of conflict. Conflictual or political activities, therefore, take place within the context of predominantly cooperative arrangements. Plays for power or position among these modernized states occur in the nonzero-sum worlds of the IMF and NATO rather than in predominantly conflictual arenas.

The low policies, in short, have become central to international politics among the modernized states and involve the building up of international collective goods in defense and NATO, and in international wealth-and-welfare organizations such as GATT and the EEC. It is within the parameters set by the need for cooperation that interplays of power and position can occur.

The collectivization of objectives in such matters as monetary and trade policies, which assume increased importance along with domestic welfare, has also set severe restrictions upon the traditional objective of independence. Since the modernized world is a highly interdependent one, both because of the existence of transnational politics and other phenomena in communications and trade, and because of policies, intentionally fostered by governments that increase interdependence, the ideal view of independence has been challenged. No amount of political will can recreate a world where independence can be obtained,

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except at costs that no government is willing to incur. This was as true for Gaullist France as it is for the United States.

Two of the chief characteristics of foreign policies conducted under modernized conditions are, then, (1) their predominantly cooperative rather than conflictual nature; and (2) the change in goals from power and position to wealth and welfare—or, at least, the addition of these new goals to the more classical ones. Both factors are accompanied by the loss of autonomy of any society in international affairs.

B. *Increased Domestic Demands and the Allocation of Resources.* It is a paradox at the heart of foreign policies in all modernized societies that increased demands on their governments result in a short-term problem of resource allocation, with the result that predominantly external goals decrease in priority relative to predominantly domestic goals. At the same time, however, increased "inward-looking" has been offset by the increased sensitivity of domestic conditions to international events as a result of international interdependence, and by absolute increases in international activities taken on by the citizens of all modernized societies.

One of the distinctive features of all modernized governments, democratic and authoritarian alike, is that they have assumed great multifunctionality. Both ideally and actually, they are not merely regulative agencies in a "night-watchman" state, but are and are seen as creators and redistributors of wealth. Increasing demands on governments have helped to create the modern social-service state and themselves result from the increased politicization of citizens in modernized societies. A government is impaled upon the "dilemma of rising demands and insufficient resources"[20] when its domestic demands are greater than its resources and when at the same time it must maintain even existing levels of commitments abroad. The demands may arise from the politicized poor who want a greater share in economic prosperity, the military for new weapons systems, the need for maintenance of public order in societies increasingly sensitive to labor and minority group disruption, etc. These are added to the "rising cost and widening scope of activities required to keep mature urban societies viable."[21] One inexorable result of these increased demands on governments is the curtailment of external commitments, or the decreased relative priority of external goals. Such curtailments add a dimension to the costs of independence.

[20] Harold and Margaret Sprout, "The Dilemma of Rising Demands and Insufficient Resources," *World Politics*, XX (July 1968), 660-93.

[21] *Ibid.*, 685.

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It may well be that the multiplier-effect generated by the allocation of resources to external commitments produces greater goods domestically than would allocations directly meeting the increased demands. However, with increased politicization it is more likely that any external allocation will be highly visible, as in the case of United States expenditures in Vietnam, or French expenditures on a striking force, indicates. It will, therefore, be viewed as a squandering of the domestic wealth. This is all the more likely in modern democracies where such allocations afford groups in opposition to the government an opportunity to raise questions concerning them. In the contemporary world, with instantaneous communication across boundaries, demands for increased services in one society also stem from their existence elsewhere.

There are several ways that the dilemma can be met, and each of these has external effects, whether they are indirect or direct, intended or not. The Sprouts have summarized a number of the indirect effects as follows:

> First, efforts may be made to *expand the economy*. . . .
> Second, the rulers may prudentially *revise their order of priorities*. . . .
> Third, the rulers may . . . *divert public attention* to other values. . . .
> Fourth, the men in power may try to *change the opinions of dissenters*. . . .
> Fifth, . . . the rulers may try to *silence dissent and opposition*. . . .[22]

In addition, these resources can be secured by various kinds of external activities involving cooperation and compatible efforts with other governments. One of the goals of the EEC, for example, is a rational division of labor in order to make available a greater pool of resources to each of the member-states in return for its giving up some degrees of domestic and external autonomy. This pooling of resources serves to create the international goods of which I spoke earlier and also serves to increase interdependence among societies, further limiting the freedom of any modern state to pursue a traditional policy of independence.

In the end, there is a decreased relative priority of external commitments made for military purposes, although other external commitments of an economic or legal nature may be made in their place. This does not imply what others have drawn as conclusions, that modern states are more "satisfied" than other states.[23] The organismic

[22] *Ibid.*, 690-91.

[23] See, for example, the organismic metaphors, and their rationalization, in Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (Glencoe 1963).

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analogy is no more helpful in this case than it was in the case of appeasement policy.

C. *Changes in the Processes of Foreign Policy-Making.* Like other processes of policy-making, those associated with foreign policy change under modernization. Cabinet-style decision-making gives way to administrative politics as the information that must be gathered for policy-making increases, as the number of states and functional areas that must be dealt with increases, and as personnel standards become professionalized. Despite the predictions made at the turn of the century by the ideologues of democracy, policy-making has not been "democratized" so much as it has been "bureaucratized." At the same time, great losses of control from the top have occurred and have been well documented.

The major transformation brought about by changes in the policy-making process has been the decreased relevance of rationality models for understanding policy and the increased importance of the bureaucratic model.[24] Policy-making in modern bureaucracies undermines the ability of a political leader to pursue rationally any explicit external goals. Rather, interest-group politics assume greater importance and foreign policy becomes more and more a reflection of what occurs in the bureaucracies upon which leadership depends for information and position papers.

Policy-making in modern bureaucracies, with regard to foreign as well as domestic affairs, involves both lateral bargaining among the members of various administrative units and vertical or hierarchical bargaining among members of various strata in a single organization.[25] The single spokesman in foreign affairs, long prescribed as a necessity for security, is made impossible by the characteristics of modern bureaucracies. Plurality in the number of foreign policy voices accompanies the increased significance of routine, daily decision-making in low-policy areas that contrasts with the more unified and consistent nature of decision-making in crises and in high politics. With such increases in routine, control at the top becomes more difficult. The several aspects of control of routine can be summarized under two headings, the organizational problem and the problem of size.

Modern governments are organized predominantly along functional domestic lines into such departments as agriculture, labor, and educa-

[24] An important explication of these models is found in Graham T. Allison, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (September 1969), 689-718.

[25] See Paul Y. Hammond, "Foreign Policy-Making and Administrative Politics," *World Politics*, XVII (July 1965), 656-71.

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tion. The domestic-foreign distinction that seemed to fit the nineteenth-century model of governmental organization conflicts dramatically with the needs of even the predominantly domestic organizational structures of modernized governments. Here, the distinctive feature is that each domestic function has external dimensions: most of the predominantly domestic departments and ministries of modern governments have some kind of international bureau. The proliferation of these international bureaus severely undercuts the ability of one foreign ministry or department to control the external policies of its government, thus severely restricting the coordination of foreign policies. The problem is all the more serious in so far as the distinction between high policies and low policies in foreign affairs has become increasingly blurred.

One way this problem is dealt with is by the formation of committees that cross-cut several cabinet organizations, serving to coordinate both information and decision-making at several levels. Each American administration since World War II has tried to reorganize foreign policy decision-making to counter the disability, but no permanent decision-making structures have been devised. Other governments tackle the problem by forming *ad hoc* interministerial committees to meet specific problems.

In addition to decreased control as a result of "domestic orientation" in modern governments, there is the added difficulty of coordinating a large bureaucracy dealing predominantly with foreign affairs. At the turn of the last century, one of the problems of control stemmed from the lack of coordination between foreign ministries and ministries of the armed forces. Thus, for example, French armed forces often freely occupied underdeveloped areas in Africa and Southeast Asia without the knowledge of the foreign minister. Today the problem of size presents no less formidable an information gap at the top of large bureaucracies. With more information available than ever, its channeling to the right person has become an organizational problem no foreign ministry has mastered.

Modernization, then—usually associated with the rationalization of political structures that foster increased control over the events in a society as well as over the environment in which men live—also creates certain disabilities that impede rational and efficient foreign policies. But modernization has also exacerbated another problem of control that has always been central to international politics—the control of events external to a state. This problem, which originates in the political organization of international society, is the one to which I now turn.

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D. *Modern Foreign Policies and Problems of Control.* The problem of control in international affairs arises from the condition of international society, which, conceived as a collection of nominally sovereign political units, has no overarching structure of political authority. The difficulty of coordination and control of events external to a society, always the major problem of international stability, is compounded by the development of interdependencies among modernized societies, for interdependence erodes the autonomy of a government to act *both* externally and internally, though the juridical status of sovereign states has not been significantly altered.

With the development of high levels of interdependence, all kinds of catastrophes, from nuclear holocaust to inflation or depression, can also become worldwide once a chain of events is begun. These disasters could be logical consequences of benefits derived from international collective goods.

One reason why modern governments have lost control over their foreign relations is that there has been an increasing number of international interactions, especially among the populations of pluralistic societies, in nongovernmental contexts. This increase was one of the first changes modernization brought in the foreign policies of states. It first became noticeable at the turn of the century with the rise of the "new imperialism" characterized by the rapidly increased mobility of people, of money, and of military equipment. It is associated today with the multinational corporation and with other new units of international activity that have varying degrees of autonomy abroad and whose external operations frequently act at cross-purposes with the foreign policy goals of their governments. They also contribute a large portion of any state's balance-of-payments accounts and therefore affect the monetary stability not only of a single state, but of the system of states in general.

The difference between interactions of transnational and intergovernmental systems is summarized in Karl Kaiser's ideal-typical models. A "transnational society subsystem," according to Kaiser, is one in which "relations between national systems are handled and decided upon by nongovernmental elites and pursued directly between social, economic, and political forces in the participating societies."[26] Intergovernmental transactions are those in which "relations between national systems are handled and decided upon by elites located in governmental institu-

[26] Karl Kaiser, "The Interaction of Regional Subsystems: Some Preliminary Notes on Recurrent Patterns and the Role of Superpowers," *World Politics*, XXI (October 1968), 91. Also see his article, "Transnationalepolitik: Zu einer Theorie der multinationalen Politik," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift* (1969), 80-109.

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tions."[27] Examples of the former are exchanges of material, capital, population, and ideas among societies, independent of governmental actions; examples of the latter are traditional alliances and new regional or global organizational activities.

These transnational interactions break down both the control of foreign affairs by a government and the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs. They may bring about situations in which governments are forced to take action, often with their freedom of choice of action restricted. This has been the case especially with regard to the stability of currencies and the development of new forms of crisis management in the monetary field in the last decade.

As transnational interactions increase, the possibilities of effecting decision-making in a purely national setting, in isolation or national encapsulation, become less likely and control is a more difficult problem, especially because knowledge of the effects of interdependencies is still limited.

A second aspect of the problem of control stems from the decreasing number of instrumentalities relative to the number of goals associated with any government. An optimum policy situation is one where the number of instruments available for use exceeds the number of goals. In principle, an infinite number of policy mixes exist, in that one instrument can substitute for another and "it will always be possible to find one among the infinity of solutions . . . for which welfare, however defined, is a maximum."[28] This is not only the most efficient situation, but it is also the fairest, for it allows any pressure to be "distributed more evenly over the various social groups."[29] When, however, the number of instruments is smaller than the number of goals, there is no clear solution on grounds of efficiency or fairness.

It is precisely this situation that occurs with the breakdown of the domestic-foreign distinction and with increases in international interdependence. As long as the two spheres remain more or less distinct, policies in either area can be implemented with different sets of instrumentalities. As soon as the separation is eroded, the spillover of effects from one sphere to the other results in the reduction of the number of usable instrumentalities.

This is true for two reasons. First, since policy instruments have recognizable effects both internally and externally, it is more and more frequently the case that any one instrument can be used for either

[27] *Ibid.*, 92.
[28] Jan Tinbergen, *On the Theory of Economic Policy*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam 1963), 37-38.
[29] *Ibid.*, 41.

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domestic or external purposes. However, domestic wage increases can be used for the purpose of establishing higher general levels of living. At the same time, the propensity to consume imported goods increases directly with wage increases and depresses any balance-of-payments surplus—a situation that is worsened by the positive effect of wage increases on prices and the subsequent negative effect on exports.

Second, what is optimally desired is that objectives be consistent. "If they are not consistent, no number of policy instruments will suffice to reach the objectives."[30] As long as domestic and foreign affairs were separated, consistency was a problem only within each sphere. With interdependence, not only must domestic and foreign goals be compatible with each other, but so must the goals of a set of societies if welfare effects are to be spread optimally. Consistency then becomes more difficult because of the economic nature of the objectives and the diversity of political units in international society.

Together with increased international transactions associated with growing interdependence, there have also developed rising levels of transactions internal to modernized states as well as higher levels of national integration. It is often concluded that the increases in national cohesiveness that accompany modernization counteract international interdependence.[31] Actually the reverse is true.

There is a fairly simple relation between rising levels of transactions internal to one state and increased interdependence among states. As *internal* interdependencies increase and as governmental organizations are institutionalized, even if international transactions remain constant (and they do not) *international* interdependencies also increase. This is true because sensitivity to transnational activities increases the domestic implications of international transactions. For example, as the levels of interdependence within a state rise, the same order of trade has increased implications for domestic employment, fiscal, monetary, and welfare policies.[32] It is precisely this element of interdependence that is fundamental and that Deutsch and other theorists have overlooked.

The three-fold increase in the number of sovereign, if not auton-

[30] Richard N. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community* (New York 1968), 155.

[31] See the recent works of Karl W. Deutsch, including Deutsch and others, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics* (New York 1967); and "The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory," in Abdul A. Said, ed., *Theory of International Relations: the Crisis of Relevance* (Englewood Cliffs 1968), 74-92.

[32] For an elaboration of this point, see Richard Cooper, *Economics of Interdependence*, 10.

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omous, political entities since World War II disproportionately increases the problem of coordination and "mutual adjustment," just as it increases the size of a bureaucracy needed to gather information and to coordinate action. This increase presents a kind of change that is usually destabilizing for a social system. It compounds the problems accompanying the development of transnational society discussed above, by increasing the number of interactions among governments and between governments and transnational nongovernmental organizations.

The present diversity in type of state actor is unparalleled in history. This variety can be viewed along five different dimensions, and each dimension adds to the complexity of coordination because each represents a set of conditions that must be handled in a separate way. Moreover, the greater the diversity of approaches incorporated in handling each set of conditions, the greater is the problem of consistency in foreign policy objectives and instrumentalities.

First, there is tremendous diversity and "unevenness of development among national societies in response to the revolution of modernization."[33] This unevenness of development has been increasing recently, rather than narrowing. Second, there is great variety in the "power" of states. Third, there is increased diversity in the alignment of states. Fourth, states are differentiated according to whether they are interactionist or isolationist. Finally, governments differ along dimensions characterizing their internal organization, ranging from highly pluralistic to highly authoritarian. Accordingly, diplomatic initiatives and responses to such governments must take into account the particular context of governmental structures in other societies and this too hinders overall foreign policy consistency.

In addition to diversity of state units, there have arisen a variety of new kinds of nonstate units with impressive economic wherewithal, with which governments must interact at least indirectly and often directly and actively. The existence of these units has challenged the state-centric theory of international politics, for they have formed transnational links among societies. Their importance varies with the state and unit in question, and depends upon a variety of elements that have not yet been spelled out. In general, the effect on foreign policy of the nonstate units is one about which we know very little.

These additional units can be summarized under four headings, with great variety in each. First, there are international organizations of

[33] Manfred Halpern, "The Revolution of Modernization in National and International Society," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., *Revolution* (New York 1966), 195.

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states. Second, there are international organizations of nongovernmental interest groups, including political parties, unions, and business organizations. Third, there are transnational or multinational corporations, some of which rival states in their economic power if their net sales are viewed as roughly equivalent to the G.N.P. of national economies.[34] Fourth, there are other transnational groupings, such as the Vatican and United Jewish Appeal, which deal in large transfers of capital across state lines and often to governments.

These new organizations serve both as evidence of interdependence and as important agencies furthering it. Either they have grown up as reflections of interdependence or they have been specifically established for the purpose of controlling its effects. Since both kinds of organized entities are of wide-ranging diversity, and since they differ from the formal sovereign states, they have remained anomalous for international politics theory. Like all organizations, they have political aspects in all senses of the term, but they are not predominantly political organizations. Moreover, they are of such complexity and diversity that the coordination and control of their activities by formal sovereign political entities has become difficult.

Conclusions

The transformations in all three aspects of foreign policies—in their contents, the processes associated with policy formation, and the control of policy effects—offer the citizens of any modernized society opportunities for increased wealth and welfare that were unthinkable in any system with much lower levels of interdependence. They also increase the chances of instability for international society as a whole; for interdependence has increased far in advance of either the instruments capable of controlling it or of available knowledge of its effects. There are, however, two aspects of modernization and foreign policy that, in conclusion, must be highlighted.

First, the various changes discussed above pertain to all modernized societies and are affected very little by ideology or by particular sets of political institutions. To be sure, it may make some difference whether institutions are democratic or nondemocratic in particular instances. In the long run, however, the general influences that have transformed foreign policies are ubiquitous.

Second, these changes are likely to be dispersed throughout the inter-

[34] General Motors, for example, with global net sales of $20.2 billion, would rank as the eighteenth most important state in such a ranking. See *War/Peace Reports* (October 1968), 10.

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national system far ahead of other aspects of modernity. They are, therefore, likely to characterize the foreign policies of some less modernized societies before these societies become relatively modernized—or even if they do not become modernized. The speed with which modernity spreads will, therefore, only increase the problems of control and will make more urgent the need for establishing new mechanisms of international order.

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THE URBAN POOR

Disruption or Political Integration in Third World Cities?

By JOAN NELSON*

MOST of the nations of Africa and Asia remain predominantly rural and agricultural. However, more than half the people in most Latin American countries are no longer rural, and a fifth to a third live in cities of 100,000 or more. In Asia and North Africa, Lebanon, the U.A.R., and the Philippines are also substantially urbanized, and Morocco, Syria, Turkey, South Korea, and Taiwan are not far behind. Moreover, virtually everywhere in the developing world, regardless of the extent of urbanization already achieved, cities are growing at rates of 5 to 8 percent annually. That is, they are doubling their populations every ten to fifteen years.[1]

Such rapid growth has far-reaching social, economic, and political repercussions. Rural areas are steadily losing many of their more ambitious young adults. A large and growing share of the cities' populations are newcomers to urban life. Exploding physical size and pressure on urban services impinge on long-established urban groups. All of

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[1] In Brazil and Mexico between 1940 and 1950, population in cities of 100,000 or more grew at average annual rates of 5 and 6.7% respectively. During the 1950's, Santo Domingo grew 7.3% yearly; Panama City expanded at a rate of 7.9%. (United Nations *Compendium of Social Statistics*, 1963, Series K, No. 2, Table 7.) In the 1950's and early 1960's, Bogotá's population rose an average of 6.8% a year; Cali's increased at 6.3%. Paul T. Schultz, *Population and Labor Force Projections for Colombia, 1964-1974, mimeo.* (Santa Monica, California, RAND, July 10, 1967), 12. Between 1941 and 1959 Caracas averaged a 7.4% annual growth. Bruce Herrick, *Urban Migration and Economic Development in Chile* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 31. In some other parts of Asia and the Near East, rapid urban growth rivals that of Latin America. Korean cities have been growing rapidly since the 1950's: Seoul added 6.6% more people each year from 1960 to 1966. Turkey's population centers of 100,000 or more grew 6.7% a year from 1955 to 1960; Ankara averaged 6.8% annually from 1960 to 1965. (Estimated from figures in the United Nations *Demographic Yearbook*, 1962, 1963, 1967.) In South Asia, urban growth rates are generally lower. Delhi grew 5% a year from 1951 to 1961, but greater Bombay expanded at an annual rate of 3.9% during that period, and Calcutta's rate was 1.9%, reflecting in part the immense size already reached by these two giants. Kingsley Davis in Roy Turner, ed., *India's Urban Future* (Berkeley 1962), 10.

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these changes have political effects. Yet to date there has been remarkably little analysis of the political effects of rapid urban growth.

This paper focuses on only one set of effects: the immediate and longer-run political role of migrants to the larger cities, and more generally of the urban poor. It argues that, contrary to widespread speculation by both foreign observers and elites in the countries concerned, neither new migrants nor the urban poor are likely to play a direct destabilizing role. Indeed, historical experience in industrialized nations suggests that the urban poor are not likely to play a significant political role at all. However, there are major demographic, economic, and political contrasts between today's developing nations and Europe and North America in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The differences in context make it possible that the urban poor of Latin America, North Africa, and Asia may come to take a more active part in municipal and national politics than did their historical counterparts. The paper concludes with some suggestions regarding possible patterns of political participation by the urban poor.

I. Urban Growth and Political Instability[2]

Many of the migrants swelling the cities have little or no education and few skills. Moreover, in most developing countries rates of unemployment and particularly underemployment are high and rising. Programs to improve conditions in rural areas are often urged as a means to stem the movement to the cities. But the very processes that promote rural modernization and integration—education, mass media, transportation—also spur the exodus in search of a better life. Labor-intensive techniques in industry are sometimes proposed as a means of absorbing laborers once they reach the cities. But such techniques often imply high unit costs of production, and are unlikely to be adopted on a large scale. In short, the cities face a steady rise in the proportion of their populations that is unskilled, semi-employed, and abysmally poor—marginal to the city's economy and social organization.[3]

[2] For a more detailed discussion of the points in this section, see Joan M. Nelson, *Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability in Developing Nations*, Harvard Center for International Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 22 (Cambridge, Mass. 1969).

[3] Open unemployment rates of 5 to 10% appear repeatedly in surveys of major Latin American and Indian cities. Rates are higher among the unskilled, among young men seeking their first jobs, and in larger cities. Fred Dziadek, *Unemployment in the Less Developed Countries*, AID Discussion Paper No. 16 (Washington, June 1967), Appendix A. Urban underemployment must greatly exceed unemployment, but it is extremely difficult to measure. A proxy indicator of the extent of underemployment is productivity in the tertiary or service sector, which drops as the sector is

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From the viewpoints of welfare and economic development, the growth of a large marginal urban population is not necessarily detrimental. Despite insecure jobs and squalid living conditions, most migrants feel that they are better off than they were before coming to the city. The movement to the cities facilitates wider distribution of certain services, particularly schools and clinics. Concern on grounds of welfare therefore is probably misplaced. Rural-to-urban migration also removes redundant labor from agriculture. While productivity in the overloaded service sector is falling in many developing nations, it is still substantially higher than productivity in agriculture. Though separate data are not available on productivity in intermittent day labor or construction jobs and in low-paid segments of the service sector (vending, loading and carrying, domestic help, petty personal services), these ways of scraping by are probably not less productive than marginal production in agriculture. Moreover, residence in the city exposes the migrant to modernizing influences, and improves his opportunity to acquire skills, however modest. The major economic disadvantage is the diversion of public funds and energies from more directly and immediately productive uses that is likely to result from pressure for expanded municipal services.

The strongest concern about rapid urban growth and urban underemployment is political rather than economic. A lengthening list of articles asserts that chaos and revolution lurk in the *favelas* of Rio and the alleys of Calcutta.[4] Dire predictions about the political effects of rapid urban growth take two main forms.[5] Some of the prophets focus on the migrants. Uprooted, isolated, disappointed, and frustrated, they are viewed as tinder for any demagogic or extremist spark. Other theorists argue just the opposite: new migrants are politically passive.

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swollen by peddling, domestic service, and other marginal occupations. It has been calculated that in Latin America between 1950 and 1965, while productivity in agriculture grew at 1.8% a year and industry, mining, and utilities at 2.5% annually, productivity in the service sectors fell, suggesting "a level of underemployment equivalent to 10% of the national labor force." Since services absorb much more urban than rural labor, the implied underemployment rate in the cities would far exceed ten percent. Hollis B. Chenery, *Toward a More Effective Alliance for Progress*, AID Discussion Paper No. 13 (Washington 1967), 12.

[4] See, for example, Barbara Ward, "The Uses of Prosperity," *Saturday Review*, August 29, 1964, 191-92; Franz Fannon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London 1965), 103.

[5] Peter Lupsha's interesting article, "On Theories of Urban Violence," presented at the American Political Science Association meetings in 1968, lists many more theories of the causes of urban violence, including "conspiracy," "riff-raff," "teen-age rebellion," and "police brutality." However, the "recent migrant" and "frustration-aggression" theories discussed here are the two theories that appear most often in discussions of urban problems in the developing nations.

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The threat to political stability lies not with newcomers, but with those deprived and frustrated slum and shanty dwellers who are longer urban residents, or with the second generation. These contentions are explored in turn.

THE DISRUPTIVE MIGRANTS

The theory. In cities growing at annual rates of 5 percent or more, with migration accounting for more than half the increase, migrants come to constitute the bulk of the urban population within a few decades. Moreover, many are very recently arrived: a quarter or more of the population of many major Latin American cities have arrived within the past five years.[6] It is often assumed that many or most of the newcomers have been torn from a tightly structured rural society and plunged into a bewildering, impersonal, and harsh environment with few or no sources of support and guidance. Shock and isolation produce personal disorientation and political anomie. Economic conditions are also an acute disappointment. Frustrated and disillusioned, the migrant is readily persuaded to political violence or extremism.[7]

The evidence. There is virtually no evidence that new migrants are either radical or violence-prone. Direct evidence is hard to find, because it is difficult to separate newcomers from the rest of the population. Myron Weiner examined the Calcutta voting pattern for state assemblymen in 1957 and 1962, and found that districts with heavy concentrations of migrants (not necessarily newcomers) correlated closely with high votes for the Congress Party.[8] Soares and Hamblin, analyzing factors affecting the Chilean presidential elections of 1952, found a negative relation between departments with high proportions of migrants and a high vote for Salvador Allende, the candidate of the radical left.[9] Studies of recent urban violence in the United States have found migrants under-represented among the rioters.[10] Charles Tilly, studying urban turbulence in nineteenth-century France, finds no consistent relation at all between the frequency of violent conflicts in de-

[6] Bertram Hutchinson, "The Migrant Population of Urban Brazil," *America Latina*, VI (April-June 1963), 43, 46; Paul T. Schultz, 2.

[7] Philip Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Industrialization and Society* (The Hague 1963), 210-11; Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin, "Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left, Chile, 1952," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967), 1055. See also Mancur Olson, "Economic Growth as a Destabilizing Force," *Journal of Economic History*, XXIII (December 1963), 534.

[8] Myron Weiner, "Urbanization and Political Protest," *Civilisations*, XVII (1967).

[9] Soares and Hamblin.

[10] National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders, *Report*, advance edition printed by The *New York Times* Company, 1968, 130-31; Lupsha, 7.

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partments and the rates of increase of the urban populations in the cities dominating those departments.[11]

Where the theory goes wrong. Data that shed light on where the theory goes wrong are more plentiful than direct evidence on the political behavior of newcomers to the cities.

1. Regarding the shock of urban life: Many migrants into the great cities come from smaller cities and towns, not from the countryside. Surveys indicate that in Santiago, Chile,[12] and in six Brazilian cities including Rio and São Paulo,[13] roughly two-thirds of the migrants were *not* rural in origin. This reflects the well-documented pattern of step-wise migration. In India, higher proportions of migrants come directly from the countryside. Surveys in the mid-1950's found that 50 and 75 percent of the migrants to Delhi[14] and Bombay,[15] respectively, were rural in origin.

Among those migrants who do come from small villages, many have some previous exposure to urban influence. Surveys in squatter settlements in Bogotá[16] and Ankara[17] found that two-thirds of the migrants came from less than 100 and less than 120 miles away, respectively. Villages near large cities are often affected by urban influences. Many migrants have also visited city relatives or friends before deciding to move. There are villages where for many years high proportions of the young people have migrated; earlier migrants return on visits to tell prospective migrants what they can expect.

Particularly in Latin America, traditional rural social structure has been eroded in all except the most remote areas.[18] Therefore many of those migrants who are rural in origin do not come from tightly structured social settings. Though rural change and disorganization have little to do with affirmative preparation for urban life, these trends do cast doubt on the assumption that migrants are traumatized by the shattering of deeply ingrained habits and values.

[11] Charles Tilly, "Urbanization and Political Disturbances in Nineteenth-Century France," mimeo., presented to the annual meeting of the Society for French Historical Studies (Ann Arbor, April 1966), 7-8.

[12] Herrick, 53-103.

[13] Hutchinson, 43-44.

[14] V. K. R. V. Rao and P. B. Desai, *Greater Delhi: A Study in Urbanization 1940-1957* (New York 1965), 79.

[15] D. T. Lakdawala, *Work, Wages, and Well-being in an Indian Metropolis: Economic Surveys of Bombay City* (Bombay 1963), 159.

[16] William L. Flinn, "Rural-to-Urban Migration: A Colombian Case," Research Publication No. 19 (U. of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center July 1966), 10, 23.

[17] Granville Sewell, *Squatter Settlements in Turkey*, unpub. diss. (M.I.T. 1964), 304.

[18] Marshal Wolfe, "Some Implications of Recent Changes in Urban and Rural Settlement Patterns in Latin America," paper presented at the U.N. World Population Conference (Belgrade, September 1965), 25.

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Finally, since most migrants are young adults with better education and training than the average in their places of origin, their capacity and desire to adjust can be presumed to be comparatively high.

2. Regarding isolation: Newcomers obviously know few people when they arrive in the city. But very high proportions—from 70 to 90 percent—of samples drawn in several Latin American cities[19] report receiving help in settling from family, friends, or employers. In some regions and countries, new arrivals may also find assistance and friends in provincial, home-town, tribe, or caste associations.[20]

3. Regarding economic conditions and migrants' reaction to them: Most migrants find jobs quite quickly. (A Santiago sample: 40 percent within 2 days;[21] a second Santiago sample drawn from squatters only: 47 percent within the first week.[22] A Brazilian sample of the adult population in six cities: 80 percent within a month.[23] Other surveys report similar findings.)[24] Surveys also consistently show lower rates of open unemployment among migrants than among native urbanites.[25] This, however, may reflect age structure: higher proportions of native-born members of the labor force are adolescent or in their early twenties, age groups with higher-than-average unemployment rates.[26] Migrants are somewhat over-represented in low-level jobs, but the overall patterns of employment are not markedly different from those of urban-born workers.[27] This probably reflects the high proportions of migrants who come from other cities and towns, and who may well be better educated and more highly skilled than the average for the city of destination. The few surveys that compare current jobs (or

[19] Gino Germani, "Inquiry into the Social Effects of Urbanization in a Working Class Sector of Greater Buenos Aires," United Nations Economic and Social Council, E/CN.12/URB/10, December 1958, Table 10, p. 26; Herrick, 91, and ECLA, "Urbanization in Latin America: Results of a Field Survey of Living Conditions in an Urban Sector," mimeo., E/CN.12.622, 1963, 17; Flinn, 27; Hutchinson, Table 12, p. 61.

[20] William Mangin, "The Role of Regional Associations in the Adaption of Rural Migrants to Cities in Peru," in Dwight Heath and Richard Adams, eds., *Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America* (New York, 1965), 319.

[21] Herrick, 92.

[22] ECLA, "Results of a Field Survey," 16.

[23] Hutchinson, 67-68.

[24] Germani, 69, Table 37.

[25] Slighton, 38; Herrick, 84; Weiner, "Urbanization and Political Protest," 6; Rao and Desai, 341, Table 16-1, and 383, Table 17-3; Dantwala, 481; R. Mukerjee and B. Singh, *Social Profiles of a Metropolis* (Bombay 1961), 116; G. M. Farooq, *The People of Karachi: Economic Characteristics*, Monographs in the Economics of Development No. 15 (Karachi, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, July 1966), 19.

[26] Herrick, 79; Slighton, 37.

[27] Germani, 51, Table 29; Rao and Desai, 373, Tables 16-19; Herrick, 86-87, Tables 6-9; Lakdawala, 466, Table VI-37, Columns 7-8; Mukerjee and Singh, 88-89; Rao and Desai, 223, Tables 12-15.

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first job in the city) with jobs before migration show considerable upward mobility.[28]

Migrants' reactions to city housing vary, depending on their previous standards and on the geographic and climatic conditions that largely determine the objective adequacy of low-cost housing and shanty settlements. Germani's working-class samples in Buenos Aires, most of whom came from smaller cities or towns, were quite dissatisfied.[29] But Pearse and Bonilla both stress that *favela* housing in urban Brazil is much like rural housing throughout the nation.[30]

More generally, surveys conducted in settlements ranging from well-established blue-collar neighborhoods in Buenos Aires to squalid shantytowns outside of Baghdad concur: overwhelming proportions of migrants say that their incomes, material possessions, access to services, and opportunities for their children are better in the city.[31]

To summarize: The assumptions that migrants are uprooted and isolated in the city are grossly overdrawn. The assumption that most are disappointed and frustrated by economic conditions is simply wrong. Some migrants undoubtedly are disillusioned, but lack of widespread contacts plus political inexperience and traditional patterns of deference makes it most unlikely that newcomers' frustrations will be translated into destabilizing political action.

THE RADICAL MARGINALS

The theory. To exorcise the myth of the disruptive migrants is to raise a new specter—that of the radical poor. If migrants feel an initial sense of progress, what happens when their memories of earlier misery fade? If low levels of political awareness, deference to authority, and perhaps political conservatism are part of the rural baggage migrants carry with them, what happens after prolonged urban exposure? As migrants become established urbanites with urban aspirations and attitudes, but still eke out a marginal existence, will not they or their children sooner or later express growing frustration through political radicalism or violence?[32]

[28] Rao and Desai, 94-95, Tables 5-14, 5-15; Herrick, 94-95.

[29] Germani, 16.

[30] Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro," in Philip Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Latin America* (UNESCO 1961), 196; Frank Bonilla, "Rio's Favelas: The Rural Slum Within the City," American University Field Staff *Reports*, East Coast South America Series, 8:3 (1961), 2.

[31] Doris Phillips, "Rural-to-Urban Migration in Iraq," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, VII (July 1959), 417; Flinn, 5, 37; Sewell, 109-110.

[32] For example, see Glaucio Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in Brazil," in Irving L. Horowitz, ed., *Revolution in Brazil* (New York 1964), 192,

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The evidence. The theory is hard to test empirically. Data on length of urban residence are scarce. Adequate indices of radicalism and workable definitions of marginality are difficult to devise. Glaucio Soares states the theory particularly clearly but cites only one piece of evidence: a survey conducted among skilled and unskilled workers in Rio in 1960, showing that support for the Brazilian Labor Party increased substantially among unskilled workers with longer urban residence, but not among skilled workers.[33] I have tried to approximate his test using data from the Almond-Verba surveys in Mexico[34] and from Inkeles' surveys in Argentina and Chile.[35] The Mexico data contradicts Soares' Rio findings: skilled workers with greater urban experience leaned toward demonstrations and violence as effective political techniques; unskilled workers did not. The Inkeles data looks more like Soares' findings, but the index of radicalism is inadequate: replies to questions regarding the need for substantial and rapid social change, with no reference to political means.

Studies of class voting patterns and of participation in urban violence do not distinguish among degrees of urban experience and therefore do not really test the hypothesis. But in the absence of good tests, such studies at least provide data on the political behavior of the urban poor in general. In the Venezuelan presidential elections of 1958 and 1963, there was little support in the poorest districts of Caracas for the Communist ticket in 1958 and the farthest left legal candidate in 1963. In Santiago, Chile, high proportions of the low-rent district vote went to Salvador Allende in 1958, but in 1964 much of this support shifted to Eduardo Frei, a moderate reformist alternative not previously available.[36] Indian survey data gathered before the 1966 national elections found low-income voters in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras no more and no less ready to support extremist parties of the right and left than were more affluent voters.[37] Myron Weiner states that demon-

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195; also Kingsley Davis and Hilda H. Golden, "Urbanization and the Development of Pre-industrial Areas," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, III (1954), 19-20.

[33] Soares, 192.

[34] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton 1963).

[35] Large-scale attitudinal surveys of factory workers and control groups were conducted by Alex Inkeles and his associates in Argentina, Chile, Israel, Nigeria, India, and Pakistan, as a basis for a study of the modernizing impact of factory experience on attitudes. I am indebted to Professor Inkeles for permission to use his data.

[36] George F. Jones, "Urbanization and Voting Behavior in Venezuela and Chile, 1958-1964," typescript prepared at Stanford University, March 1967, 40-43, 69-72.

[37] Indian Institute of Public Opinion, "The Structure of Urban Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Surveys*, XI (February 1966), 15-16.

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strations in Calcutta are much more likely to involve violence if they are based on the middle class than if they are predominantly working class.[38] Tilly and other students of French history conclude, from formidably detailed police records, that those involved in the repeated Parisian incidents of the nineteenth century were mostly from the skilled, established crafts, "segments of the working class already politically alert, organized, and integrated into the life of the city."[39]

Where the theory goes wrong. The radicalization theory has more validity than the myth of the disruptive migrants, but is seriously overstated.

1. Regarding the aspiration-achievement gap: Aspirations undoubtedly rise, but they probably do so quite gradually. No studies are available, to my knowledge, on the effect of urban exposure on material and other aspirations. My own attempts to use Inkeles' data for this purpose do show an upward drift in aspirations as urban experience lengthens. Rising aspirations for better jobs, housing, and status are more marked, however, among the skilled than among the unskilled workers. The urban-born are less satisfied with their jobs and self-assessed status.[40]

Sociological studies of working-class norms provide a firmer basis for the hypothesis that aspirations rise slowly. Those at the very bottom are preoccupied with survival. Some may be victims of the apathy Oscar Lewis calls "the culture of poverty." Those a step or two up the ladder set modest targets for themselves: sons of unskilled workers in Querétaro, Mexico, want to be masons, shoemakers, or construction workers.[41] Realism may not only trim targets but may also shape values. Studies of working-class norms in the United States find "getting by" stressed more heavily than "getting ahead."[42]

Turning to achievement: modest occupational progress out of the lowest categories is probably quite widespread. Data on intergenerational occupational mobility in three cities in developing countries—São Paulo, Buenos Aires, and Poona—show a majority of the sons of unskilled workers rising out of this category, and substantial fractions

[38] Myron Weiner, "Violence and Politics in Calcutta," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, XX (May 1961), 277.

[39] Charles Tilly, "A Travers le Chaos des Vivantes Cités," mimeo. paper presented to the Sixth Worth Congress of Sociology (Evian-les-Bains, September 1966), 17, 19.

[40] Joan Nelson, 45-51.

[41] Andrew Whiteford, *Two Cities of Latin America: A Comparative Description of Social Classes* (New York 1964), 120.

[42] S. Michael Miller and Frank Reisman, "The Working-Class Sub-culture," *Social Problems*, IX (Summer 1961), 92, 95-96; Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York 1962), 219-221, and passim.

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rising into nonmanual occupations[43] (Table 1). São Paulo may be uniquely dynamic, but the data from Poona probably is not unrepresentative. Moreover, Germani's data from Buenos Aires show that the second generation, with its higher aspirations, is also more likely to move out of the unskilled category.[44]

The much-deplored squatter settlements may provide many urban poor with an additional channel of achievement. Such settlements are

TABLE 1
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY OF MEN WHOSE FATHERS WERE UNSKILLED

Occupational level of respondents	São Paulo, Brazil (1960)* %	Buenos Aires, Argentina (1960)* %	Poona, India (1954)* %
1. Unskilled manual workers, domestics, vendors.	31.2	21.1	43.2
2. Semiskilled and skilled manual workers, including supervisory manual grades.	42.0	52.6	26.1
3. Lower-level nonmanual, including supervisors, shop and office clerks, small businessmen (1-5 employees).	12.1	21.1	22.2
4. Higher-level nonmanual and owners of medium-small businesses.	8.6	2.3	3.2
5. Administrative and executive posts; owners of medium-large stores and factories; liberal professions.	3.0	2.9	1.0
6. High professional and administrative posts.	3.0	0.0	0.8

* The samples include: São Paulo: 338 sons of unskilled fathers from a total sample of 1056 adult men; Buenos Aires: 341 sons of unskilled fathers, from a total sample of 2078 heads of households; Poona: 2004 sons of unskilled fathers, from a total sample of 4505 heads of households.

[43] Sources for data in Table I: São Paulo: Bertram Hutchinson's survey data as reported in S. M. Miller, "Comparative Social Mobility," *Current Sociology*, IX (1960), 69. Buenos Aires: Gino Germani, "La Mobilidad Social en la Argentina," mimeo., Publicacion Interna No. 60, Instituto de Sociologia, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires. Poona: N. V. Sovani, "Occupational Mobility in Poona Between Three Generations," in *Urbanization and Urban India* (Bombay 1966), 96

[44] Gino Germani, data developed for but not presented in the study on social mobility cited in footnote 43. I am indebted to Professor Germani for permission to use his data.

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not usually the first stop for the incoming migrant, but are more often established by families with longer urban experience. Where squatters are not harassed by the police, and where terrain and initial density of settlement permit, many shantytowns evolve over ten or fifteen years into acceptable working-class neighborhoods.[45] Squatting offers immediate relief from the burden of rent and the threat of eviction, and a long-run prospect of a modicum of comfort and respectability. In many cities in Latin America, North Africa, and Turkey, 10 to 40 percent of the population live in squatter settlements.[46] Not all of these settlements are "self-improving," but for many among the urban poor, squatting is a means of substantial progress.

2. Regarding frustration: The slow rise of aspirations and the wide incidence of modest progress may explain the otherwise puzzling finding that even among groups reporting that their economic situation has deteriorated in the past few years, overwhelming majorities express optimism about the future[47] and belief that the economic and social system is open to talent and hard work. Surveys in many different countries, asking a variety of questions, concur on this point.[48] Faith in the future may make present hardship less bitter. And general belief in open opportunity prevents conversion of individual misfortune into a sense of social injustice.

3. Regarding conversion of frustration to disruptive political action: Frustration obviously can be expressed in many ways—withdrawal and defeat, quarrelsome behavior, alcoholism, religion. Political ac-

[45] See John Turner, *Uncontrolled Urban Settlement: Problems and Policies*, Working Paper No. 11 for the Inter-Regional Seminar on Development Policies and Planning in Relation to Urbanization, organized by the United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations and the Bureau of Social Affairs, October-November 1966, paper numbered 67-44032; Daniel Goldrich and others, "The Political Integration of Lower Class Urban Settlements," mimeo., prepared for the American Political Science Association meetings, September 1966, 4; Flinn, 3-4; William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," *Latin American Research Review*, II (Summer 1967), 74-75.

[46] Estimates place a fifth to a quarter of Lima's population in the early 1960's in squatter settlements; 16% of Rio as of 1964; 30% of Caracas in the late 1950's (despite construction of immense public housing projects absorbing an additional 18% of the city's population); and over a third of Mexico City. Richard M. Morse, "Recent Research on Latin American Urbanization," *Latin American Research Review*, I, 1965, 50; John Turner, 1. In Turkey, Granville Sewell estimates that squatters comprise a fifth of Istanbul, a third of Ankara, and a third of Adana. 71, 186, 193.

[47] Santiago and Lima: Goldrich. Caracas: CENDES print-out. Mexican working class: data drawn from taped data of interviews conducted by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba for their study of the "Civic Culture" in Mexico and other countries.

[48] Bonilla, 11; CENDES print-out; Goldrich, "Politics and the Pobladore," Tables 1, 17, and "Demographic and Socio-economic Background, Social Mobility, and Expectations"; Germani, "Social and Political Consequences," 389-90. Inkeles' survey data demonstrate a similar belief in the hard-working poor man's prospects. See Nelson, 61.

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tion, whether individual or associational, moderate or extremist, legal or illegal, is only one class of reactions among many. The point is obvious, but it is often overlooked.

Moreover, the urban poor are particularly unlikely to choose aggressive political action to express their grievances. Low status and lack of contacts make them more vulnerable to police force and less likely to get fair treatment in the courts. They are unorganized, their level of political awareness is low, and these conditions are perpetuated by the constant inflow of additional unskilled, poorly educated migrants. Moreover, the causes of poverty, unemployment, and inflation are remote. Wealthier and better-educated people may think in terms of governmental policies and their effect on economic conditions, but the poor and uneducated are less likely to blame the authorities for general economic difficulties[49] (Table 2). The recent militancy of minority groups among the poor in the United States appears to contradict these generalizations, but that is the product of very different circumstances.

To summarize: The theory of radicalization and the deprivation/frustration/aggression model on which it rests may contain a good deal of truth. The theory itself does not specify the pace of radicalization. But it is usually linked to predictions of political upheaval in the not-too-distant future. This implicit estimate almost surely overstates the rate at which both discontent and political awareness spread among the urban lower classes. Such calculations also imply a high rate of conversion from frustration to radical political action. In fact, the bulk of economic and social frustration is likely to leak into alternative channels, including nonradical political action.

The question of destabilization or radicalization has pre-empted much of the meager attention scholars have given to the study of the political implications of urban growth abroad. Yet if we want to locate the sources of urban turbulence and extremism, the urban lower class is the wrong group to examine. Indeed, most of those scholars primarily interested in civil conflict have focused their attention on other groups, primarily students, organized labor, and the military. If, however, we are interested in the current and potential political role of the urban lower class, preoccupation with instability blinds us to a number of more probable, and equally interesting, patterns of evolution.

In brief, most inquiries into the political role of the urban poor in developing countries have asked the wrong questions. Moreover, most analysis to date has stressed social psychology to the point of ignoring

[49] Derived from Indian Institute of Public Opinion, *Public Opinion Surveys*, x (March 1965), 21-32.

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TABLE 2

"To whose policy do you ascribe this shortage (of foodgrains)?"

	No. reporting shortfall	% blaming government	% blaming others	% blaming both
Income Group				
Under Rs. 75	30	30	23	30
76-150	142	58	12	23
151-300	182	59	9	31
301-500	67	58	6	30
Education				
Illiterate and literate but without formal ed.	56	37	7	30
Primary, undermatric. and matric.	229	49	8	35
Some college	270	59	8	28
Occupation				
Worker	38	42	16	34
Salaried employee	265	57	9	26
Independent	163	60	8	30

Source: Indian Institute of Public Opinion, all-urban sample of 1000, March, 1965. Differences between totals and 100% are "don't know."

highly relevant political variables. The attitudes of the urban poor, so far as they can be ascertained, are certainly important. But these attitudes are shaped by and interact with the political context in the individual nation and city. The agents and channels of political socialization of the urban poor, and the factors determining the degree and nature of interest in the urban poor on the part of established political organizations, are topics that deserve much more attention than they have received thus far.

II. The Capacity of the Urban Poor for Political Participation

Built into the lives of the urban poor are a multitude of factors impeding political mobilization. Industrial labor and workers in large modern service establishments are relatively well-paid and secure, usually unionized, and often politically active. In contrast to this labor elite, the bulk of the urban poor work in occupations that provide few handles for political mobilization. Small artisan and service shops,

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vending, and domestic service are inherently difficult to organize. Stevedoring and construction are organizable, but the relentless pressure of unskilled job-seekers impedes unionization. Even social and religious organizations are weak among the urban poor. Insecure jobs and rented rooms mean that many move frequently, which probably prevents the growth of interest in and knowledge of local issues, certainly impedes the growth of ties within the neighborhood, and in the past has legally disenfranchised large numbers of the poor. In many cases, ethnic and religious cleavages further reduce the potential for collective action.

Moreover, the most urgent needs of the very poor are intensely individual—a day's work, a room, a week's credit, medical aid, someone to fix trouble with the police. Others equally poor and ill-connected usually cannot offer much help. The poor, rural as well as urban, turn for aid to better-established individuals or organizations—landlord, employer, shopkeeper, church, settlement house, regional or caste or tribal association, local fixer, ward boss. The patron-client relations that result may or may not form a stable pattern. They are less likely to do so in an urban setting where there are several possible sources of assistance, and where the best or most accessible source of help for one problem may be less appropriate or available for other problems. Where a stable pattern exists, it may or may not be tied into the broader political system, depending on the interests and connections of the patron(s). Politicized patron-client relations therefore are possible, but not automatic, in an urban setting.

In the cities of the United States during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both the needs of the urban poor and their ethnic loyalties were used as bases for powerful political machines. But while their votes might elect the candidates of the machine, the urban poor had little or no influence over the city governments they put in office. The nature of their political role—the large-scale institutionalized trading of individual votes for individual favors—precluded any substantial impact on governmental programs and policies. Political integration in this more fundamental sense of influence on governmental actions took place, in the experience of Europe and North America, only as the urban poor were gradually absorbed economically and socially, that is, as they joined the stable and organized working class.

In the cities of today's developing nations, the social and economic characteristics of the urban poor are in many ways similar. Is there then any reason to expect them to play a different or more active or influential political role in Latin America, Africa, and Asia than they

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played historically in the industrialized nations? Perhaps not. But there are major differences as well as similarities between current and past patterns of urban growth and industrial expansion. These contrasts may produce different political results.

First, cities today are growing much more rapidly. Annual growth rates of 5 to 8 percent are common among the cities of the less developed world. In contrast, few major European cities grew more rapidly than 3 or 4 percent a year during any decade of the nineteenth century.[50] North American cities mushroomed rapidly in their early stages but then slowed down, despite heavy immigration as well as internal migration. Today's more rapid growth in the developing world results not from heavier migration into the cities but from lower urban mortality rates, in turn the product of improved public health measures.[51] Moreover, in Europe millions chose to emigrate rather than move to their own growing cities, and in North America the frontier long offered an alternative channel for the restless and ambitious. In the developing countries today, few can emigrate, and only a handful of the nations of Latin America and Africa have extensive arable frontier regions. In most countries there is only one magnet for those who want a better life: the city.

Second, although cities are growing faster, urban jobs are probably multiplying less rapidly than they did in the past. Surely this is true of employment in manufacturing. Even in those few centuries where industry is making good progress, employment in manufacturing rarely expands by more than 3 or 4 percent a year.[52] Modern technology is, of course, laborsaving. Moreover, poorly trained and unreliable labor plus legally required social security benefits may mean that labor costs per unit of output are high despite low hourly or daily wages. Development policies such as rapid write-off and other tax concessions and special exchange rates for imported capital equipment reduce the cost of capital compared to labor. From the entrepreneur's standpoint, labor may be relatively costly and capital comparatively cheap even in countries where labor is plentiful and capital scarce.

In short, demographic and economic trends conspire to produce a larger marginal class persisting over a longer period than in the cities

[50] Adna F. Weber, *The Growth of Cities* (New York 1899), chap. 2.

[51] Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," in *Cities* (New York 1966), 18-19.

[52] Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), "Structural Changes in Employment within the Context of Latin America's Economic Development," *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, x (October 1965), 166; see also Werner Baer and Michel Herve, "Employment and Industrialization in Developing Countries," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXX (February 1966).

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of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Europe and North America. In view of the limited capacity of the urban poor for political action, a large mass of marginals persisting over many decades has no necessary political implications. However, the political climate and structure of today's developing nations differ from those of nineteenth-century Europe and North America in ways that may produce more political activity among the urban poor.

The poor themselves may be better educated and informed, and therefore may have a greater capacity for political action than did their historical counterparts. Because urban mortality rates are much lower, a higher proportion are urban-born. In the cities, free or cheap primary schools are more widely available than they were in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century in Europe and North America. Radio now reaches even the illiterate.

For many of the urban poor, squatting also provides a social setting that is more conducive to collective action. Squatting was not unknown in Europe and North America, but is far more extensive in today's developing countries, largely as a result of more rapid urban growth. Widespread squatting almost certainly implies more stable residence patterns. Stephan Thernstrom[53] and other historians interested in United States social history around the turn of the century report incredibly high rates of turnover among the urban poor. Although housing is only part of the picture, it is clear that a man who rents his shelter and loses his job is likely to be evicted, while a man who owns his house and loses his job is likely to cling to his remaining source of security.

Stable residence and home ownership or quasi-ownership encourage collective action for collective neighborhood interests. Studies of squatter settlements often mention neighborhood councils that are more or less active and effective in pressing for legal recognition and extension of city services into the community.[54] Their demands are concrete and often limited: for example, the covering of a former irrigation ditch that endangers neighborhood children. Some goals are startling for their upward-striving character: Alejandro Portes describes a government-sponsored community in Santiago, Chile, where the *pobladores* insisted that their monthly payments for their lots and houses be in-

[53] Stephan Thernstrom, "The Case of Boston," *Massachusetts Historical Society*, (Autumn 1967), 114-15, and "Working-Class Social Mobility in Industrial America," mimeo., prepared for delivery at the Anglo-American Colloquium of the Society for Labour History (London, June 23, 1968), 5-6.

[54] William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements," 69-70; Talton Ray, *The Politics of the Barrios of Venezuela* (Berkeley 1968), passim.

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creased to hasten the day when they could claim clear ownership.[55] Nonetheless the combined demands of many neighborhoods can seriously strain the administrative and financial capacity of responsive city or national governments. From an economic standpoint, therefore, it is important to add that many communities have proved capable of substantial self-help programs, contributing funds and labor for a series of community improvements with or without external support. In some cities, presumably where squatters' relationship to legal authorities is unclear or insecure, neighborhood councils have also played a quasi-judicial role, adjudicating local disputes regarding boundaries, right of way, and similar issues.[56] Neighborhood councils undoubtedly are providing many of the urban poor with their first experience in limited local self-government.[57] Recognizing this potential, Chile in 1968 passed legislation that grants legal status to the neighborhood councils that had grown up spontaneously in many local-income urban areas, gives them a voice in the allocation of the (very limited) annual municipal budgets, authorizes them to borrow from the banks, and empowers them to share in other ways in urban government.

Neighborhood councils in low-income urban areas also offer political parties an organizational channel through which to reach the urban poor on a more sustained, institutionalized basis than periodic campaign tours and speeches. Whether parties take advantage of the opportunity depends largely on the national political context—on the importance of elections, the extent of the franchise, the degree of party competition, the nature of major parties' ideologies and leadership, and other factors, all of which vary tremendously. However, the political context of urban growth in Latin America, Africa, and Asia appears more likely to encourage responsiveness to or alliances with the urban poor than was the case in the now-industrialized nations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The franchise is considerably broader, if only because women are included in the electorate in almost all developing countries. Despite the immense diversity of political systems, ideas about the proper role of government and the scope of governmental responsibility for the welfare of its citizens are every-

[55] Alejandro Portes, "Los Grupos Urbanos Marginados: Un Nuevo Intento de Explicación," typescript (Santiago, Chile, June 1969).

[56] Kenneth Karst, "Preliminary Report on a Study of the Internal Norms and Sanctions in Ten Barrios of Caracas," mimeo., talk prepared for a meeting of Latin American Scholars (New York, Autumn 1968).

[57] This experience is not necessarily positive. See Daniel Goldrich and others, "Political Integration," 10-14.

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where more interventionist than in even the most progressive nations fifty years ago.

In sum, while the urban poor are unlikely to play a major political role in the developing countries, they may well prove more active than were their counterparts in the past experience of the industrialized nations. Urban marginals are likely to be more numerous relative to total urban population. They may also prove somewhat more alert and sophisticated, with greater capacity for political organization. This capacity will probably be matched, in at least some countries, with stronger interest on the part of established political groups in organizing and tapping the political potential of the poor.

III. Possible Patterns of Political Integration

The suggestions that follow are doubly speculative. Any effort to anticipate the pattern of events as they unfold is necessarily speculative. But even early returns can provide useful clues to eventual outcomes. Hence my second disclaimer: what follows are preliminary hypotheses, supported by general structural considerations but not yet tested against available evidence.

I start from the assumption that in most developing countries the urban poor are at best weakly integrated politically. This need not mean that they are alienated from the system. It may mean merely that few among them have much interest in politics, or perceive politics as relevant to their interests. They may regard the government as legitimate (or at least not illegitimate) but (probably quite realistically) view politics and politicians cynically, and discount the possibility that they themselves can influence government policies or actions. Political parties, for their part, may give lip service to the needs of the urban poor, and candidates will put in an appearance in slum and squatter areas during political campaigns. One or more parties may make a more serious effort to organize support based on patron-client relations. However, they are unlikely to alter their programs significantly, nor, if they take office, to reflect the needs of the poor in budget priorities. The exchange of individual favors for individual votes falls far short of any sustained influence on party priorities or programs.

Sharp ethnic cleavages can change this picture drastically. The easiest and in some cases the only effective way for elite or middle-class leaders in racially divided societies to expand their following is to appeal across class lines to ethnic loyalties. Race or religion transforms legitimacy into a simple, concrete, and highly charged issue, and also provides a ready link between legitimacy and bread-and-butter issues such

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as jobs. Race also provides a basis on which to appeal simultaneously to urban and rural groups whose interests and outlooks might otherwise conflict. In short, race politics operates as a powerful unifying and mobilizing force within racially homogeneous segments of the urban lower class and across class and rural-urban boundaries. However, it may be profoundly disintegrative at the national level, creating or exacerbating tensions as disruptive as and more enduring than those based on class in the absence of race cleavage.

In racially homogeneous societies, class is the more formidable barrier to political integration. In theory, one possible pattern of evolution in such a society might be the formation of class consciousness and class-based political organization. Some analysts of Latin American politics, particularly those with European backgrounds, seem to regard this possibility as not unlikely. Several surveys have attempted to detect the emergence of class consciousness among factory workers or among more marginal groups.[58]

Such a pattern seems to me improbable. The highly individual needs of the very poor plus their distrust and lack of organizational experience militate against collective organization. Kerr and Siegel's theory of isolated masses suggests that shared work experience and conditions of life, coupled with isolation from the broader society, are likely to produce unified and aggressive action.[59] But by these criteria the urban poor in today's developing nations are less likely to develop strong group consciousness than were those of yesterday's European and North American cities. A smaller proportion share the common experience of factory work; more earn a precarious living in constantly shifting day labor, with little opportunity to develop ties with their fellow workers or hostility toward a common boss. Fewer live in rented tenement rooms in solidly lower-class neighborhoods; more are housed in squatter settlements where they may have as neighbors (though not necessarily friends) aspiring lower-middle-class clerks, policemen, or teachers. Maurice Zeitlin's study of the determinants of revolutionary attitudes among Cuban workers suggests that those in occupations in which management and workers are sharply separated and have little contact are most likely to develop radical sentiments.[60] But many mar-

[58] See, for example, Alain Touraine, "Conscience ouvrière et développement economique en Amerique Latine," *Sociologie du Travail*, IX (July 1967), 229-54.

[59] Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike: An International Comparison," in Arthur Kornhauser, Robert Dubin, and Arthur Ross, eds., *Industrial Conflict* (New York 1954).

[60] Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and The Cuban Working Class* (Princeton 1967), chap. 6.

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ginal occupations such as vending or day labor involve either no management or a constantly changing series of bosses, while domestic service and artisan manufacture are characterized by close and constant though not necessarily cordial relations with employers. Germani suggests that class consciousness in Latin America is also impeded by the constant inflow of rural migrants, diluting the shared experience and attitudes of the more experienced urban poor.[61]

Several alternative patterns seem much more probable than mobilization and organization of the urban poor on a class basis. One possibility is the emergence of a strong urban populist party appealing both to urban marginals and to industrial labor, possibly in alliance with low-level white-collar groups, on a platform stressing employment, public works, housing programs, and other immediate benefits. Such a pattern is more probable where urbanization and industrialization are comparatively extensive but established parties have proved unresponsive not only to urban marginals but also to industrial labor.

A second possibility is a pattern of gradually increased responsiveness to the needs (and votes) of the urban poor on the part of one or more of the established political parties, to the point of a significant revision of party programs and organization. Such a trend would appear most likely where elections are important in the national political system, party competition is substantial, and at least one major party is disposed to seek mass support. Interest in the urban poor may reflect ideology, a calculation of electoral advantage, or a combination of the two. In Italy in the early 1960's, the Communist Party recognized the political potential of mass migration from the south into the industrial cities of the north, reversed its earlier position endorsing restrictions on migration, and made an all-out play for the migrants' votes.[62] The Christian Democrats followed suit, but only after a lag. In Chile, also, the Communists and Socialists were first to try to capture local neighborhood councils in low-income areas of the cities; the Christian Democrats have since made a strong competitive bid. Where middle-class groups face an unyielding traditional elite, they may well seek alliance with the urban poor. In Venezuela, middle-class parties shut out of the political arena after a taste of power in the late 1940's found that they could use the power of the *barrios* to oust Pérez Jiménez in 1958. There-

[61] Gino Germani, "Social and Political Consequences of Mobility," in Smelser and Lipset, *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development* (Chicago 1966), 387.
[62] Robert C. Fried, "Urbanization and Italian Politics," *Journal of Politics*, XXIX (August 1967), 525.

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after, they competed vigorously for control of local *barrio* organizations and first claim on the loyalties of the *barrio* residents.[63]

If it is the case that the urban poor in many developing countries have more capacity for semi-autonomous local organization for limited purposes than did their historical counterparts, the possibility of direct-confrontation tactics by organized groups of the urban poor is also greater than it was in the past. A particularly clear-cut and large-scale instance occurred in July, 1968, in Lima, where squatters threatened a march on the Presidential Palace unless the government decreed that they could be issued title to their lots.[64] With the proliferation of local neighborhood councils, mothers' organizations, and similar groups, it is easy to envisage more limited demonstrations along the lines of recent protests by welfare recipients in several cities in the United States. Direct pressure for needed services or immediately relevant policy changes is not necessarily an alternative to the other suggested patterns. It could well occur in combination with them. In dominant-party, single-party, or no-party states, however, petitions and limited local confrontations over specific issues may be the sole channels available, if indeed the authorities will tolerate this degree of pressure from a relatively weak group.

IV. Conclusion

Fear of the urban mob is as ancient as cities. Concern about rapid urbanization was widespread in Europe before and during the nineteenth century. But there is little ground for belief that the swelling urban masses of today's developing nations will prove to be politically radical or violent. There is, however, some reason to expect that they may play a more active and influential role than did their historical counterparts.

The important question, then, is how and under what conditions the urban poor are integrated into these political systems. In plural societies, race, religion, or tribe is the pole around which political organization will almost certainly coalesce. In more homogeneous societies, urban political machines may well appear, transforming traditional patron-client relationships into the large-scale institutionalized trading of votes for favors. Neighborhood associations in squatter settlements offer an alternative channel of political integration, with greater potential for influence by the poor on governmental activities.

[63] Ray, chap. 7.
[64] *New York Times*, September 24, 1968.

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Or populist leaders may seek a coalition between poor urban voters and better-established working-class groups.

Any pattern of integration that gives the urban poor some significant influence on the allocation of material and human resources will alter the path (and may retard the pace) of economic growth. The political mobilization of the urban poor does, then, challenge the political systems of the developing nations. The challenge, however, is not the containment of extremist or anarchic outbursts, but the evolution of means to respond to concrete and usually moderate demands without the sacrifice of other development objectives.

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NEW TRENDS IN SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD

By ELIZABETH KRIDL VALKENIER

THE trend toward economic rationality in the USSR has not been confined to domestic issues alone. It is also manifest in the search for more advantageous and efficient procedures in foreign economic relations, specifically aid and trade with the third world. In this search for ways to secure tangible gains, Soviet relations with the developing countries are entering a new phase, in which economic considerations of profit are challenging the hitherto dominant political motivations.

Change in this area has not been as dramatic as in domestic economic policies. A critical re-evaluation began in late 1961, but it has not been capped with any announcement of sweeping reforms. It has, however, brought some new policies and much discussion that presses with mounting intensity for further innovations.

I. Re-evaluation

At the same time that the Russians began to discuss publicly the ways of reviving their lagging economy, the disastrous failures of two large-scale aid programs—those in Cuba and Indonesia—became evident. Whatever the causes and confluences, the regime reduced aid commitments to a bare minimum during 1961-1962 and started looking for better ways to realize returns on its investment.

Speaking before the 22nd CPSU Congress in October, 1961, Anastas Mikoyan informed his audience that "it will be necessary to make wide use of foreign trade as a factor for economizing in current production expenditures and in capital investment."[1] Even though he did not specifically refer to it, trade with the third world was of concern to the government. At about this time the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences set up a research group in the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System to devise indices of the effectiveness of economic relations with the newly independent countries.

Very little of the ongoing re-evaluation leaked into the open at first. There were general criticisms of autarky and equally general proposals

[1] *Pravda*, October 22, 1961, p. 8.

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to "utilize the advantages of international division of labor" to speed up domestic development.[2] Although this indicated concern over the economic costs that the policy of limited dependence on foreign trade entailed and an acceptance of the principle of comparative advantage, the time did not seem ripe for new policy moves. At the first UNCTAD in 1964, the Soviet delegates mentioned only in passing their country's readiness to conclude long-term agreements and contracts with the developing countries for specialization in different types of production. But neither they nor the documents they submitted to the Conference came up with any specific proposals to bring this about.

A possible explanation for Soviet vagueness at Geneva may have been Khrushchev's opposition to any public airing of the USSR's interest in a fair return on all the money and resources it poured into the third world. He never tired of boasting that the Kremlin valued trade with the former colonies primarily for political reasons and found it burdensome to give them economic aid. Understandably, then, it was only after his fall in October, 1964, that detailed, practical policy proposals appeared.

The first article, based on the findings of the research group working on the effectiveness of Soviet economic relations with the developing countries, was published in February, 1965;[3] it was followed by several articles and at least two studies in the next eighteen months. One book discussed the planning of foreign trade and the profitability of such operations financed through long-term credits.[4] The other, written by the researchers at the Institute of the Economy of the World Socialist System, offered recommendations for stabilizing and expanding ties with the developing countries through closer economic integration.[5]

Basically these works proposed a precise economic rationale for Soviet dealings with the developing countries through integrating the allocation of aid with the expansion of trade. They viewed aid-giving primarily as an alternative to domestic investment and argued that it would be cheaper for the USSR to import certain goods and ma-

[2] V. Sergeev, "K voprosu kategorii vsemirnyi rynok" [On the problem of the world market], *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, No. 4 (April 1963), 17-24. S. Stepanov, "Sotsialisticheskoe vosproizvodstvo i vneshniaya torgovlia" [Socialist production and foreign trade], *ibid.*, 1 (January 1962), 3-10.

[3] L. Zevin, "Vzaimnaya vygoda ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Mutual benefits in the cooperation between the socialist and the developing countries], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, 11 (February 1965), 72-83.

[4] B. S. Baranov, ed., *Vneshniaya torgovlia sotsialisticheskikh stran* [Foreign trade of the socialist countries] (Moscow 1966).

[5] G. M. Prokhorov, *Problemy sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsia stran* [Problems of cooperation between the socialist and the developing countries] (Moscow 1966).

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terials than to produce them at home, as well as to have the East European states replace some of the raw materials they obtained from the Soviet Union by imports from Africa or Asia.

Rendering aid on such principles would involve the USSR in planning with the developing countries the joint extraction or processing of various natural resources and the joint production of some goods, based on long-term aid and trade commitments. The list of suitable raw materials most frequently included iron ore, lead, copper, zinc, aluminum, and petroleum. The list of manufactures has been much shorter and less explicit, usually starting with cotton fibers and textiles and quickly trailing off into unspecified consumer products and processed goods.

Pronouncements by top government figures indicated that new relations were actually being established. Reporting to the 23rd CPSU Congress in April, 1966, Kosygin claimed that cooperation with the developing countries enabled the USSR to "make better use of the international division of labor."[6] Although this may not have been so readily apparent at the time, there is enough evidence four years later to show that the Soviets are seriously working out a long-range policy based increasingly on projects that intermesh with the needs of their economy and transcend the traditional approach based on barter.

II. New Forms and Methods in Aid and Trade

Planning is visible on various levels. At the first UNCTAD, Nikolai Patolichev, the Soviet Foreign Trade Minister, did not mention planning at all. At the second, however, he not only repeated that the Soviet Union would increase its imports from the developing countries through the conclusion of long-term trade agreements and through specialization and coordination arrangements in various industries, but also added that it would take these matters into consideration in drawing up its own plans.[7]

There is no evidence of any overall coordination of production and trade, but extensive long-range planning is being introduced in Soviet relations with individual countries.[8] In October, 1968, Moscow and

[6] *Pravda*, April 6, 1966, p. 6.

[7] Interview. *New Times*, XV (April 17, 1968), 9.

[8] The East European, not the Soviet, economists have been the persistent advocates of the need to coordinate and integrate the Bloc's economic relations with the third world. Cf. L. Dvorzhak, "Glavnye tendentsii v ekonomicheskom sotrudnichestve sotsialisticheskikh i slaborazvitykh stran" [Main tendencies in economic cooperation between the socialist and the underdeveloped countries], *Novye yavleniya v ekonomike sovremennogo imperializma* [New phenomena in the economy of present-day imperialism] (Moscow 1963), 90-104. Even though the USSR and the East European

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Teheran agreed to work out twelve- to fifteen-year projections for increased economic collaboration and trade based on their natural resources as well as other economic and technical potentials. Similarly, a year earlier, Pakistan and Russia had decided to "draft a plan on a further substantial increase in economic cooperation and trade" extending to 1975. In India the 1968 talks on cooperation in industrial production and dovetailing these projects with a long-term trade agreement and the plans of the two countries have faltered because of the poor production record of Soviet-aided projects in the public sector. The agreement that was finally concluded in December, 1968, committed the USSR to buying certain Indian products more to pull India out of economic difficulties than to provide the Soviet Union with vitally needed goods.[9]

Such arrangements go far beyond the simple Soviet commitment to provide aid for constructing a given number of projects in a country's forthcoming plan, as had been the case hitherto. They involve a certain amount of economic integration, based on coordinating relevant aspects of the Soviet plan with those of the recipient. Increasingly, Soviet experts helping the developing countries in drawing up their plans or concluding aid agreements with them will be seeking areas open to closer coordination, such as the joint production of raw materials and manufactures and the setting up of mixed companies and assembly plants. Permanent administrative machinery to institute and supervise closer economic relations between the USSR and other countries is being created. Joint permanent commissions, composed of high-level officials and experts, have recently been set up with India, the UAR, Iran, Algeria, Morocco, and Afghanistan to facilitate consultations and planning. For example, it is the Soviet-Iranian commission that is working out, together with the planners of both countries, the prospects for long-range collaboration mentioned above. The meetings of these joint commissions are no *pro forma* gatherings. They are hard-working ses-

states have been participating in the construction of a number of large aid projects, collaboration seems to be limited to subcontracting, and there has been no mention of any office within CEMA that might work on or administer a multilateral approach. However, the East European states are beginning to innovate on their own. Poland, Hungary, and Rumania have committed themselves in their 1969 trade plans with India to trilateral import arrangements and have agreed to consider transferability of funds. *Weekly India News*, No. 36 (November 22, 1968), 3. At present the Soviets are only discussing the desirability of departing from bilateralism in trade with the developing countries and of setting up multilateral clearing accounts within the Bloc. V. Savelev, "Obmen mezhdu razvivayushchimisia i sotsialisticheskimi stranami" [Exchanges between the developing and the socialist countries], *Ekonomicheskie nauki*, 1 (January 1968), 58-64.

[9] I. Temirskii, "Moscow and Delhi," *New Times*, v (Feb. 5, 1969), 10-11.

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sions, lasting as long as two weeks, at which supplementary agreements are signed.[10]

Thus far, the Soviets have been mainly active in the *joint production of raw materials*. Geological prospecting figures very prominently in Soviet aid. In some cases, Syria and India for example, the discovery of oil deposits has been followed up with additional aid for its extraction and commercial exploitation. Increasingly, a third step provides for direct Soviet utilization of the raw material and even for Soviet marketing of the product. After Soviet geologists discovered rich natural-gas deposits in Afghanistan, an agreement was signed in October, 1963, to deliver a large part of the output to the Soviet Union in repayment for aid in extracting the gas and constructing a pipeline to the Soviet border. (In May, 1967, just before the pipeline was opened, Afghanistan agreed to supply 58 billion cubic meters through 1985, not only to repay the debts incurred in this venture but also to finance additional trade.)

In cases where the USSR has not helped to locate natural resources, Moscow is willing to accept raw materials in exchange for aid. Under the terms of the January, 1966, agreement, Iran pays with natural gas for Soviet aid in the construction of a steel mill, a machine-tool plant, and part of the pipeline to the Soviet border. (Shipments are to start in 1970, and by 1975 the annual volume is to amount to 15 billion cubic meters.) Under the terms of the June, 1969, agreement with the Iraqi National Oil Company, the USSR will provide equipment and technicians to develop the oil fields, as well as help in marketing, in return for Iraqi oil.

By the Soviets' own admission, the additional supply of natural gas enables them to alleviate the fuel shortage in the Central Asian republics.[11] But what remains unmentioned is that it also frees considerable amounts of natural gas produced in European Russia for export to the West in exchange for scarce industrial products. In June, 1968, Moscow contracted to export natural gas to Austria in exchange for large-diameter pipes. As for the Iraqi oil, it might either be sold through the refining and marketing companies the Soviets are setting up in Western Europe or be diverted to East Europe in order to free Soviet oil for Western transactions.

Cooperation in manufacturing has not been so much in evidence as has cooperation in the development of extractive industries. Thus

[10] Results of an Algerian-Soviet commission's meeting are reported in *Pravda*, October 27, 1969, p. 5.

[11] *Kommunist* (Erevan), September 8, 1968, p. 3.

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far, several aid agreements have provided for the repayment of credit with the finished product. The Soviet Union is already getting high-quality cotton yarn from textile mills it helped set up in the UAR. A similar agreement was concluded in March, 1968, with Uganda. Since late 1965, Guinea has been shipping canned foods to repay part of the loan for a food-processing plant.

Recently the Soviet Union has been negotiating with India on specialization and coordination in the more complex branches of industry, such as petrochemicals and fertilizers. This calls for a much more intricate and closer relation between the contracting parties than, say, that in the food and textile industries, which merely involves exporting part of the production to Russia. As of late 1969, no definite plans have emerged for the heavy-industry ventures. But India has agreed to set up a shoe factory specifically catering to Russian needs.[12] Although this falls within the light-industry category, it is nevertheless a new departure involving a higher degree of coordination, with production specifications geared to Soviet standards and needs. Soviet assistance to Algeria in the production of brandy, most of which is to be shipped to the USSR, is another instance of integration. At first, after Algeria lost much of its French market, the Russians merely offered to import increased quantities of wine.

There is much talk about getting better returns on aid and trade through new forms of partnership. Economists urge the formation of *mixed companies* as an advantageous type of investment that would also assure the USSR a steady supply of needed raw materials and industrial goods.[13] But the practical and legal aspects of partnership have hardly been discussed in print. One recent article indicated that the Soviet Union should take less profit for its share in a joint enterprise than would a Western partner, but at the same time it should obtain an unspecified but "fair" return on its investment. Moreover, the author envisaged a partnership of limited duration, with the Soviet share being gradually bought up by the assisted country.[14]

Highly-placed aid officials are considered to be hostile to this administrative and ideological innovation. The statement that, unlike the West, the USSR renders "disinterested" aid and does not seek

[12] *The Times of India,* October 5, 1968, p. 1.

[13] L. Zevin, N. Ushakova, M. Strepetova, "Ekonomicheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh gosudarstv s razvivayushchimisia stranami" [Economic cooperation of the socialist states with the developing countries], *Nova i noveishaya istoriya,* II (February 1966), 12.

[14] Yu. Shamrai, "Problemy sovershenstvovaniya ekonomicheskogo sotrudnichestva sotsialisticheskikh i razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Problems of perfecting economic cooperation of the socialist and developing countries], *Narody Azii i Afriki,* IV (August 1968), 10-13.

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any assets on the territory of other countries to derive profit at their expense has been such a cardinal principle in the Soviet aid program that it seems hard to compromise. Thus far, the Soviets have established joint trading companies with only Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Morocco, and a joint shipping line with Singapore.[15] By contrast, the East European states have no reservations and have been busy in Africa and Asia setting up joint ventures ranging from sugar refineries to copper mines.

Soviet economists believe that practical considerations will force the aid officials to look with a more tolerant eye on their proposals and to accept mixed companies for the sake of efficiency, if not of profit. Often enough in the past, a completed aid project handed over to the recipient government was either bankrupted by maladministration or offered to a Western company for management. Because of such miscarriages of Moscow's expectations, the Deputy Director of the Soviet aid agency now concedes the need for joint management as a possible form of control preferable to sending emergency teams to reorganize administration, production, and marketing.[16]

In the case of *assembly plants* there seems to be a comparable reluctance to venture into a new field. For several years, specialists have been pointing out that the shipment of unassembled machinery to the countries of the third world would make exports much more profitable, reduce transportation costs, and enable the recipients to go through an intermediate stage of industrialization.[17] But there is scarcely any mention of such projects. There is a plant in India assembling Soviet watches; negotiations are under way on assembling tractors in Morocco and in Pakistan; and an unconfirmed Western report states that the Soviet Union plans to assemble cars in Australia for re-export to Asia.[18]

Despite the obvious timidity of the Soviet trade and aid officials,

[15] In the case of the trading company in Ethiopia, the USSR supplied 51% of capital and the local entrepreneurs the rest. *Za Rubezhom*, XXIII (June 2-8, 1967), 27.

[16] D. Degtiar, "Ekonomicheskoe i tekhnicheskoe sotrudnichestvo SSSR so stranami Afriki" [Economic and technical cooperation of the USSR with African countries], *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, IX (September 1968), 2-5. For the story of how additional Soviet technicians revived the milk processing plant in Somalia see V. Bulimov, "Pervyi v Somali" [The first in Somalia], *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, XXXII (August 1968), 46.

[17] I. F. Andreev, "SSSR—krupneishii eksporter mashin i oborudovaniya" [USSR—the biggest exporter of machinery and equipment], *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, VI (June 1966), 3-9. I. F. Andreev, "Sovetskie mashiny na mirovom rynke" [Soviet machinery in the world market], *Mashinostroitel'*, IV (April 1968), 4-6. Yu. Shamrai, "Nekotorye voprosy rynochnykh otnoshenii mezhdu sotsialisticheskimi i razvivayushchimisia stranami" [Some problems in market relations between the socialist and the developing countries], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, II (April 1969), 22.

[18] "Soviet Planning Production of its Cars in Australia," *The New York Times*, July 4, 1965.

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it seems very likely that more assembly plants will be set up in the future. Such projects will promote the current drive to raise the ratio of machinery in Soviet exports. Since the Russians believe that they enjoy an advantage in the production and export of machinery, the economic directives prepared for the 23rd CPSU Congress, as well as Kosygin's speech at the Congress, called for structural changes in trade with the developing countries through expanded exports of machinery and equipment.[19]

At present complete plants account for more than 60 percent of Soviet exports of machinery to the third world.[20] However, the major importers of Soviet equipment have reached levels of industrialization that enable them to contribute substantially to plant construction on their own. India has already indicated that she is no longer interested in being presented with completed projects on a turn-key basis, as was the case with the Bhilai steel plant. Because much equipment and technical skill is now available indigenously, and will be increasingly available in the future, additional pressures are created for new forms of partnership.

Marked interest in *commercial contracts* is another aspect of the Soviet drive for more profitable relations with the developing countries. When asked about new forms of economic cooperation in the next Five-Year Plan, the Soviet aid administrator, S. Skachkov, answered that "as an independent national economy was being set up and developed in the former colonies, it was becoming increasingly possible for the USSR to establish business relations with them on a commercial basis." He cited several such contracts previously concluded: with Iran for equipping a thermo-electric station, and with the UAR for geological surveying and for the construction of vocational schools.[21]

Much has been made of the commercial loans that were granted in 1967 to Brazil and Chile to promote exports of machinery. (The four-year $100-million loan to Brazil carried a 4 percent interest; the $15-million loan to Chile was repayable over 8 years at 3 percent interest. The customary terms of the ordinary "aid" credits are 2½ percent repayable in 10-12 years after the completion of the project.) Articles and comments single out these agreements as examples of new, purely

[19] *Pravda*, February 20, 1966, p. 5 and April 6, 1966, p. 6. In 1960, the share of the developing countries in the total value of Soviet machinery exports was 11%; by 1966, it had doubled to 22.4%. Capital goods constitute a very high proportion of Soviet exports to many countries: in 1966, they accounted for 52% of exports to India, 60% to Pakistan, 39% to Iran, and 67% to the UAR. I. F. Andreev, 5.

[20] *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, VII (July 1967), 12.

[21] *Ibid.*, I (January 1966), 6.

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commercial contracts that should be concluded more frequently. Moreover, because the Russians are now willing to collaborate with India in setting up projects in third countries[22] and to sell technical assistance to private firms,[23] new opportunities for other commercial ventures are opening up.

At present, the cumbersome state monopoly over all foreign economic transactions hinders the search for business deals abroad. Trade and aid agreements are negotiated by the representatives of the Foreign Trade Ministry and the State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations. Actual work on trade orders and aid projects, ranging from surveys and designs to personnel training, is entrusted to All-Union Associations, which in turn subcontract specific jobs within the industry they represent. However, Soviet economists have been discussing the fact that in Hungary, East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia large individual enterprises are now permitted to engage in direct bids and negotiations with foreign clients, hinting thereby that similar reforms could be introduced at home.[24] However, high officials are outspokenly opposed to these proposals. The Foreign Trade Minister, N. S. Patolichev, has indicated that the regime intends to continue the central control of aid and trade transactions, having them conducted by juridically and economically independent state organizations.[25]

So far, the only concession the regime has made in the direction of involving enterprises more directly in foreign transactions was to set up, in the All-Union Associations, special advisory councils in which representatives of industry participate. Conceivably, it may not be very long before decentralization and plant autonomy reach the point where it will become possible for larger plants to bid for foreign contracts directly.

III. New Thoughts on Development

A review of new trends in Soviet economic relations with the third world would be incomplete without mentioning new views on prob-

[22] *The Times of India*, October 5, 1968, p. 1.

[23] I. Kapranov, "The U.S.S.R. and the Industrial Development of the Newly Free States," *International Affairs*, VI (June 1966), 33-36.

[24] G. Gertsovich, Yu. Shamrai, "Vneshneekonomicheskii aspekt khoziaistvennoi reformy v stranakh SEV" [The external economic aspects of economic reforms in the CEMA countries], *Voprosy ekonomiki*, IV (April 1968), 58-70.

[25] Speech in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of Soviet trade. *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, VI (June 1968), 8. Similarly, the Rector of the Foreign Trade Academy, B. Vaganov, favors continuing state monopoly of foreign trade in its traditional form to avoid competition between Soviet organizations and to save money on maintaining trade agencies abroad. *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, XXIII (June 1968), 42.

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lems of development. It is not coincidental that at the same time as the officials began to grope for more advantageous and economically viable forms of aid and trade, economists began to alter their dogmatic views on underdevelopment. Since theoretical writings produced by the various research institutes of the Academy of Sciences are far from being purely academic exercises and are often the basis for policy-making, the timing of the change indicated that the search for new forms in economic relations was supported by serious work in development economics.

The Soviet approach to the economic problems of the former colonies was unrealistically simple in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Backwardness, it was alleged, was caused by colonial rule and persisted because of unequal relations with the former metropoles. Therefore, curtailing relations with the West through nationalization, industrialization, and extensive dealings with the Socialist bloc would produce rapid growth. This political approach to development, based on the theory of "economic liberation," was pointed up by a Soviet readiness to grant aid for prestige projects or for almost any ventures proposed by a newly independent country without a prior investigation of their economic viability and over-all effects.

A new look at the process of economic growth was heralded by the publication in the September, 1962, issue of *Kommunist*, the theoretical organ of the CPSU, of several articles on the current stage of the national liberation movement. They all eschewed radicalism for a moderate, gradual approach that recognized the usefulness of light industry, of private local and foreign capital, and of noncomprehensive planning.

Since then numerous articles, symposia, and books on economic growth, on industrialization and agrarian problems, on the prospects of individual countries and continents have broadened and refined Soviet views almost beyond recognition.[26] It is now generally accepted that economic growth involves prerequisites, stages, diversification, and interrelations among the various branches of the national economy. Considerably more attention is being paid to the internal retarding factors than to the adverse effects of Western domination and other external influences. In short, analysis and evaluation are based more on economic facts than on political dogma.

A good illustration of advanced thinking on the subject is a statement by one expert on development: the more backward an economy, the wider the circle of concrete problems that will have nothing to do

[26] Elizabeth K. Valkenier, "Recent Trends in Soviet Research on the Developing Countries," *World Politics*, xx (July 1968), 644-59.

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with either socialism or capitalism but will have to be solved through certain basic, essential steps.[27]

To what extent are these trends in development economics reflected in actual policies? From scattered sources and comments we get the impression that the Russians are guided these days by pragmatic economic considerations, particularly since they give less and less of their aid for individual projects and are increasingly becoming involved in a plethora of interlocking economic activities.

Current Soviet views on *planning* can give an indication of the policy suggestions offered in the third world by Soviet experts when they help in drawing up a national development plan.[28] It used to be argued only a few years ago that effective long-range national development plans could be constructed only after the nationalization of production and the neutralization of market forces and the price system, and within the sociopolitical framework of a proto-socialist state. Nowadays such sweeping steps are frowned upon as "voluntaristic," for they ignore the actual costs and other economic realities. The Soviet Nep experience is now discussed as a possible model for Africa and Asia, and it is broadly hinted that the Soviet policies following upon that period should not be copied blindly.[29] There is serious research on the planning carried out by "capitalist-oriented states," such as Iran,[30] and it is acknowledged that they have pioneered some successful policies.[31]

Although a command economy is no longer advocated, there is quite a variety of views on the extent of central direction. Some economists still feel it necessary to stress the advantages of central controls over the market.[32] Others opt for more indirect methods and speak in terms of the state's "influence."[33] Still others argue outright that

[27] V. M. Kollontai, *Puti preodoleniya ekonomicheskoi otstalosti* [Ways of overcoming economic backwardness] (Moscow 1967), 206.

[28] The Soviets have had a hand in the plans of India, the UAR, Uganda, Afghanistan, Iran, and Algeria.

[29] N. Shmelev, "Stoimostnye kriterii i ikh rol' v ekonomike razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Cost criteria and their role in the economy of the developing countries], *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (hereafter cited as MEMO), VI (June 1968), 51.

[30] A. Z. Arabadzhian, A. I. Medovoi, eds., *Plany-programmy ekonomicheskogo razvitiya stran Azii* [Plans-programs of economic development in Asian countries] (Moscow 1966).

[31] R. Andreasyan, "New Aspects of Middle East Countries' Oil Policies," *International Affairs*, IX (September 1968), 30.

[32] *Stroitel'stvo natsional'noi ekonomiki v stranakh Afriki* [The building of a national economy in the countries of Africa] (Moscow 1968), 36-59.

[33] "Finansirovanie ekonomiki razvivayushchikhsia stran" [Financing the economy of the developing countries], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, I (January 1968), 3-20.

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the market should not be supplanted altogether by detailed central controls.[34]

With this background of recent economic literature, we can assume that Soviet experts no longer urge upon Afro-Asian countries a crude and stereotyped imitation of the Soviet experience of the 1930's, as they did for the Second Indian Five-Year Plan. After Zanzibar rejected realistic Soviet and East German advice in favor of radical Chinese proposals, the Russians must have felt vindicated when they broadcast Vice President Hanga's attribution of the failure of the plan to the "lack of proper economic justification and insufficient study of profitability."[35]

It should not be assumed that every aid decision or counsel on planning will be offered with only cost and profit considerations in mind. Soviet development literature recognizes that, especially on the macro-level, profit cannot be the only criterion for investment since social gains and future goals are often of overriding importance. But there is no doubt that Soviet experts recognize now the organizational role of costs as well as the dynamic factor of the profit motive and will try to prevail on African and Asian regimes to take them into consideration in national development plans.

Current Soviet views on the role of the state and private sectors are closely related to the changed outlook on planning. As recently as 1965, economists still argued that the larger the *state sector*, the faster and better an economy would grow. This is now definitely an outdated view. What interests specialists is the performance, not the size.

There is a frank discussion of the ills that afflict the state sector: overextension, burdensome bureaucracy, corruption, and deficit operations. However, we should not conclude that the Soviets are going to turn their backs on public ownership, which remains a cardinal tenet in Communist development theory as the proper organizational moving force. The recent criticism does not mean that the Russians will ever advise countries like India and the UAR to dismantle the public sector—merely that they are now searching for ways to make it function efficiently.

Thus far, two approaches are apparent. One method is to make careful preparations so that the state sector is not hampered by limited administrative resources. The other is to extend additional aid and technical services to existing state enterprises. In Algeria, for example, the Soviets have nothing against the eventual nationalization of the

[34] N. Shmelev, "Razvivayushchiesia strany: formirovanie khoziaistvennogo mekhanizma" [The developing countries: formation of economic mechanism], MEMO, VIII (August 1968), 52-62.

[35] Quoted in *Mizan*, IX, 5 (September-October 1967), 199.

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oil industry. In the meantime they are helping to prepare the ground by setting up a large Petroleum Training Institute in that country and by training many Algerian oil engineers in the USSR.

The September, 1967, aid agreement with Guinea specifically allocated funds only for projects meant to improve the functioning of those already built.[36] Thus, the food-canning factory that had been plagued by short supplies is going to be backed up by large tomato plantations. Similarly, in the UAR, the Russians have been advising the Egyptians to raise productivity through better use of the existing industrial capacity as well as through higher material incentives and a smaller labor force rather than undertake new construction.[37] During his January, 1968, visit to India, Kosygin was so upset by the poor performance of the Soviet-aided projects in the public sector that he promptly dispatched teams of experts to the scene. One team blamed the deficit operations and below-capacity production on inexperienced management and the lack of labor discipline and of proper material incentives.[38] As a result of several inspecting missions the 1966 credit agreement was revised in December, 1968, and some of the Soviet funds were earmarked for "raising the efficiency" of large industrial projects.[39]

The other side to recognition of the pitfalls of excessive and premature public ownership is an appreciation of the contribution that *private business* makes to the economic well-being of the new nations, provided that it does not assume the predominant position. Economists, who are now eager to draw attention to this fact, back their arguments with appropriate quotations from Lenin, who held in the early 1920's that, during the transition from small production to socialism, capitalist relations could and should play a role in increasing output.[40]

The new look at the small entrepreneur extends even further. There have been Western reports from Kabul that Russian advisers told the Afghan government to expand private enterprise.[41] Even the Communist parties of Asia and Africa are beginning to display changed attitudes, and a number of recently adopted programs urge that the climate be hospitable for small businessmen.[42]

[36] *Vneshniaya torgovlia*, IX (September 1968), 20.

[37] Hendrick Smith, "Russians Suggest Reform in the UAR," *The New York Times*, October 24, 1966. E. Primakov, "Segodnia v Kaire," [Today in Cairo], *Pravda*, April 26, 1968, p. 4.

[38] *The Hindu Weekly Review*, March 25, 1968, p. 10.

[39] I. Temirskii, 10.

[40] V. M. Kollontai, 184-95.

[41] Drew Middleton, "East Meets West in Afghanistan," *The New York Times*, May 28, 1967.

[42] See, for example, the program of the Sudanese party, *Pravda*, December 16, 1967, p. 4, and a statement of the Iraqi party, *The World Marxist Review Information Bulletin*, XIX (November 7, 1968), 16-19.

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In the last two years there has been increasingly outspoken criticism of excessive nationalization of small business carried out by the radical nationalist leaders, like Ne Win or Modibo Keita. The CPSU has singled them out as "national democrats" who are the moving force of the national liberation revolution and has sought to draw them closer into the Soviet orbit by establishing official relations with their parties. Though still held up as examples for the rest of the third world to follow, the national democrats are now often criticized for resorting to "economically unsound" reforms. R. A. Ulianovskii, who heads the Central Committee department that deals with these radicals, does not approve of nationalizing domestic trade and services, or small and medium-size industry, since most newly independent countries are neither administratively nor economically ready for these steps. Such measures only contribute to the deterioration of an already difficult economic situation.[43] Given Ulianovskii's position and training as an economist specializing in Asia, similar criticism is undoubtedly meted out in personal encounters with the government figures of the radical states.

Despite occasional thundering about the need to oust "monopoly capital," the Soviets recognize now the contribution of *Western capital* to the development of the third world, as well as the unreadiness of the new states to dispense with the Western presence altogether. What the Soviets favor is not wholesale expulsion but arrangements that recognize the sovereignty of each nation over its natural resources and leave as large as possible a share of profits at home.

In this field too, the Russians are likely to advise against hasty nationalization. Speaking before an international audience in Dakar, V. G. Solodovnikov, a prominent economist specializing in the developing countries, recalled how at the January, 1967, ECA conference he advised changing the conditions under which foreign capital was invested—mainly re-investment or limitations on profit—in the hope that such modifications "would considerably weaken the tendency toward nationalizing foreign private property."[44]

It is instructive to look at the treatment accorded in the Soviet press to the Congo-Union Minière copper agreement. It was defended in *New Times* as a "reasonable compromise" in which both sides made concessions. A reader, who termed the settlement with Union Minière

[43] "Nauchnyi sotsializm i osvobodivshiesia strany" [Scientific socialism and the liberated countries], *Kommunist*, IV (March 1968), 104.

[44] V. G. Solodovnikov, "Some problems of economic and social development of independent African nations," *II International Congress of Africanists*. Papers presented by the USSR delegation (Moscow 1967), 5, 8-9.

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a complete capitulation, was told that since the Congolese were incapable of processing and selling copper on their own, they had no other way out but to enter into a compromise agreement with foreign capital. "There is no reason to assume that such agreements are . . . instances of capitulation. Such an approach bears a strong imprint of dogmatism. In the present situation, the newly independent countries can benefit by making use of foreign capital, provided . . . that [it] is placed under strict local control and the over-all economic interests of the given country are safeguarded."[45]

Two other issues of development economics—*agriculture* and industry—have been liberated from the doctrinal approach. And Soviet aid programs reflect the change.

Since the agrarian problem is now seen in terms of output, and not in terms of ownership or management, radical land reform is no longer advocated in theoretical writings. There is now open and frank discussion of the fact that expropriation of large landowners is likely to have disastrous economic effects. R. Andreasyan, a frequent contributor to the academic journals and a member of the staff of the Foreign Trade Ministry, noting that reforms could reduce farm output, has cautioned that "carrying out land reform requires a careful preliminary analysis and weighing of all the possible economic factors." He is against the subdivision of large estates farmed by extensive methods, for their "fragmentation would impair the organization of labor which has been established and the settled crop rotation. Their profitability would decrease."[46]

Other specialists have stressed assistance to the small peasant farmers and approve the setting up of cooperative and state farms only when adequate administrative personnel and machinery are available to assure full production.[47] Since state management is no longer regarded as an answer to productivity, the report that the Soviet planning experts have suggested that their Algerian counterparts decentralize the state management of agriculture is not at all surprising.[48] For similar reasons, the Soviets no longer seem to set up state farms in order to

[45] Y. Bochkarev, "Letter to the Editor," *New Times*, XXIX (July 19, 1967), 13-14. There was a similar defense of the July 1965 Algerian-French agreement on the Sahara oil. N. Prozhogin, "Neft Sakhary" [Sahara oil], *Pravda*, November 14, 1967, p. 4.

[46] R. Andreasyan, A. Elianov, "Razvivayushchiesia strany: diversifikatsiya ekonomiki i strategiya promyshlennogo razvitiya" [The developing countries: diversification of the economy and the strategy of industrial development], MEMO, 1 (January 1968), 32.

[47] V. G. Rastiannikov, "Prodovol'stvennaya problema v razvivayushchikhsia stranakh" [The food problem in the developing countries], *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1 (January 1967), 41-42.

[48] Henry Tanner, "Algeria under Boumedienne Struggles for Stability," *The New York Times*, January 16, 1967.

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introduce radical organizational concepts. Economists refer nowadays to research and experimental stations working to improve and increase yields.[49]

This concern for farm output has been accompanied by an entirely new attitude toward aid to expand agriculture. It used to be passed over in silence, and only recently have aid officials begun to speak of it as an important contribution to development. The fact that the USSR has built and is committed to construct over one hundred projects in irrigation, land reclamation, etc. (i.e., one-sixth of all the aid projects), is often mentioned nowadays and is publicized almost as much as is aid to industry. Without doubt, Soviet advisers no longer think of progress primarily in terms of rapid industrialization. When asked about favoring either the agricultural or the industrial sector while collaborating with Algerian planners, M. Misnik, the Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, stressed their interdependence: industry was essential to modernize and to mechanize agriculture, for without adequate food production "economic independence was unrealizable."[50]

The days of one-sided preference for *industry* are over. Strange as it may sound, Russians now inveigh against an excessive build-up of heavy industry in countries like India and the UAR, which used to be, and at times still are, cited as examples of the efficacy of Soviet aid policies, whose distinguishing feature was generous credit for large industrial projects.

In discussing the strategy of development many specialists warn that impairment of the proper balance between industry and agriculture "creates bottlenecks in the economy, causes excessive stress, and in the long run leads to worsening of the general condition of economic growth." The UAR is blamed for "overstepping in the direction of industrialization." India's troubles are diagnosed as due to "inadequate attention to agriculture" and "faulty industrialization policy."[51]

It should not be concluded, however, that the Soviets have become disillusioned with industrialization. In general, Soviet economists are convinced that production of capital goods is *the* dynamic factor in development. They have merely become aware through costly experience that industries have to be carefully adapted not only to the availability of raw materials but also to the potentials of the domestic and the trends in the international market. Having assisted India to build up its steel industry, Moscow has had to bail it out of difficulties by

[49] G. M. Prokhorov, "Druzhba, vzaimoponimanie" [Friendship, mutual understanding], *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, XVIII (April 1968), 46.
[50] *Révolution Africaine*, CIV (January 9-15), 1967, p. 18.
[51] R. Andreasyan, E. Elianov, 30-31.

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agreeing in 1968 to purchase considerable quantities of steel and railway cars to dispose of unsold production and assure fuller operations in the future.

To judge from recent aid agreements, we may expect that there will be a more cautious, as well as a broader, approach toward industrialization. The marked preference for steel and metal-working over other types of heavy industry is undergoing modification. In the October, 1968, agreement with India, the USSR has undertaken to assist in a range of industrial ventures ranging from petrochemicals to cellulose. Eager now to avoid excessive and prolonged subsidization, the Soviets favor projects that are quickly self-liquidating, even though they may be less spectacular and prestigious than large complexes. The Afghan king made it a point to stress, after obtaining Soviet commitment for the Third Five-Year Plan, that the USSR had shown understanding for his country's problems and had agreed to supply aid for consumer-goods industries that quickly repay for themselves.[52]

IV. Conclusion

Though the main direction of new trends in Soviet aid and trade policies with the third world is readily apparent, its consequences are not as clear.

First of all, the new types of relations form as yet a very small part of the overall pattern of economic dealings with the developing countries. In the case of mixed companies, after four years of study and discussion, they still remain paper proposals. There is an obvious reluctance in many circles to re-allocate resources in the USSR to make a fuller international division of labor possible. Moreover, the new states conduct only about 2.5 percent of their trade with the USSR, and their share in total Soviet trade is 12 percent. Therefore, neither Soviet economic relations with the new states nor the new patterns in these relations can as yet be of decisive importance.[53]

However, the portents for the future are by no means minimal. We should not jump to the conclusion that since the USSR is beginning to treat aid and trade as a form of investment there is another field of convergence and another reason to feel relaxed about the Soviet challenge. Even when the Soviet Union enters into profitable ventures

[52] *Pravda*, June 3, 1968, p. 4.

[53] Although the degree of dependence of most developing countries on trade with the USSR and its allies has not reached a high level, it should be noted that some, i.e., Afghanistan, India, Syria, and the UAR, conduct over 20% of their trade with the Soviet Bloc and have obtained even larger percentages of foreign aid component of their development plans from the Communist states.

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in the third world, it does so on terms different from those of the West. And the difference is not lost on the developing countries. As an example we may cite their demand that Western companies enter into "Soviet-type" agreements in petroleum explorations wherein the companies must rest satisfied with mere service contracts rather than with concessions on oil lands or with the offer of crude oil, instead of cash, for their services.

Many other aspects of the new Soviet policy fit the needs and aspirations of the developing countries. Soviet willingness and ability to extend long-term aid, to correlate aid with trade, to intermesh planning, as well as to import manufactured goods, respond to the needs of new nations for long-range-program aid on a continuing basis and for expanded markets for their new industries.

The closer economic cooperation, involving as it does integration, is bound to bring the developing countries closer into the Soviet orbit. The case of Algeria illustrates that where extensive economic aid has been sensibly planned and implemented, the overthrow of a pro-Soviet regime does not lead to a collapse of an alliance. Even though the pro-Communist ideologists no longer have a say in Algerian politics, Soviet planners and experts continue to be active in Algerian economic life, and Algeria has not become noticeably more pro-Western. It seems that a well-coordinated and -executed economic penetration may produce more durable sources of influence in the unstable third world than does political infiltration.

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Review Articles

SOVIET RUSSIA
Literature and Life

By ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON

FOR nearly forty years, with great regularity, the late Vera Aleksandrova contributed articles on current Soviet literature to the Socialist Courier[1]—the émigré organ of the Menshevik party. Now her husband, S. M. Schwarz, has selected from the large number of those contributions about 120 pieces and has published them in the original Russian under the sponsorship of the Russian Institute of Columbia University.[2]

The result is a long, very significant, and in some ways unique book. One has every reason to be grateful to the editor and the sponsoring institution, and the only reproach that could be raised against them concerns their failure to include in the selection articles written between 1945 and the middle sixties. But this failure could still be remedied by issuing a second volume.

Vera Aleksandrova had a knowledge of Russian literature—both Soviet and pre-Soviet—that was both extensive and profound. Literature was the main intellectual interest in her life and she had a fine sense of its aesthetic values. Her Russian has high literary quality, with apt allusions, pithy expressions, and inventive turns of phrases—those highly significant trifles that constitute a writer's own style—flowing easily from her pen. Her language is clearly superior to that of most, if not all, Soviet authors and critics, who were her subject matter. And yet, the literary qualities of the works she was discussing were of little significance to her. She hardly mentioned the horrible deterioration of Russian literary language that took place under Stalin and had started before him. Nor did she tarry to speak of form and structure of novels

[1] *Sotsialisticheskii Vestnik.*

[2] Vera Aleksandrova, *Literatura i Zhizn', Ocherki sovetskogo obshchestvennogo razvitiya do kontsa vtoroy mirovoy voyny* [Literature and Life, Essays in Soviet Social Development until the end of World War II] (New York 1969). Let me add that my translation in the preceding title of *obshchestvennyi* by "social" is somewhat problematic. Since this is a central term in Russian intellectual history and, more specifically, is important for the understanding of Aleksandrova's thought, I shall say something more in the text about the meaning of the term and the problem of rendering it in English.

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and plays, even though from time to time, at long intervals, she would heave a sigh at the low aesthetic value of most of the works she kept reading so eagerly and so untiringly.

For what she was concerned with was the substance, the content of Soviet literature. Although she rarely said so expressly, her basic assumption throughout was that literature is a mirror reflecting—though somewhat uncertainly and imperfectly (e.g., p. 118)—the country's changing intellectual atmosphere and above all the changing position, the aspirations, and the "moods"—the latter word (*nastroeniya*)[3] being her favorite term—of social groups. Thus she regarded literature as an important source of information on the life of Soviet society, and there indeed lay a problem.[4]

It was natural for a person steeped from childhood in the works of Pushkin and Lermontov, Gogol and Turgenev, Goncharov and Pisemskii, Grigorovich and Ostrovskii, to say nothing of the later writers such as Chekhov and Gorky, Kuprin and Bunin, to view literature as an *Ersatz* for uninhibited expression of political view and candid social analysis that were stifled in nineteenth-century Russia. Literature, then, in conjunction with literary criticism was quite naturally considered an integral part—probably the most important element—of the intellectual history of the country and beyond that as the natural arena of public opinion. But could one assume that the historical continuity was unbroken and that the same view could be taken of Soviet literature?

[3] *Nastroeniya* is again difficult to translate. It actually means "convictions," "beliefs," "attitudes," and the connotation of their being something fleeting and superficial—moods in the proper sense of the word—is only vaguely implied.

[4] To underline the particular nature of the present volume, I should mention at this point that some years ago Aleksandrova published a *History of Soviet Literature, 1917-1962* (New York 1963). That book, too, reveals all her fine qualities as a writer, but its focus is very different. It deals primarily with the individual writers, their life histories, their individualities, the literary merits of their writings. She discussed there, e.g. Dostoyevsky's influence on Leonov, or Babel's creative processes, or Pasternak's use of language. The book also shows much more clearly her deep love for literature as an art that at times perhaps makes her exaggerate the achievements of writers such as Sholokhov or Alexey Tolstoy. But although there, as in the articles in the present volume, her gift for precise summaries of novels and plays is in full evidence, the nature of the summaries is very different. The social and political problems and the development of Soviet society are hardly emphasized, so that even *Doctor Zhivago* is presented mostly as casting light on Pasternak's "spiritual development" rather than on the momentous historical problems that are the substance of the novel. At the same time, one of the great charms and intriguing problems of the present volume that stem from its being a series of current, contemporaneous observations is absent from the earlier book. There naturally is some overlapping, but essentially the present volume is altogether independent. Thus the previous publication, which is a good but much more conventional history of literature, could not possibly interfere with publication of the present volume in an English translation.

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The censorship in imperial Russia of the nineteenth century was narrow-minded and oppressive, but on either score—even in its most rabid periods—it must be judged to have been a good deal less restrictive than its Soviet counterpart. A scorching piece of social criticism such as that contained in the first part of Gogol's *Dead Souls*, and particularly in Chapter 9, could never pass the hurdle of censorship in Soviet Russia. The closest approximation to Gogol's satire in Soviet Russia were the two novels by Ilf and Petrov (*Diamonds to Sit On* and *The Little Golden Calf*). There the criticism was incomparably milder and much more good-natured, and no doubt was left about the basic approval of the Soviet system; and still for a number of years Ilf's and Petrov's works were withdrawn from circulation and eliminated from the libraries. The presentation of the "nihilist" Bazarov by Turgenev (*Fathers and Sons*) has no replica in Soviet literature, unless, somewhat perversely, we might think of Kavalerov in Olesha's *Envy*, a comparison that would serve precisely to underline the tremendous difference in social significance of the two figures. Even more important is something else. The censorship in tsarist Russia was negative. As the Russian philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev once put it, no one was forced to say what he did not believe. This emphatically was not—and still is not—the situation in Soviet Russia. There what came to be known as *sotsial'nyi zakaz*—the government's buying order, that is to say, the government's request addressed to the writers—was the order of the day; and writers obediently responded to all turns and twists of Soviet policies, eager to satisfy the momentary needs of the regime, even revising previous editions of their works so as to adjust them to changing situations, or merely in response to government-inspired criticism. This was not necessarily true of the first decade after the October revolution, but it was true to some extent even then, and at any rate Aleksandrova began her critical surveys precisely at the end of that decade. It could be argued that under these conditions the chance of extracting much enlightenment from Soviet literature was not very great.

It is not surprising, therefore, that as Vera Aleksandrova embarked upon what turned out to be her life work, her first attempts were received with a good deal of skepticism. And yet, it is fair to say that now, looking in retrospect at her contribution, one is forced to admit that the original doubts were unjustified and were dissipated by the very import and impact of that contribution. There is no need to enlarge here upon the reasons for which a seemingly inauspicious enterprise proved to be highly successful. Twenty years ago, when dealing

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with Soviet literature solely as a source of economic information[5]—a very narrow approach compared with that of Aleksandrova's—I mentioned a number of factors that, despite all presumptions to the contrary, argued for the usability of Soviet literature. Suffice it to refer to the most important point, that is, to the fact that whatever the distortions and embellishments of Soviet life introduced by supine and dishonest writers, however strict the censorship in eradicating the negative aspects and in enforcing the stress on the positive—in short, however thick the resulting layer of varnish, there still remained a multitude of little revealing things so deeply ingrained in the Soviet body social that neither the writers nor their censors were conscious of their significance. And beyond that the knotty problems that were presented in literature, even though always easily, happily, and artificially resolved in the end, were in themselves an indication of conflicts and struggles, of deficiencies and incongruities, of brutalities inflicted and miseries suffered.

As I intimated before, very few of the novels and plays treated by Aleksandrova have passed the test of time. Most of them were at best mediocre, and today no reader, unless motivated by special purposes, would think of opening them. It is, therefore, all the more amazing how great was the store of revealing information contained in those now forgotten writings. Particularly impressive was the amplitude of the information, that is to say, the scope of observations offered by Aleksandrova's perusal of literature. Her material seems to cover the whole of the Soviet body social in its process of growth or deformation, as the case may be. Those who were deeply disappointed and confused by the New Economic Policy of the 1920's as well as those who profited by it; the workers in the factories; the peasants in the storms of the collectivization; the emergence of the new privileged as well as that of the new underprivileged groups; men and women in their private lives in the communal apartments of the towns and in the peasant huts in the villages; the changing relations of man to man and group to group—all these appear in the novels and plays, and it is rare indeed that some eminently human traits and situations do not become visible despite abstractly conceived actors and contrived plots.

Aleksandrova, however, was infinitely more than a recorder of revealing episodes. As S. M. Schwarz rightly stresses in his *Introduction*, the great advantage of reading these articles between two covers is that

[5] "A Neglected Source of Information on Soviet Russia" Reprinted in Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962), chap. 12.

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one understands clearly something that was much more difficult to perceive when reading the same articles as they originally appeared—at intervals and dealing with diverse subjects. It is only now that one fully appreciates that Vera Aleksandrova had a social scientist's approach to her material. She was eager to extract *generalizable* illumination from the concrete, dispersed, individual, and episodic information she found in literature. She was, of course, quite aware that her subject matter was current history, history in the making. At one point she says: "The contemporary is poorer, but at the same time richer than the historian. The great lines of the development are concealed from his [i.e., the contemporary's] eye; his vision is limited by a relatively narrow horizon. But at the same time only this actually lived life in its full concreteness, with its joys and sorrows, its desires and contradictions, provides the material without which no historian will be able to unravel the moving forces of the epoch he studies" (p. 156). There is much truth in what she says; in a sense the difficulties probably are even greater than she indicates, and I shall say something more about this presently. Yet her statement does not do justice to what she actually was able to achieve. She *was* after "the great lines of the development," and some of those lines were by no means hidden from her. The nature of the dictatorship and the function of official ideology are probably the most important problems that concern the evolution of the Soviet system. And it is with those problems that she continued to grapple.

It was natural for a contributor to the *Socialist Courier* and a member of the Menshevik party to be particularly interested in the position of industrial labor under the Soviet regime. For the same reasons, it is understandable that, among industrial workers, the fate of the older group was bound to attract her especial attention. And indeed, as her articles show, she was able to gather a good many pieces of information on the subject out of which a broad picture could be put together. It is quite surprising to find out how early the deterioration in the status of this group, the decline of its weight, was reflected in literature. Aleksandrova began to notice the change rather early, and at first it appeared as though the new petty-bourgeosie (*meshchanstvo*)[6] created during the Nep were responsible for it. But from 1929 onward, beginning, that is, with Stalin's year of the "great break," it became increasingly evident that the danger came from another quarter. As the rapid industrialization under the First Five-Year Plan proceeded to

[6] The term *meshchanstvo* again is broader than *petty-bourgeoisie*. It refers both to a social stratum and to mental attitudes which roughly may be described as "philistine." Neither term yields a perfect rendition.

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dilute the factory labor with masses of new workers brought in from the villages, old labor, the proletariat in the name of which the regime claimed to act and to speak, soon found itself in the minority and on the defensive.

The group had been largely created in the great spurts of industrialization in imperial Russia from the early 1890's on. It had been raised in the long years of struggles for higher wages, greater leisure, and improvement in working conditions. Fiction shed light on the puzzlement of the old workers when they were confronted with the policy that sacrificed the traditional workers' interests to the goal of a high rate of growth. Sometimes in drastic episodes, sometimes by hint and indirection, the novels depicted the sense of solidarity of the old laborers, their contempt for and their resistance to informers, and, most of all, their opposition to the new methods of labor intensification, to the attempts, that is, to squeeze out of them the maximum possible of surplus value, to use a phrase the members of the group had assimilated throughout their formative years. Suddenly, they found themselves surrounded by enemies. The enemies were the greenhorns, the *muzhiks*—the peasant lads—who knew nothing of the history of labor and its traditions. The enemies were the *udarniki*—the stormers—the pets of the regime, the spearheads of productivity increases. And the enemies were the managers, the directors of the factories.

It was still in 1929 that Aleksandrova detected the signs of the helplessness of old labor in the new environment. She registered, although not from one of the novels, but from one of those semifictional sketches —*ocherki*—that had been popular in Russian literature at least since the days of Gleb Uspenskii, a frank statement on new labor policy. It was made by a member of the factory committee that by 1929 was no longer the representative of the workers it once had been: "How magnificently does our press work! How wonderfully it forms, presses, educates, and squeezes together the heterogeneous elements [of the labor force]! These elements can only shriek, squeak, and squeal, but *are unable any longer* to do anything. Our press squeezes them with methodical precision" (p. 53). By the autumn of 1929, Aleksandrova was ready to draw her first important generalization. She concluded an article by saying: "Thus in the thirteenth year of the revolution more and more clearly are visible the elements of a new anti-labor ideology" (p. 54). This is indeed a significant conclusion. The contemporaneous observer might well be proud of her powers of perception. It is another matter that a historian may feel that the origins of that "anti-labor ideology" in Soviet Russia lay a good deal further back than the fateful year of

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1929, when Stalin became the undisputed general manager of the largest monopolistic corporation in the world, called Soviet industry.

Aleksandrova offered the conclusion in a somewhat tentative mood. To some extent, it was still in the nature of a working hypothesis. But from then on she kept looking for further corroborations, and did not have difficulty finding them. As industrialization proceeded and evoked a crop of "construction novels," the discontented worker became more and more frankly an object of denigration, and "positive heroes" in fiction began to compute how many man-hours could be saved if workers could be cured of the nefarious habit of starting to wash their hands a few minutes before the whistle. And thus grew Aleksandrova's collection of instances in which the average worker is presented as a hostile force who obstructs the policy of building up socialism.

Meanwhile, literature offered deep insights into the nature of the great upheaval in the villages. High in the crop of the literary treatment of collectivization stood the works of Panferov and Sholokhov, and particularly the latter's *The Virgin Soil Upturned*, and Aleksandrova devoted much attention to them. Sholokhov's novel—or rather its first part[7]—presented a most vivid picture of the life and death struggle between the peasantry and the regime, a struggle that ended with the smashing defeat of the peasants. Aleksandrova was not wrong when she said that Sholokhov's novel, despite its author's positive attitude toward collectivization, was a convincing, severe indictment thereof.

Under the combined impact of literary information on both factory and village, Aleksandrova gradually moved toward her second large generalization. However great her antagonism to Bolshevist policies, she was not opposed to the Revolution, which she regarded as a historical phenomenon of immense positive significance. Behind the horrors and bestialities of the Civil War, she tried to see the great ideas of a better society—the dreams of the exploited classes—which she considered infinitely more important than the lust to avenge past wrongs and even than the acquisition of the landlords' land. There was a line in her mind separating the Revolution from the regime that had emerged from it. As she began her surveys in the second half of the 1920's, she still believed that she saw the historical limitations of the process that she assumed to remain essentially an agrarian revolution. This view was no longer tenable in the thirties. A new and important

[7] The second part was returned to the author with request for revisions; it was not published until about a quarter of a century later and turned out to be an extremely weak piece of mediocre, if not vulgar, writing, deserving little interest.

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conclusion forced itself upon her searching mind: the classes that had made the Revolution—the proletariat and the peasantry—were stepping down from the historical stage. The proletariat was no longer the master of the new state. In 1932, by a decree of the Central Committee, RAPP—the association of proletarian writers—was dissolved, confirming in the field of literary policy the demise of the allegedly hegemonic class. But what came to replace the displaced? Again, literature provided—and this time rather seemed to provide—the answer. A new dominant class was emerging, and from characters in a number of novels Aleksandrova sketched its nature and the essential traits of its members. It was made up of the technical and managerial staff in enterprises and the bureaucrats in the agencies of the Party. Somehow close to them were also the literary fellow-travelers who for years had been the object of persecution by the proletarian writers of RAPP. Aleksandrova noticed carefully the changes in the outward appearance of the new men: the hands and the shirts were clean; the khaki field jackets—the normal attire of the revolutionary years—had given way to "bourgeois" suits whose collars were no longer soiled by dandruff. The new period was called "Anti-Nep," but the new class appeared to have assimilated in its attire and behavior some traits of the "Nep-Men." Marital habits had become stricter, at least in appearance. The modest if not ascetic tone of life of the former years was replaced by ready acceptance of comforts. "Career" used to be an opprobrious word in the Russian vocabulary, but the careerism of the members of the new group was clearly in appearance. As one of the heroes in a novel put it, there could not be anything shameful about promoting your own career when it coincided with "the career of the socialist state." A new *meshchanstvo*—a new petty-bourgeoisie—had arisen, very different from that of the Nep period, and it aspired to the ruling position within the society. A new stage had been reached, in the *obshchestvennyi* development of Soviet Russia—to use again the term that has caused me hesitation and trouble in rendering in English the title of the present book.

A brief word on the meaning of the term is indispensable at this point. *Obshchestvo* in Russian means "society" and the adjective *obshchestvennyi* in the first instance means "social." But this does not begin to exhaust the connotations of the word. It also means "intellectual," and the fairly numerous books called *istoriya russkoy obshchestvennoy mysli* had best be translated as "history of Russian intellectual thought." At the same time, *obshchestvo*—"society"—was clearly a counter-term to "state" or "government." And the derivative *ob-*

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shchestvennost' referred to the articulate sector of society, the seat of its ideologies and the carrier of public opinion. It is in this sense that Aleksandrova interpreted the change that had taken place. The new class was the new leader of Soviet *obshchestvennost'*; it represented the dominant ideology; and she perceived, at least fleetingly, the only hope of the displaced classes in the injection into the villages of teachers and agronomists who would merge with the peasantry and might form a new intelligentsia, a process that might resist the dominance of the new class and in the end despite everything still lead to a democratic consummation of the revolution. For it was idle, she thought, to expect resistance to the new class from the Politbureau and the apparatus of the state (pp. 87 and 161). On the contrary, in the official endorsement of the presentation in literature of strong, activist individuals—of doers, filled with energy and a sense of self-importance, eager for personal advancement, stern and distant with subordinates, and entirely undisturbed by the deprivations of workers and peasants—she saw the clear confirmation of her belief that in the place of the demoted proletarian ideology, the government was helping to erect "the solid edifice of the ideology of the new privileged ruling estate of Soviet Russia" (p. 122). Thus she conceived the change that occurred as a process within the *obshchestvennost'*.

It has been important to dwell on this interpretation by Aleksandrova of social change in Russia in the early 1930's, because it brings into relief both the strength and the weakness of her approach and sheds some light on both the problem of "contemporary history" and the methodological problem of using literature as a revealing source.

The strength is obvious. It was one thing to speak abstractly of the phenomenon of bureaucracy in Soviet Russia. Many did that. It was another to see the new group in its motley composition and its members, alive, in stark human concreteness with all their big and small outward and inward traits. Nowhere else except in literature could the foreign observer—and, in fact, also the citizen of the Soviet Union—obtain such a clear and convincing picture of the changes that were taking place. In this way was preserved much that was an integral part of the development but was then obliterated by the subsequent evolution. Besides, a less obvious aspect must be mentioned. The very misinterpretations by contemporary observers of what was going on are of considerable significance. For they remind us that the process of change was a highly complex one. The aspirations of what Aleksandrova calls the new ruling *estate* (using deliberately the pre-revolutionary term) were real indeed. Even so, in the field of literary policy it is important to

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keep in mind that the abolition of RAPP (April 1932), with its despotic terrorizing rulings on what Soviet literature should and what it should not be, was generally seen as a retreat of the government before the new class, adumbrating a period of greater freedom for novelists, playwrights, and poets. The literary fellow-travelers were no longer the merely tolerated "foreign bodies" in Russian literature. Men like Ilya Ehrenburg and Alexey Nikolayevich Tolstoy suddenly became full-fledged members of the new Union of Soviet Writers and were freed from the stigma of being "unproletarian." We know now that those were illusions, deliberately fostered by the dictatorship. In her English book, previously referred to, Aleksandrova had no difficulty in describing that period of alleged liberalization as a "false respite."[8] But three decades earlier the meaning of the change was not easy to grasp. The RAPP group was destroyed because they were the guardians of an inflexible ideology that would have become an obstacle in the dictatorship's policy of continually changing and adjusting the substance of its ideology in accordance with the regime's changing needs. The freedom granted was no more than a screen designed to hide the sense of the measures taken, and it did not take the dictatorship long before it embarked upon a policy of suppression of the former victims of RAPP's intolerance, except of those who knew how to prostitute their writings in the service of the regime, an art no one had mastered more shamelessly than had Count Alexey Tolstoy.

Thus, along with the strengths certain weaknesses of the approach must not go unnoticed. Precisely because the contemporary may be deceived, also the novelist and the playwright may be slow in seeing the emergence of the new. It can be argued, for instance, that the basis for the decline of the working class in Soviet society was laid long before Aleksandrova so keenly perceived its reflection in Soviet literature. Possibly it began as early as 1919, when Lenin declared: "We recognize neither freedom, nor equality, *nor labor democracy* if they are opposed to the interests of the emancipation of labor from the oppression of capital."[9] The obvious implication was that the working class was unable to recognize its own interests and had to rely on an authentic outside interpretation thereof. In some sense, it can be also said that the anti-labor ideology of the "Anti-Nep" period merged, perhaps unnaturally but nonetheless quite really, with the Nep ideology that preceded it. To say this is not at all to detract from the value of the

[8] *Ibid.*, 48.
[9] V. I. Lenin, Speech, May 19, 1919, *Sochineniya*, 4th edition (Moscow 1950), XXIX, 346.

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information on the subject that Aleksandrova was able to glean from literature. It is only to point to some of its possible limitations.

More important, however, is something else. It would seem that it is with regard to the early thirties, and particularly, to the years 1932-1934 that the fears expressed by Aleksandrova in her previously quoted passage were justified. During that period the contemporary historian, however sharp her generalizing acumen, was unable to see "the great lines of development." She saw the new class and its aspirations. She kept thinking in terms of group ideologies and changes within the Soviet *obshchestvennost'*. What she did not see was that *obshchestvennost'* no longer was the key concept to the understanding of processes of historical change in Soviet Russia. The new allegedly ruling class very soon proved to be nothing but a handmaiden of the true ruler, itself used and abused, purged and terrorized, continually molded and remolded. This failure to see at once the signs of the times is in itself of considerable interest. It was difficult indeed to understand that the traditional social categories were no longer applicable. The ideology of groups was no longer important, as the process of the subjugation of society by the dictatorship was being completed. The inertia of traditional modes of thought and of the traditional terminology is great at all times. Thus such a failure would be understandable and forgivable under any circumstances. But it is all the more so in the present case because the enlightenment came so soon.

For Aleksandrova did not have to wait for the Great Purge in order to arrive at a new and much deeper appraisal of the nature of the Soviet social and political development. By 1934, her interpretations began to change and to change rapidly. It is possible that Alexey Tolstoy's novel *Peter I* played a considerable role in influencing her thinking. As Tolstoy himself said, he conceived his treatment of Peter the Great as his personal contribution to the task of Soviet industrialization. The novel involved a revision of Tolstoy's earlier views on the Tsar as laid down in a little fragment he had published in the 1920's (*Peter's Day*). Now the negative features of the earlier piece had disappeared. The contrast between the powerful state and the impoverished, enserfed people receded far into the background. What emerged was the great national task—the great revolution—engineered by the "Tsar-Transformer," as Peter was described in Russian historiography. Aleksandrova at once perceived behind the novel the attempts at a historical justification of Soviet dictatorship and its need to establish its roots in a past that lay back far beyond the October revolution or the

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fairly short history of the modern Russian working class (p. 160).[10]

This was an important ideological revision, introducing the element of nationalism and historical continuity into the official Soviet ideology. It is the latter concept that now increasingly preoccupied Aleksandrova. She discerned in literature the reflection of Stalin's concept of "Soviet people" (p. 154)—*sovetskie liudi*—a general concept that was designed to replace the class concept, as the Soviet Union was declared to be a classless society. And in a specific sense it did become a classless society, because the interests and the ideology of the individual groups within that society were no longer operative. As Aleksandrova so rightly remarked (p. 155), "the fact that workers no longer can fight in defending their interests is an essential prerequisite for the formation of the official ideology." She spoke of the self-isolation of the dictatorship and believed that the reflection of that process in various ways was the actual subject matter of Russian fiction during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan. She was not surprised to see that the official ideology still sailed under the flag of Marxism, and she had no illusions about the falseness of that flag. Even earlier she had been amused to note the meaningless use of Marxian concepts in application to most improbable and exquisitely unsuitable areas; and she had quoted titles of papers from a variety of scientific journals: "Dialectics and the Internal Combustion Engine," "Marxism and Surgery," "Dialectical Materialism and Venereal Diseases" (p. 108). She rarely said so explicitly, but it is clear that she realized clearly that the official ideology in reality had little to do with Marxism. "The dictatorial regime," she said, "because of its very origins needs political mystique and romanticism" (p. 143).

This no doubt was a most important insight. What she must have meant is that dictatorial government—the illegitimate child of the revolution—is desperately in need of an ideology that hides its illegitimacy and vindicates its existence. It was natural for Aleksandrova, the literary expert, to arrive at this view, guided to it by the unrealism of what from the early thirties on had come to be called "socialist realism" as the dominant characteristic of Soviet literature. She quoted a speaker at the meeting of the Union of Soviet writers who declared it to be the task of Soviet literature "to *idealize* the socialist tendencies of our reality, to romanticize the new men." Thus socialist realism comes to mean "the primacy of the communist ideology over reality" (p. 162),

[10] In fact, a comparison between Soviet Russia and the epoch of Peter the Great appeared in Soviet literature even several years earlier in a novel by Leonov, and in a couple of novels by Pilnyak, but there the references to Peter were hardly more than fleeting remarks by some of the novels' heroes, and while Aleksandrova duly registered them (p. 69), she attributed then (in 1930) no particular importance to them.

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and as such a natural element of the ideology of the dictatorship. For "a totalitarian regime cannot exist without a totalitarian ideology. The ruling totalitarian group cannot but strive to present the defense of its own interest as a defense of 'the general interests' of the state as a whole. *Otherwise it would lose its claim to dominance*" (p. 239). This is a brilliant characterization of a crucially important aspect of Soviet dictatorship, and it is certainly remarkable that it was made by one who through her persistent and penetrating reading of Soviet literature was intimately in touch with the concrete reality of Soviet life.

Thus, after all, the "contemporary historian," was able to see "the great lines of development" and to see them much more clearly than many a historian of our day who enjoys the benefit of hindsight and distance. It is truly astonishing how over the short period of about two years Aleksandrova was able to shed her antiquated tools of social analysis and to abandon concepts and terms that no longer fitted the object of her studies. Actually, she never was quite able to abandon the term *obshchestvennost'*; she still used it a couple of times but combined it with the adjective "official." After what has been said before about the meaning of the term, and the dichotomy of state and society implied in it, it is clear that "official *obshchestvennost'*" is a contradiction in terms in the established usage of the word, and its use, curious as it is, only serves to underline the progress of Aleksandrova's thought and the flexibility of her mind that enabled her to perceive a new and momentous phenomenon.

It is another matter that even though her new and original insights had been largely derived from literature, at times she may have been slow in reapplying them to the works of fiction. Perhaps her treatment of the last volume of Sholokhov's *And Quiet Flows the Don* is a case in point. Aleksandrova thought highly—perhaps much too highly—of that long novel, a curious reproduction within the Soviet environment of both *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina*, all rolled into one, which incidentally so inexplicably and mysteriously deteriorates after the first volume. The point, however, is that Aleksandrova praises Sholokhov, because he failed to provide a happy ending to his novel by refusing to let his hero, Grigorii Melekhov, finally become a convinced Communist and a model collective farmer. She feels that to do so would have pleased the official Soviet critics (p. 354). I believe this is a misapprehension of the value system of the dictatorship and probably also of Sholokhov's motivation. The idea of the repentant sinner who may be more valuable than two righteous men is altogether alien to that ideology. The whole period of the Great Purge stood in the sign of unfor-

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giveness for past sins. Aleksandrova herself points it out time and again in the field of literature, when novelists were suddenly attacked and attacked viciously because of books they had published a decade or more earlier. As Leonov showed after the war in his novel *Russian Forest*, the idea of perfect biography is deeply ingrained in the ideology of the dictatorship, which after all makes very good sense. Since no biography is perfect, everybody is perennially vulnerable to exposure and retribution. To welcome Grigorii Melekhov, who had fought in the Civil War on both sides—with the Whites and with the Reds—into the fold of the system would have been an act directed against one of the carrying principles of that system; and Sholokhov very wisely refrained from doing so.[11]

Thus Aleksandrova may not have always drawn the full measure of application from her own analysis. But what she did accomplish in her treatment of Soviet fiction and above all in her magnificent broad insights into the nature of the Soviet system—insights inextricably connected with her preoccupation with literature—is admirable in the highest degree. I can only reiterate the hope that a second volume containing the articles written since the end of the war will, too, see the light of day. This would seem particularly important precisely in view of the conceptual problems raised in the present volume. Many important things have occurred in Russian literature since the death of Stalin and especially since the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party. For a time at least, a fresh breeze began to sweep away the well-established standards of conformity. Suddenly novels appeared dealing—and dealing sympathetically—with the discontent of the young generation and their protest against the "verbal fetishism" of the official ideology. The horrors of Stalinism found their way into fiction. Eternal problems of human life—love and death—began to be treated, the heroes of the novels speaking with a voice that no longer was the voice of the omnipotent and ubiquitous state. Some cautious experimenting with new genres became possible. And in general, fiction began to provide a much more truthful picture of everyday life with its problems and miseries,

[11] In Soviet literary criticism, Sholokhov's treatment of Grigorii's unhappy end is praised as revealing the "militant Communist truth" of the work, while Sholokhov's real motivation is somewhat disguised by references to "the bourgeois conditions of life" and "the world of private property" that had "crippled" Grigorii's soul. Even quotations from Engels are adduced to show both the inevitability of Grigorii's fate and the "ideological correctness" of Sholokhov's treatment of his hero. Cf. L. Yakimenko, *Tvorchestvo M. A. Sholokhova* [The Work of M. A. Sholokhov] (Moscow 1964), 264-65. Authoritative interpretations of this sort have been generally accepted and have penetrated into the run-of-the-mill college textbooks on Soviet literature. Cf., e.g., the book by a very different and very inferior L. P. Aleksandrova, *Russkaya Sovetskaya Literatura* [Russian Soviet literature] (Kiev 1964), 56.

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free of mendacious beautifications and traditional taboos. It is true that there was also simultaneous expansion of information from government publications and scholarly works as well as the greatly widened personal contacts. But fiction still provided illumination that was unobtainable from any other source, and the insights it offered were incomparably more numerous and deeper than was true of the preceding periods.

Neither in quality, nor as a source of information, nor as a vehicle of social criticism, did Russian literature of the post-Stalin years reach the levels of its great predecessor in the nineteenth century. But, for a number of years, it clearly moved in that direction. And it was particularly with regard to its critical function that the resemblance to the nineteenth century was clearest. There is no need to exaggerate the degree of closeness between the two literatures in this respect. Evtushenko's most courageous poems were still tame enough when compared to the last sixteen lines of Lermontov's violent and vitriolic outburst, "On the Death of Pushkin." But criticism, and at times bold criticism, there certainly was. And in Vera Aleksandrova's language this meant that the *obshchestvennost'*, the independent public opinion, whose voice had been silenced and which itself was dead and buried, again became an actor on the stage of Soviet social and political life. It would be enlightening indeed to be able to follow, again between two covers, Aleksandrova's attempts to interpret for us the vicissitudes of this revival as they appeared to a sharp-eyed and sharp-witted observer.

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STABILITY, TRANSFORMATION, AND REGIME INTERESTS

By J. DAVID GREENSTONE

Eric A. Nordlinger, *The Working-Class Tories: Authority, Deference and Stable Democracy*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 276 pp. $8.95.

Maurice Zeitlin, *Revolutionary Politics and the Cuban Working Class*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 306 pp. $8.50.

NORDLINGER and Zeitlin have each used survey research techniques to make insightful and important contributions to the analysis of political transformation and regime stability. Yet Nordlinger's book on British working-class Tory voters and Zeitlin's study of the revolutionary Cuban working class differ as widely in approach as do the two political systems they study. Zeitlin makes a central assumption "that the social pressures arising out of the work situation are fundamental to the workers' political outlook" (p. 221), and he concentrates on concepts such as alienation and exploitation, which Nordlinger never explicitly considers. But he pays less attention to the distinctive elements of Cuba's political tradition that contributed to the one successful socialist revolution in the Western hemisphere. By contrast, Nordlinger explicitly seeks to connect the exceptional stability of British democracy with such apparently undemocratic, but characteristically English, attitudes as social deference and acquiescence toward authority. Despite the weight of some of his own data, he only briefly considers an interpretation of working-class Labour supporters as acting rationally on the basis of their class interests.[1]

Methodologically, the books have many parallels. Each is the result of an imaginatively constructed questionnaire administered without the substantial resources of most well-known survey research projects. Both authors lucidly present their relationships in tables of percentages, but do not use statistical measures of association to help compare dif-

[1] Nordlinger infers that "highly partisan attitudes are largely a result of a predetermined set of emotional dislikes . . . the data imply that strong partisans unthinkingly accept the black-and-white view of the two parties painted by the propagandists of their own party" (p. 145). Yet the same data indicate that an association between high partisanship and low awareness, an indication of nonrational voting, is much stronger among working-class Tory voters than among working-class Labour voters—suggesting that Labour voters conform to a rationalist class-interest model. (See also table 33.)

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ferent relationships. Neither book uses partial correlations permitting simultaneous control for several variables. And the reliability of their findings suffers from their limited resources. Zeitlin's sample included only 210 workers, of which 96 percent were actually interviewed. Nordlinger had a substantially larger sample (717), but only 66 percent completed their interviews.

These methodological drawbacks are mitigated by impressive substantive contributions. Zeitlin ingeniously and often creatively tests central propositions from political sociology in the almost unprecedented setting of a radical, one-party socialist regime. (As a result, he feels it necessary to provide an extended, forceful, and on the whole persuasive argument that his respondents were not afraid to express anti-revolutionary attitudes.) In his sophisticated contribution to the literature of political culture, Nordlinger recognizes some of the difficulties in connecting behavioral indicators to basic orientations and accounting for each respondent's particular world view. Moreover, he shows a familiarity with the subtleties of causal analysis.

I

In this review I shall attempt to re-analyze their data in terms of a view that combines their concerns with system stability and transformation. To do so I shall apply the concept of *regime interest* that Paul Peterson and I have developed in connection with our analysis of the politics of poverty in American cities.[2]

To summarize very briefly, this concept assumes that—*in addition to class or group interests*—every citizen of a given polity has an interest in the maintenance of the polity's existing authority relations. This concept is grounded in the macro-sociological tradition, notably the work of Talcott Parsons, which emphasizes the sources of stability and functional coordination in modern societies. We believe this perspective accounts for significant aspects of social life, in other words, that much of the time almost all individuals participate in a number of relatively stable relationships that further the persistence of ongoing societies. Particularly in political life, these relationships involve the exercise of authority—that is, behavior patterns of command and obedience that link the political authorities with the entire body of citizens. These commands are justified by legitimating principles, which identify attributes of the political authorities, such as type of behavior or personality trait, which a substantial portion of the citizens recognize as

[2] J. David Greenstone and Paul Peterson, *Poverty and Participation* (New York, forthcoming).

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sufficient justification for obedience. Examples of such principles include popular election, traditionally ascribed status, charisma (the gift of grace), or conformity to bureaucratic or libertarian norms.

The content of this regime interest is therefore the stake that each citizen has—even if it is very small—in civil peace and in the particular pattern of public policy decisions or outputs that depend upon the stable, predictable capacity of the political authorities to obtain obedience readily. Part of the regime interest in the continuation of the authority relations thus includes the widespread acceptance of the relevant legitimating principle.

Much of the time these authority relations form the stable and largely implicit underpinning for the bargaining and conflict over policy decisions that constitute political life. The concept of regime interest, however, is particularly designed to account for those instances in which the continuation of the authority relations themselves becomes an explicitly political issue. To account for these cases we have borrowed from Ralf Dahrendorf's reformulation of the Marxist concept of class.[3] Just as an individual is *assumed* by the observer to have a class interest in his role of worker, employer, or the like, almost every individual is *assumed* to have a regime interest in his role as citizen.

The regime-interest concept does not mean that in any particular empirical case the continuation of these authority relations is "good for" each citizen. Any such generalization is altogether false. Rather, we believe that the concept can account for important aspects of political behavior by making the assumption that each citizen has regime interests, and then, as in the case of class interests, determining under which conditions he acts politically on behalf of and consistently with the interests, and under which conditions he does not.

In order to make this determination, we must distinguish between regime interests that are consciously recognized, that is, manifest, and those that are not consciously recognized, that is, latent. A regime interest is manifest when the citizen recognizes first that he benefits from an existing authority relation and second that the outcome of the conflicts in the polity will make it harder or easier for that relation to persist and for the legitimating principle to continue to be accepted. In other words, the citizen acquires an awareness of the potential effect that ongoing or likely political conflict will have on the benefits he derives from the existing authority relation. A regime interest is latent when the citizen lacks this awareness. Of course, political life may well

[3] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford 1959).

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involve quite dissimilar authority relations and legitimating principles in a single polity. And it is possible that for any one citizen, some regime interests will be more manifest than others, depending on conditions in his social, economic, and political environment.

Necessarily, an interest that is not recognized by the actor in question is imputed by the analyst. Thus the regime-interest concept is a heuristic formulation—and is imputed by the analyst—in precisely the same way as is Ralf Dahrendorf's version of the Marxist concept of class interest. Neither concept is an empirical description of attitudes, to be judged by *verification*. Rather, each concept is an approach to organizing the relevant data that is to be evaluated by its *utility* or fruitfulness in generating theoretically significant propositions that are themselves testable. Ultimately, such propositions should specify first the conditions under which latent regime interests become manifest (or manifest regime interests become latent), and second the consequences that such changes in regime interests have for system stability and transformation.

Limiting myself to the data and inferences that Nordlinger and Zeitlin provide, I shall illustrate the application of this concept in two very different contexts. In the Cuban case I shall use the concept to suggest an explanation for the elements of continuity in the Cuban political regime despite the drastic alteration of class relations under Fidel Castro: namely, that hitherto latent interests in maintaining certain authority relations became much more manifest *for the revolutionaries* in the course of their struggle against Batista. In the English case I shall attempt to lay out a possible evolution of British politics suggested by Nordlinger's data. I believe that in order to anticipate and account for this change we must assume increased manifestness of one regime interest, namely, that the government acts by universalistic and achievement standards. In turn, this increased manifestness produces a conflict with the regime interest in the maintenance of another authority pattern, that is, deference to ascriptively defined elites.

In each case, the critical development is identified as a *regime strain*. This strain can be traced to change in the manifestness of one or more regime interests of specific groups in the polity, which may take place in a number of ways. For example, increased manifestness for one group may be accompanied by a decline in the manifestness of this same regime interest for another. As we shall see, the Cuban revolutionaries acquired a more manifest regime interest in the limited toleration of dissent, while this interest became increasingly latent for the Batista government and its allies. Again, a regime interest already mani-

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fest for one group may become manifest for another. For example, a recognition by black Americans that they had an interest in the legitimation of the political authorities by elections has led to new levels of black voting, first in the north and later in the south. In turn, this participation has created powerful pressures for further social, economic, and political change. Thus regime strain is a political conflict *over the structure of authority in the polity itself* which grows out of two or more manifest regime interests perceived to be in conflict with each other. This conflict is analytically distinct from, even if empirically linked with, conflict between social factions, such as classes, over the distribution of material and psychic policy outputs.

II

Zeitlin studies not the peasant base of the Castro revolution but, as he acknowledges, the initially less enthusiastic working class. But this focus enabled him to study a presumably less monolithically pro-Castro stratum of the population and, at the same time, to test the extensive literature on worker radicalism. In the light of these considerations, one of his most impressive findings was that the substantial majority of his entire randomly chosen sample supported the Castro regime, even when ambiguous responses were systematically considered to be nonfavorable. But Zeitlin concentrated his analysis on the association between these pro-revolutionary attitudes and a number of socioeconomic variables. Support was particularly strong among black workers and those not fully employed before the revolution.[4] In addition, workers whose economic discontent had decreased since 1958 disproportionately supported the revolution. When Zeitlin then considered the phenomenon of alienated labor that Marx discussed in his early manuscripts, he found that every one of the twenty-five respondents who reported a decrease in this specific form of estrangement supported the revolution.

[4] Despite their economic and social deprivation, however, the black respondents were not appreciably more friendly than white workers to the Communist party before the revolution. But the Communists were substantially more popular among *employed* black workers than among either employed whites or unemployed blacks. Zeitlin suggests that gaining employment may have been a threshold-phenomenon that helped black workers think about their economic rather than their racial status. See p. 82. Zeitlin cites John Leggett's comparable findings on Detroit black workers. John Leggett, "Economic Security and Working-Class Consciousness," *American Sociological Review*, XXIX (April 1964), 2. See also John Leggett, *Class, Race, and Labor: Working-Class Consciousness in Detroit* (New York 1968). Zeitlin also reports that large plant size, interacting with a low ratio of administrative to production employees, encouraged pro-communism. But the argument is weakened by his having to exclude from consideration the workers in the two largest plants in his sample. These workers were particularly conservative, a fact he explains on *ad hoc* grounds.

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Zeitlin's study is not limited to these creative investigations and to the correlates of proletarian radicalism. A secondary theme throughout his book, and an explicit focus of his last chapter, is the transformation of Cuba's society *as a whole*. Yet stated systematically in terms of authority relations, Zeitlin's observations about the Cuban polity reveal a degree of continuity that contrasts markedly with the revolution's massive transformation of class relations. And this pattern is not easily accounted for by several explanations that come readily to mind. Drawing upon Zeitlin's data and insights where appropriate, I shall try to carry his analysis forward by using the regime-interest approach to explain the remarkable mixture of continuity and change he reports.

In a brief historical summary of political trends before the revolution, Zeitlin indicates that despite some considerable variation, coups and revolutions overshadowed democratic elections as the means of selecting, and, we may infer, legitimating the authority of the rulers. Zeitlin does not depict these Cuban governments as scrupulously observant of civil liberties, but there did not seem to be—at least until Batista's time—thorough, systematic repression of autonomous social groups or even radical factions. Finally, the administration of public policy was marked by a vigorous and often corrupt pluralism that included benefits to unionists, at least until the 1952 coup. But this pluralism was marked by a favoritism to groups with high inherited status or entrenched economic or political position, which radicalized some skilled workers. Observing the special benefits achieved by unionized workers in some industries, Zeitlin divided his respondents into those from privileged and less privileged industries. He then found that skilled workers in the less privileged industries were disproportionately pro-Communist. Evidently these workers resented the pluralist violation of achievement norms by which workers in the favored plants were accorded far greater benefits, although they were no more skilled.

In sum, Zeitlin's evidence suggests that at least three authority patterns, and accompanying legitimating principles, characterized Cuban politics until 1952. They included a limited tolerance of independent groups, a commitment to allocate policy outputs on the basis of economic, political, or inherited privilege, and a claim to a revolutionary mission, or at least ideology or rhetoric, which obviated the need for democratic elections. These conclusions, based on the re-analysis of Zeitlin's data, are set forth in Table 1.

Zeitlin's account suggests that the revolution replaced inegalitarian pluralism with far more universalistic-achievement standards in the administration of public policy. But in other respects his data reveal

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a remarkable continuity. Of those who expressed an opinion, more than three-fourths of his respondents *opposed* having an election "soon," a position that reliably indicated pro-revolutionary attitudes.[5] This rejection of elections by the Castro regime was consistent with a political tradition in which neither left nor right in Cuba had consistently legitimated its authority through elections. By contrast, of those workers clearly favoring the revolution (142 out of 202), only 27 percent opposed toleration for critics of the Castro regime, even though the Bay of Pigs invasion had occurred just a year before Zeitlin's interviews.[6] Indeed, limited toleration for dissent was not only an official position in 1962

Table 1

Relevant Aspects of the Cuban Political System before Castro

	Method of Selecting Political Authorities	Input Processes (Articulation of Demands)	Output Processes** (Patterns of Policy Outputs)
Specific Type of Authority Relation	"Government by coup or revolution."	Limited toleration of political tendencies which are not embraced by the government.	Inegalitarian pluralism (particularistic and often corrupt distributions of policy outputs with limited regard to achievement norms or universalistic criteria).
Legitimating Principle*	Good government is determined by the mission, ideology, or at least rhetoric of the successful insurgents (rather than by popular mandate through elections).	Good government requires some minimum level of freedom to articulate demands.	Good government involves a responsiveness to pressure-group politics and to individual self-interest forcefully articulated, and a deference to ascriptively defined social elites.

* *This row is inferred from Zeitlin's account, but not specifically asserted by him.*

** After the revolution, inegalitarian pluralism was replaced by an adherence to achievement and universalistic criteria, both as the output-authority relation and as the appropriate legitimating principle.

[5] Responses to this question form part of a five-item Guttman scale with a coefficient of reproducibility of 0.95, which Zeitlin used to determine favorable attitudes toward the revolution (p. 44).

[6] Unfortunately, Zeitlin did not report the civil-liberties attitudes of workers hostile to the regime.

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but was particularly frequent among the regime's most politically interested supporters (pp. 256 and 267 ff.) Again this position resembled the pattern of limited toleration under pre-Batista regimes.

III

How can we explain this pattern of continuity and change? Some of the obvious alternative approaches are clearly unsatisfactory. An economic-determinist explanation would expect the revolution in class relations to entail a comparable political transformation, especially the abolition of a middle-class commitment to individual freedom. If we rely on Castro's early rhetoric, we would anticipate both democratic elections and civil liberties. If we consider his later affinity for Communist nations we would expect him to have rejected both of these authority patterns. Neither expectation would be correct. We might explain the toleration of dissent through 1962 as a rational calculation of the revolutionary leadership designed in the short run to increase Castro's popularity. But among other problems, this interpretation fails to account for the libertarian commitments of the bulk of the revolution's rank-and-file supporters, and especially of the most politically interested.

Of course, scholars have frequently observed that some elements of continuity appear even in the most thoroughgoing revolutions. But such a generalization is not an explanation and, most crucially, it does not begin to account for the *dynamic process* by which some elements of the old order survive and others do not. Although Zeitlin himself spends little time analyzing his respondents' or the regime's opposition to elections, he argues that limited toleration was made possible by the weakness of Castro's opposition. But such weakness can only negatively explain the lack of incentive for repression. It cannot explain the presence of a positive commitment to toleration in a revolutionary regime that rejects democratic elections.

The regime-interest approach seems particularly helpful in explaining this positive commitment and the process by which it emerged. The change from inegalitarian pluralism obviously reflects the social commitments of the 26th of July movement, *but is not identical to them*. As Zeitlin repeatedly indicates, the grievances against the old regime extended beyond the exploitation of the lower classes by the upper classes to the special favors and privileges arbitrarily granted even to some workers as well as to the powerful, rich, or well-born. These grievances of the revolutionaries made their regime interest in inegalitarian pluralism extremely latent. They did not perceive their stake in the main-

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tenance of this authority relation, let alone the importance of political action to protect it. (They may be assumed to have a latent interest because they still behaviorally participated in a political system in which this authority relation operated.) This latent interest paralleled the merely latent class interests of the bulk of American workers before the 1930's, who behaviorally participated in the industrial work process, but embraced neither socialism nor industrial unionism. (Regime-interest analysis would not impute even a latent interest in inegalitarian pluralism to those Castroites in open rebellion. Because they cut themselves off from civil society, they did not behaviorally participate in this authority relation.)

The elements of continuity between the revolutionary regime and its predecessors would be explained by provisionally attributing—even to the movement's rebels in the mountains—a manifest regime interest in "government by coup or revolution" and in limited toleration of dissent. Presumably, the awareness or manifestness of these two regime interests among the revolution's supporters grew partly out of their need to make an explicit appeal to the masses of Cuban citizens. These citizens had been socialized into pre-Castro political regimes and had no reason to reject limited toleration or government by revolution, whatever their distaste for inegalitarian pluralism. Moreover, it seems likely that these insurgents themselves participated in authority relations, if only because they had to establish sufficient authority within their own ranks to act effectively, and in doing so drew upon their experience as Cuban citizens. For one thing, the movement claimed legitimacy as a revolt against Batista's apparently unprecedented repression of individual rights. The revolutionaries were evidently most likely to recognize the authority of leaders within their own movement if it were legitimated by this toleration. This tendency was apparently strengthened by the dominant role in the revolution of young adults. Indeed this role was so pronounced that young people were persecuted by Batista's police *because of their youth*, whether they were insurrectionary or not (p. 225). In his chapter on political generations, theoretically the most impressive in the book, Zeitlin found that Castro's greatest support came from his own peers, who became adults after 1952.

At the same time, the rigors of a long struggle with only uncertain popular support and little overt cooperation from the working class in Havana may well have strengthened the movement's commitment to its revolutionary mission as the source of its legitimacy, rather than the popular mandate of election. Again, this commitment was strengthened

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by the situation in the larger polity. Zeitlin found that Castro did not win his next-highest support from those younger workers who reached adulthood under the revolutionary regime, nor from the next-older workers who became adults during a period of union-government collaboration, the ouster of Communist union leaders, and tangible economic gains for union members. Rather, support for the revolution was higher among those workers who became adults in the 1930's, when student- and Communist-led revolutionary movements dominated the political left and apparently popularized the commitment to a revolutionary mission as a legitimating political authority.

But through what process did these regime interests become so particularly manifest for the revolutionaries? Barrington Moore argues that in societies that, like Cuba, had labor-repressive agriculture, rural entrepreneurs favored a repressive polity in order to control their workers, and thus paved the way for fascism.[7] But, as Zeitlin observes, Cuba had a feeble feudal tradition, a weak Catholic church, and, perhaps crucially, an upper class so dependent on foreigners that it could not use nationalist appeals. These social and economic facts explain not only why the ruling elite was too weak to block a tradition of limited toleration in Cuban politics, but why Castro's social revolution acquired such momentum. In turn, it was the severity of this conflict between classes that stripped authority relations of their routine character and encouraged Cuban citizens of all strata, including the revolutionaries themselves, to consider explicitly the principles that had hitherto legitimated obedience. Regime strain followed. For the Castroites, government by revolution and limited toleration became manifest regime interests, while the social, economic, and political position of Batista's supporters made inegalitarian pluralism a manifest regime interest for those supporting the old regime. The social conflict thus spread to the issue of authority relations themselves.

In sum, conflict between particular strata, as shaped by Cuba's social and economic conditions, helped determine which regime interests would be latent and which would be manifest for both the revolutionaries and their enemies. But the substantive content of the regime interests—inegalitarian pluralism, revolutionary mission, and limited toleration—must be at least in part explained by the development over time of the authority relations that patterned Cuban politics. The independent role that this analysis would leave for the political regime

[7] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston 1966), chap. 8.

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in shaping, and even contributing to, system transformation becomes still more evident when we turn to re-analyzing Nordlinger's study of the British working class.

IV

Nordlinger is concerned with working-class support for the British Conservative Party not simply because it fosters stability by reducing class tensions. Rather, the Tory workers exemplify for him the more fundamental attitudes of directiveness and acquiescence toward authority that have stabilized British politics. Specifically, British working-class political culture accepts a "pre-democratic" authority pattern, "indirectly legitimized by ascriptive criteria," which associates inherited social pre-eminence with "experiences and opportunities that are especially useful for . . . political leadership" (pp. 17 and 63). Among Nordlinger's respondents, 44 percent of the Tories and 51 percent of the Labour voters said that they would approve government policies proposed by the opposition party when in office, even if opposed by a majority of the electorate. Less than one-third of all his respondents cited majority rule as a justification for rejecting such policies. This general deference seems to have moderated the most intense class antagonisms. Class conflict was important for only 60 percent of Nordlinger's Tory respondents, and it was important for even fewer of his Labour supporters (52 percent). Moreover, "a belief in class solidarity progressively decreases with decreasing age" (p. 176 and p. 182, n. 1).

This pattern was still more typical of those respondents Nordlinger labels deferentials, that is, Tory voters who, in choosing a prime minister, would unequivocally prefer both the son of a peer to the son of a clerk and an Eton graduate to the graduate of an excellent grammar school. But working-class Conservatism also reflected other elements of British political culture, especially among the remaining Tory respondents, whom Nordlinger calls pragmatists. More frequently pro-business, more anti-trade-union than either the deferentials or Labour voters in evaluating political leaders, the pragmatists were most impressed by educational qualifications and least impressed with social connections. (Like Labour supporters, more of them preferred the Eton graduate than preferred the peer's son.) "In a fundamental sense they ought to be viewed as the most 'modern' or 'contemporary' of the three groups," committed to the "achievement norm . . . by which evaluations of others are made *solely* on the basis of their abilities" (pp. 74-75). For these workers deference was due to experts and bureaucratic officials rather than to the merely well-born.

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These findings indicate that in addition to the constitutional protection against government invasion of political and civil rights, two other important authority relations with their legitimating principles can be said to characterize British politics. In one, public policies are legitimated in so far as they treat the citizens according to achievement-universalistic criteria. In the second, the authority of the political rulers rests on a combination of deference to inherited social status and popular election by a "passive" (p. 228) though sovereign electorate. Regime-interest analysis would therefore attribute to the citizen an interest in maintaining these three authority relations together with the acceptance of their legitimating principles.

Nordlinger's emphasis on the mixture of directive and submissive authority attitudes insightfully illuminates the British polity's handling of the stresses of industrialization and class politics over past decades. And by stating this condition of regime stability, Nordlinger identifies those conditions that have forestalled political change. His analysis of stability is therefore at least the beginning of a theory of political transformation that takes the role of authority relations into account. Nevertheless, his ultimate reliance on the single directive-acquiescent variable creates two interrelated difficulties in considering potential change—difficulties that may perhaps be remedied by a regime-interest approach.

For one thing, Nordlinger appears to underestimate the independent importance of conflict between social groups such as classes. For example, Barrington Moore argues that in the British case prolonged and violent conflict among such social factions as the Crown, the aristocracy, the middle classes, and diverse religious groups directly accounts for Britain's stable constitutional democracy. Moreover, it is by no means clear that other stable democratic polities must have the same pattern of acquiescence-directiveness that Nordlinger found in Britain. For example, in his ambitious, ingenious, but only partly satisfying last chapter, Nordlinger attempts to subsume Almond and Verba's four conditions of democracy under his single acquiescent-directive variable.[8] But the United States has had a stable democracy with a much less acquiescent political culture than Britain's, partly perhaps because the factional conflict between economic classes was more diffuse and less clearly polarized than in Western Europe. Democratic stability would thus seem to depend on, at a minimum, two independent factors, consensus-cleavage among social factions and

[8] Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton 1963).

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FROM THE CONTENTS

Articles by:

Robin FOX	The cultural animal.
Elisabeth T. CRAWFORD, Albert BIDERMAN	Paper money: Trends of research sponsorship in American sociology journals.
Philip STONE, Richard BRODY	Modeling opinion responsiveness to daily news: The public and Lyndon Johnson, 1965-1968.
Alastair MUNDY-CASTLE	The descent of meaning.
Fernand BRAUDEL	History and the social sciences. The long term.

and the sections: Research on development, Theory and methods, Sociology of the social sciences, Inventories and bibliographies.

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acquiescence-directiveness in authority relations. As a result, a change in one of these variables could conceivably offset the effects of a change in another without any adverse, or favorable, net effect on democratic stability itself.

But to explain the role of authority relations in producing these quite sudden and rapid changes necessarily takes us beyond Nordlinger's rather static formulation in terms of political culture to the regime-interest concept. Nordlinger sees political culture orientations as "*stable*, internalized dispositional traits, underlying and guiding individual behavior" (p. 46, italics added). They comprise "latent, unquestioned and crucial attitudes" that are "tapped [only] in an interview situation" (pp. 55 and 54). But the very stability of these traits makes it difficult to use them in explaining rapid transformation of ongoing political systems—or even the sudden emergence of political conflict over authority relations. To be sure, regime interests, like class interests, are assumed to be generated by relatively stable patterns of behavior—in this case, relations of command and obedience that may themselves change very slowly, even though *the importance of these relations for the process of policy decisions and outputs may change very rapidly*. It is this gap between fairly stable behavioral patterns and their fluctuating political importance that the concepts of class and regime interest attempt to fill by the latent-manifest distinction. Specifically, whereas political culture changes slowly, the manifestness of the regime interest can change quickly enough to account for the rapid emergence of new conflicts and new patterns of policy outputs. Thus the regime-interest concept does not consider authority relations as political *attitudes* to be tapped in interviews. Rather, authority relations are seen as the *contingent source* of political attitudes, some of which emerge only when the regime interests become manifest.

Specifically, regime interests that are latent for some citizens may become manifest if changing political, economic, or social conditions force these citizens, as an interview could not do, to recognize the connection between prevailing authority relations and ongoing political conflicts. Evidence that some such process may occur, and contribute to the potential transformation of British politics, is tentatively provided by Nordlinger's creative division of his Tory respondents into deferentials and pragmatists.[9]

[9] Nordlinger's data also indicate that the manifestness of a particular regime interest varies with a variety of social political and psychological attributes. Tory workers often cite their low social status in voluntarily excluding themselves from key positions of leadership in Conservative organizations, an act of self-denial very possibly associated with certain personality traits (pp. 36-38). Again, Nordlinger ob-

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SPECIAL ISSUE ON TIBET

Contents

The Status of Tibet in International Law	R. P. Anand
India and the Tibetan Question	P. C. Chakravarti
India's Himalayan Frontier	T. S. Murty
China's Control of Tibet and Its Implications for India's Defence	R. Sawhny
The Institution of Dalai Lama	R. Rahul
Towards Integration: Tibet since the Revolt	G. P. Deshpande
Tibet and the Sino-Indian Impasse	Chanakya Sen
Notes and Memoranda	
China and Tibet, 1949-1959	S. H. Ahmad
Indian Opinion on the Tibetan Question	Nancy Jetly
American Public Opinion on the Tibetan Question	B. K. Shrivastava
The Soviet View of the Tibetan Situation	R. Vaidyanath
Bibliography	
India and Tibet: A Select Bibliography	Shaukat Ashraf, Manoharlal, and Kokila Shrimali
Reviews	

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In one of his most suggestive passages, Nordlinger sees a tension between the achievement and ascriptive commitments of Tory workers. In explaining the larger proportion of pragmatists than Labour supporters who see class conflict as important, he suggests as a "possible interpretation" a new class conflict that might "pit the traditional establishment types against the rising 'meritocracy'" (p. 177). But if we search out the sources of this conflict, we find that they are primarily political rather than economic issues. Despite their identification with the business community, the pragmatists, by comparison with the deferentials and Labour voters, were most likely to engage in political activism. They were also the most hostile of the three groups to partisan politics. Like the American urban reformers, they most frequently saw both parties as behaving instrumentally in search of votes and material advantage rather than "the good of the country" (p. 139). In sum, the pragmatists were the most committed to citizen participation rather than representation by either social or party elites (pp. 177, 139).

Similarly, even though Nordlinger did not find powerful class feelings among Labour voters, he did find substantial political disaffection. More Labour than Tory workers believed themselves to have no influence on governmental decisions. In all age groups, Labour voters who believed themselves to have little or no such influence were more dissatisfied than the Tories, and this dissatisfaction was greatest among younger workers (p. 98 and 103).

In terms of regime interest, the pragmatists' interest in maintaining achievement-universalism as an authority relation may be becoming particularly manifest, while their regime interest in maintaining social deference becomes steadily more latent. There is some indication that a similar process is at work among some Labour voters as well.

Given the prevailing Tory ideology, and the deferentials' pattern of latent and manifest regime interests, these findings suggest the possibility of significant regime strain, in which the character of authority relations becomes a central focus of a political conflict. This conflict would be the direct result of the decreased manifestness of the pragmatists' regime interest in social deference and the increased manifestness of their regime interest, and that of some Labour voters, in universalistic-achievement standards for public policy. Of course,

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serves that Conservative Party leaders have in fact been much more concerned with maintaining traditional authority patterns than with defending all upper-class social and economic interests. The Tories have shunned any campaign stress on their candidates' humble social origins—an ancient and often successful tactic of American conservatives—but have accepted a welfare state far more extensive than any even proposed by either major party in the United States.

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Labour and pragmatist voters remain divided by traditional issues of industrial class conflict. But if these issues continue to lose importance, a new coalition might well emerge around a new agenda of issues involving the political regime, specifically the roles and prerogatives of British citizens and the implications of universalistic norms for public policy. This new coalition would resemble the alliance of black groups in the United States with some urban reformers. It would combine protest over the grossly unequal life-chances of the British lower classes with protest over the exclusion of British citizens from active political roles. In the long run, this political struggle could produce a transformation of authority relations in which participation legitimated by popular mandate might replace deferential politics legitimated by ascribed status, and the public policies would conform more closely to universalistic-achievement standards.

Such a shift in the pattern of latent and manifest interests is a necessary but not in every case a sufficient condition for producing a political conflict over the character and legitimation of authority relations. Crucially, the precipitating factors in this case are likely to be traced in part to tensions and differences engendered by the British social structure. The American reform movement combined a belief in expertise with a democratic commitment by assuming that the citizen could act disinterestedly on the basis of expert advice, particularly given favorable institutional arrangements. As the average level of education and technical competence among British citizens increases, this point of view could prove increasingly attractive to certain social strata, especially if they are faced with recurrent and intensifying social and economic crises.

At best, Nordlinger's data can only tentatively support this reinterpretation, which, of course, may resemble those of other observers.[10] Moreover, partly because class loyalties and patterns of social deference are both far more deeply ingrained in Britain than in the United States, British workers might be less prominent than certain middle-class groups in such a new pattern of conflict, should it eventually emerge. The essential point, however, is less the precise role of the British working class than the possible effect of authority patterns that, as Nordlinger himself observes, characterize not just workers but all of Britain's social and political life. The analysis offered here, therefore, does illustrate one possible way in which changes in the manifestness of regime interests can lead citizens to perceive incompatibilities

[10] Samuel H. Beer, "The Comparative Method and the Study of British Politics," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (October 1968), 36.

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among already existing authority patterns and therefore among the principles that legitimate them.

Paradoxically enough, an increase in the recognition of an interest in maintaining distinct authority patterns would turn some citizens against other authority relations and thus promote conflict over the transformation of the political regime. This observation brings us full circle. In illustrating the use of the regime-interest concept in the Cuban case, we suggested that political regime interests shaped a social revolution. In the British case I am now hypothesizing that economic and social conditions may eventually trigger a conflict based in large part on a political element: the consciousness of different regime interests.

VI

Although much of sociological theory considers authority relations a major source of social cohesion and stability, Dahrendorf has pointed out that these relations between authorities and non-authorities also generate conflict and thus social transformation. Through the regime-interest concept, Peterson and I combine elements of each of these perspectives. We attribute to all citizens a shared interest in the maintenance of authority relations and their legitimating principles, which may become politically relevant—or lose their relevance—very rapidly. Any one polity, in other words, may have several authority relations which are not logically or conceptually consistent. Such authority patterns are more likely to coexist without regime strain if all the citizens' regime interests are not equally manifest. Accordingly, the widespread recognition of an interest in maintaining a particular authority relation, and concomitant action to preserve it, may in fact help produce substantial political change. The prevailing order is thus vulnerable not only to "contradictions" between classes or other social factions, but also among authority relations.

I have maintained here that the manifestness of any particular regime interest depends in large part on the prevailing economic and social conflicts in a particular system. But this means that to account for social change we must understand the interaction among the pattern of manifest and latent social conflict groups like classes on the one hand, and the pattern of latent and manifest regime interests on the other. Needless to say, this enterprise presents conceptual hazards as well as formidable difficulties of empirical analysis. Yet it is this intersection of shared authority relations and conflict among social factions that shapes contemporary political life.

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